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ABSTRACT. 
This submission seeks lo establish the case that this corpus of work makes a significant 
and original contribution to a central problem for social work as a profession: the status in 
relation to practice of its formal knowledge base. This issue has generated intensive 
debate, with some claiming a central place for formal knowledge in practice and others a 
more peripheral position. The debate is inconclusive, but evidence suggests that social 
workers do not generally use theory in practice. This has necessitated recourse to a 
'subconscious assimilation' thesis, but evidence from the main research studies is 
inconclusive, because of the absence of a comparison group for social workers: it was 
not possible therefore, to claim that their characteristic processes of making sense were 
distinctive. 
Two central problems provide the focus for this thesis: the extent to which formal 
knowledge is reproduced by social workers in the conduct of their practice, and given the 
range of conflicting and growing knowledge forms available to social work, principles by 
which this knowledge could be more closely and overtly related to practice. The first of 
these was analysed by a comparative analysis of the practice of social workers and 
community psychiatric nurses, drawing upon the ideas of the occupationally based 
reproduction of knowledge in practice. The second involved the development of the 
theory of emergent understanding and social science based assessment schedules, using 
the exemplar of the development and evaluation of the Compulsory Admissions 
Assessment Schedule. 
A central theme is: that formal knowledge is reproduced by social workers in their 
practice, and that in order to understand this, and further developments in the theory-
practice relationship, it is important to assign a central place to meaning. Two key issues 
emerged in the examination of practice: the occupation based development of meaning 
involving particularly the knowledge content of training and the nature of the activity -
social work - itself, upon which this knowledge is focused. Both entail issues of meaning: 
how practitioners 'make sense' of the 'stuff of their practice, and the nature of that activity 
(social work itselQ. The development of further principles and methods for relating 
formal knowledge more overtly and closely to practice was based on three key 
dimensions: the nature and limits to social science knowledge (based on a Realist 
approach), what such knowledge is being applied to (social work) and the way in which 
meaning is created - how humans characteristically make sense. The ways in which social 
workers may bring formal knowledge to practice, therefore, involves the knowledge, its 
focus and the ways in which practitioners may relate these together. The use of social 
science as a basis for social work involved a recognition that to maximise its relevance it 
needs to be, as far as possible, consistent with the nature and purposes of social work. 
This is the basis for the development of three concepts underlying practice led theory: the 
practice paradigm of social work, the principle of convergence and the principle of 
adequacy of fit . Two developments of knowledge forms were proposed: one focusing on 
process issues, the Theory of Emergent Understanding, and the other focusing on the 
produci of research, Social Science based Assessment Schedules, both of which 
encapsulate the elements of practice led theory. 
This work seeks to make a major contribution in an area of first rank importance. It 
establishes for the first lime, that social work possesses a distinctive form of practice 
consistent with its formal knowledge base. This is evident in terms of the distinctive 
psychosocial domain of social work, in which interpersonal skills have a major part. In 
the process this work draws upon a number of concepts from occupational and 
educational sociology: in particular those of classification and boundary maintenance. It 
also involves the development of major new theoretical concepts, with which to make 
sense of the conduct of practice and the development of formal knowledge. These include 
the concepts of 'reflexive eclecticism', 'progressive hypothesis development', 'comparative 
hypothesis assessment', the 'practice paradigm of social work', and the principles of 
'convergence' and 'adequacy of fi t ' . These provide significant bases with which principles 
may be developed through which a practice relevant knowledge base might be developed. 
The Theory of Emergent Understanding and Social Science Based Assessment Schedules 
present significant developments in the problem of relating theory and practice, and these 
concepts present means for further and more closely relating together the practice of 
social work and its knowledge base. 
AN E X P L O R A T I O N AND D E V E L O P M E N T O F T H E K N O W L E D G E 
F O U N D A T I O N S O F S O C I A L W O R K , W I T H P A R T I C U L A R R E F E R E N C E T O 
M E N T A L H E A L T H AND C O M P U L S O R Y ADMISSIONS A S S E S S M E N T S . 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL. 
Please Note: all references in brackets refer to publications which are the subject of this 
submission. Otherwise references are numbered. 
INTRODUCTION. 
This submission seeks to establish the case that this corpus of work makes a significant 
and original contribution to a central problem for social work as a profession: the status in 
relation to practice of its formal knowledge base. The submission establishes for the first 
time, that social work possesses a distinctive form of practice consistent with its formal 
knowledge base. This is evident in terms of the distinctive psychosocial domain of social 
work, in which interpersonal skills have a major part. In the process this work draws upon 
a number of concepts from occupational and educational sociology: in particular those of 
classification and boundary maintenance. It also involves the development of major new 
theoretical concepts, with which to make sense of the conduct of practice and the 
development of formal knowledge. These include the concepts of refiexive eclecticism, 
progressive hypothesis development, comparative hypothesis assessment, the practice 
paradigm of social work, and the principles of convergence and adequacy of fit. These 
provide significant bases with which principles may be developed through which a 
practice relevant knowledge base might be developed. The Theory of Emergent 
Understanding and Social Science Based Assessment Schedules present significant 
developments in the problem of relating theory and practice, and these concepts present 
means for further and more closely relating together the practice of social work and its 
knowledge base. 
THE ISSUE. 
A significant, perhaps the significant, issue for social work as a profession is the status in 
relation to practice of its formal knowledge or theory base. This involves the fundamental 
issue of the validity of training. Although interest has been wide ranging, attention has 
frequently been focused on social science in general, and Sociology in particular. The 
issue has been subject to intense debate, and as Sibeon and Webb have pointed out, has 
prompted an extensive reappraisal of the place of social science and sociology on the 
curriculum L The basic positions of the protagonists are well established. Opinion may be 
divided into two, admittedly disparate, groups, one sceptical and the other more positive 
about the usefulness of theory. 
Those sceptical of this formal knowledge have fallen into three broad camps: 
1. The status of social science, some believe, is uncertain. It is characterised by 
theoretical diversity, a lack of consensus, conflicting results and a poor predictive record. 
Questions exist about whether a cumulative knowledge base can ever be developed^. 
This hardly, it is thought, provides a solid base for its application to practice. 
2. Others have suggested that practitioner constraints are more significant^ than theory, 
that Sociology in particular has a critical edge undermining practice (although possessing 
some limited relevance)'^* and that social workers would do better to focus on knowledge 
of the welfare state and its resources^. 
3. A third view is that social work is centrally about understanding others, a primarily 
intuitive process, and that any formal knowledge has a subordinate status^. 
Others have been more positive. 
1. One view, by Hardiker, is that theory is implicit in practice. Although practitioners are 
frequently unaware of its use it is nonetheless critical to practice and evident when 
researched appropriately^ . 
2. Others have suggested that the 'theory gap* is in part a practice-academic culture gap, 
together with a failure to adopt consistent principles for choosing and developing 
appropriate knowledge forms^. 
3. A third view is that social science cannot be 'surgically removed' from social work, 
concerned as it is with the social world, and that micro sociology is a particulariy fruitful 
source of knowledge. Sibeon has suggested that a non reductionist and reflexive 
sociology of the middle range is most appropriate for contemporary social work^. 
One subsequent group of contributors are not concerned about whether social science 
may be applied, but how this could happen. They recognise this is not unproblematic. 
They are quite variable, ranging from those who would use middle range theory**^ to 
others who would use different methods of application according to the type of theory 
and type of practice used* * to still others who advocate reflexivity in theory use*2. 
Another group are more concerned with the language of the debate than substantive 
issues. We should, they think, examine the discourse used when considering the 
importance of theory for practice*^. They do, however, recognise a central problem in the 
'scarcity of theoretical accounting-of practice'*^. A final group, less concerned with the 
broader issue of the social work-social science relationship, have advocated the use of 
evaluative studies of social work practice as one of the best ways of developing the 
occupation's knowledge base*^. Indeed, some consider the curriculum should emphasise 
methods whose effectiveness is demonstrated*^. 
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In view of the importance of, and controversy surrounding, this issue, it has been subject 
to remarkably little research. One approach, examining practitioners' accounts of their 
practice has found little evidence of direct use of theory*^. Theory is not, according to 
these studies 'applied' knowingly to practice. In the absence of any direct theory use, 
researchers have been apt to suggest a 'subconscious assimilation' thesis whereby theory • 
informs practice without practitioners being directly aware of i t*^ A further approach, 
examined the way students attempted, with greater or lesser success, to make theory 
relevant for practice*^. The immediate concern students have with education and training 
is likely to have made the concentration on their accounts of practice more productive 
compared with more experienced and qualified practitioners. Another recent student 
study argues that the theory-practice problem was less about the issue of 'applied 
knowledge' than how practitioners construct 'good' practice from competing ideologies. 
However, this approach assumed that social workers qua social workers are able to 
choose the ideology that suits them, which takes no account of the role constraints and 
consensus assumptions of practice^O. The work most closely associated with this issue, 
finally, is Hardiker's, who sought to excavate, particulariy from probation reports, 
practitioners' implicit use of theory^l. However, this did not involve classification of 
their formal knowledge (as opposed to its practice use) and without a comparison group 
she was vulnerable to criticisms that there was nothing distinctive about social work. The 
'theory' may be no more than that available to the intelligent layperson 
Two central unresolved issues, therefore, arise from this debate: 
• The extent to which social workers can be said distinctively to reproduce theory or 
formal knowledge in their conduct of practice, and 
• The twin problems of the unfettered growth of theories or formal knowledge, which, 
according to Howe^^ involves the steady accumulation of 'unrelated relics' rather than 
real knowledge development, and the apparent failure, according lo the 'subconscious 
assimilation' thesis, of practitioners to recognise their use of theory in practice . 
These studies sought first to discover the extent to which formal knowledge was 
reproduced in practice by social workers and then to develop principles and methods by 
which formal knowledge, particularly social science, could be related more overtly, 
closely and consistently to practice. 
KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIAL WORK. 
This problematic relationship requires ftrst a theoretical understanding of its origins. This 
was undertaken in this submission through a conceptual analysis of two related issues: the 
diverse ontological and epistemological issues underlying social science, and the 
consequent disparate ways of applying social science and evaluating this application. 
Social Science 
Three major traditions of social science were identified and compared (Sheppard, 1995, 
Part 111, Introduction): Positivism, Interpretivism and Realism^^. Analysis of key 
elements of these traditions showed that their conception, broadly, of what constitutes 
knowledge differs in quite fundamental ways, which may be summarised thus: 
• For the interpretivists the issue of meaning and understanding are central; for the 
positivist they are at best peripheral; for the realist, they are the entrie to more profound 
explanations. 
• For the positivist an objective reality exists and it is observable and unproblematic; for 
the interpretivist all perceptions of the 'world' are interpetive, involving active 
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organisation by the mind; for ihc realist there is an objective reality, but it is not confined 
to (he observable. 
• For the posilivist, knowledge is objective and cumulative; for the interpretivist it is 
largely 'created' and merely an interpretation; for the realist it is provisional and theory 
soaked. 
• For the positivist, scientific interpretations will provide us with a true representation of 
reality; for the inlerpretivist, no one form of knowledge is superior to another; for the 
realist one theory may be better than another if it explains more. 
• For the posilivist the subject's viewpoint is subjective and secondary to scientific 
explanation ; for the interpretivist the views of the subjects, in social science, is what we 
aspire to discover; for the realist they are an important factor to be included in our genera! 
explanation of social life. 
Applied Knowledge. 
A critical analysis of the notion of 'applied knowledge' was undertaken within the 
framework of the dominant intellectual traditions in social work. Three traditions were 
identified: an experiential model, an 'applied social science' model and an interpretivist 
model (Sheppard, 1995, ch 8). These approaches differ not only in relation to the status of 
'knowledge for practice' but also in the way its effect in practice may be evaluated. 
Experientialism emphasises social work knowledge that is distilled from individual 
experience. On the job, experientialiy acquired practice wisdoms are here regarded as 
being of far greater importance than formal or written (professional) knowledge. There is 
a strong adherence to a belief in the uniqueness of the individual and a reluctance to 
entertain generalisations^^. A directly associated dimension is the existence of an oral 
culture which exists alongside, and whose insights are considered more profound than, 
the formal knowledge of written texts^^. 
The approach characterising Applied Social Science is one which involves the 
development of laws or principles which are then applied to practice. This involves a 
separation of theory and practice into distinct domains, and in the application of that 
knowledge, a unidirectional relationship, from theory to practice. It is an approach of 
instrumental reasoning. In its most firmly positivist form, the evaluation of practice is 
undertaken through an experimental design of empirically based outcome investigation^^ 
Intcrprclivisl approaches, focusing particularly in education and learning techniques have 
been particulariy associated with the 'transfer of leaming'^S. This emphasises meaning in 
the understanding of human affairs, active construction of views of actions and events on 
which basis individuals develop 'perspectives'. Social workers use various perspectives 
gained from the social sciences, but learning, practice and knowledge for practice are 
actively constructed by students and practitioners. Transfer of learning is facilitated 
through the development of concepts which may be applied to diverse areas of practice. 
Learning is cyclica|29 from theory to practice to theory etc. or from practice to theory to 
practice etc. The examination of practice is undertaken not through an experimental 
design, but an analysis of the range of concepts and theories used by practitioners*^^. 
THE EXAMINATION OF 'KNOWLEDGE IN PRACTICE*. 
Empirical Research. 
The question of knowledge for social work is not, therefore, simply a matter of empirical 
disagreement, but it goes to the very heart of claims about the status and application of 
social science knowledge. There is, however, a clear empirical dimension which relates to 
the extent to which formal knowledge is reproduced in the conduct of practice: to what 
extent does 'practice' reflect *theory'? Hardiker's work demonstrated that different 
'frameworks for understanding' were used by social workers. However, it was unclear as 
to what extent this reflected the 'formal knowledge' of social work, or whether this simply 
reflected, in a social work context, the categories and schemas people use in everyday 
life, which would not be inconsistent with an experiential emphasis. Crucially, there was 
a lack of a comparison group. Hence a further issue was the extent to which both formal 
knowledge and practice are distinctive to social work? 
It was noted eariier (p 6) that Hardiker's^* attempt to establish that social work practice 
distinctively reflected its formal knowledge base ultimately foundered because of the absence 
of a comparison group. Any attempt to transcend these difficulties required an analysis both of 
(1) formal theory and practice and (2) the use of a comparison group. This was undertaken by 
focusing on the work of mental health social workers in comparison with CPNs (community 
psychiatric nurses) (Sheppard, 1991). This had a number of merits. Mental health social work 
is a major element of social work practice, while providing greater specificity than an analysis 
of all aspects of social work practice; CPNs have increasingly laid claim to occupational 
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territory traditionally the domain of social work, implicitly (and explicitly) claiming similar 
competencies; yet these occupations undergo separate training leading to separate 
qualifications. The comparison group resolved the problem, in Hardiker's research, 
highlighting (potentially) distinctive elements of social work theory and practice. The study, 
therefore, involved: 
1. A comparative analysis of theory available to social workers and CPNs 
2. A comparative analysis of practice in the light of this theor>'. 
3. An examination of clients' experience of practice, focusing particulariy on skills manifested. 
The reproduction of knowledge in practice was considered important for the extent to which 
this practice 'fitted' with professional role expectations. The analysis was undertaken in the 
light of role expectations of mental health social workers. The common base for practice - a 
community mental health centre (CMHC) - involved a high level of interprofessional 
collaboration, providing a severe test of the extent to which social work practice distinctively 
reflected theory. In these circumstances we might expect, i f experience were more significant 
than formal knowledge, that the common experience of working together would be likely to 
lead to a 'convergence' between occupations in the conduct of practice. 
Methodology 
The methodology emphasised the importance of meaning in the definition and transmission of 
occupational knowledge (Sheppard, 1991, Appendix; Sheppard, 1995, ch 14; see also 
Sheppard, 1995, ch 8). Hence, first, the examination of theory, or formal knowledge, and 
practice needed to be undertaken in terms meaningful to those involved including their 
definitions of the way they conducted practice. Second, the study was characterised by two 
forms of triangulation, an approach emphasising that the combination of methods is superior to 
single methods. These were method triangulation, involving the combination of more than one 
technique, and data Iriangulation, involving the use of more than one source^^. 
The procedure involved the analysis and classification of each occupation's theory base, 
derived from a comprehensive examination of each occupation's theoretical literature. This (a) 
identified the nature and 'boundaries' of the theory bases (b) provided an analytic framework 
from which the examination of practice could be undertaken in terms meaningful to those 
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involved in the study and also to these professions generally and (c) provided a basis of shared 
meanings by which inter professional comparison could be undertaken. This was undertaken 
both in relation to their general theoretical foundation and relationship/interpersonal skills in 
particular. 
The analysis of practice was undertaken through a survey of 353 cases referred to the CMHC 
using structured self administered instruments and a quantitative approach. Survey techniques 
have been used widely in other studies^^. With appropriate methodology, Marsh^^ has 
obser\'cd sur\'eys may incorporate actors' meaning into the analysis, while handling data from a 
high number of cases. The study of theory provided an analytical framework for constructing 
the instrument's main dimensions. Detailed construction of the questionnaire was a joint 
enterprise between myself and the social workers and CPNs involved in the study. This meant 
that data collected would be meaningful for the occupations (and subjects) involved. The self 
administered nature of the questionnaire meant, furthermore, that data collected reflected 
practitioners'judgement of what occurred. This approach, furthermore, resolved the problem 
identified by Paly and Hardiker (discussed above), that practitioners do not tend to refer to 
theory in their accounts of practice. The close relationship between the definition and 
classification of knowledge and the methods for examining practice allowed the examination of 
the extent of knowledge reproduction in practice without relying on practitioners' accounts. 
This broad strategy for (he conduct of practice represented one way of identifying theory-
practice links. These links could be further examined in terms of the largely interview hosed 
interaction between worker and client, which focused on the use of interpersonal, or 
relationship, skills. These were examined through interviews with clients, since the main 
justification for their use is that skills help clients or facilitate work with them. It is to clients, 
therefore, whom we should look for skills assessments. Interviews were undertaken with a 
stratified sample of 77 clients. However, a central problem was that they would be unlikely to 
know the language of interpersonal skills - they lacked access to 'meanings' internal to the 
professions. Two solutions were used. First, client verbal accounts were subject to content 
analysis^^, based on the classification of skills identified in theory. Their lay language may 
have differed, but its content, appropriately classified, might well indicate their experience of 
skills. Through content analysis, therefore, it was possible to 'translate' clients' experiences into 
responses about skills. Second, a quantitative analysis was undertaken. This involved the use of 
a questionnaire which had a classification identical to that used by the professionals. This was 
completed with the client during the interview. It was designed to focus on communication and 
case management skills. The questionnaires, developed for practitioners, however, left a 
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problem of meaning. Differences in practitioner-client responses might arise from different 
interpretations of the same terms used in the questionnaire, or simply through a lack of 
understanding of them. They were piloted initially with ten clients, and definitions of different 
areas were provided, leaving the client to decide whether it was appropriate in their case. 
Clients found little difficulty with it, except in some technical areas of mental health, which 
given the study focus were inappropriate to exclude. Interpretation of these data was therefore, 
treated with extreme care and discussed extensively in the text. 
The Study. 
(I) The Areas of Discourse in Theory. 
The examination of theory in the study classified seven broad areas of discourse: knowledge 
orientation, practice orientation, defining the client, context of intervention, contexts specific to 
mental health, direction and duration of work with clients (Sheppard, 1991, Ch. 2). There was 
some overiap. The uncertainty of social work's social science foundations is reflected in CPNs* 
mental health models. Both borrow knowledge from other disciplines, although unlike CPNs 
social workers have also generated their own knowledge. Both also claim an interest in the 
psychosocial (although CPNs are also interested in 'bio'). Both professions, furthermore, 
recognise limits to formal knowledge and ascribe importance to judgement. However, there 
were noticeable differences also. Phenomena are defined by CPNs primarily through mental 
health models, while social work emphasises its social science knowledge base. CPNs are more 
individualistic and social work more developed in relation to their theoretical treatment of 
social environment. Finally, CPNs raise problems, such as the disadvantage-illness relationship 
with which their theory does not equip them to deal. 
(/ J) Practice. 
The issue, then was: how far were these trends reproduced in practice? Practice was, first, 
examined in relation to a survey of 210 brief and 143 extended intervention cases. This 
division reflected practice at the CMHC. Analysis of brief intervention showed differences in 
theory were largely not reflected in practice (Sheppard, 1991, Ch. 4). The main impression 
was of similarity between the groups. This was the case with mental health, social and primary 
problems identified, in roles and activities undertaken and the attribution of cause of client 
problems. Differences, in emphasis on social environment and practical problems, were the 
exception and not consistent with expectations from theory. The evidence suggested an 
explanation emphasising either (1) an uncertain knowledge base with unclear boundaries and 
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emphasis on practice based judgement, or (2) a 'seepage' of knowledge based on extended 
contact and collaboration between professions. 
However, differences were marked with extended intervention (Sheppard, 1991, Ch. 5). Social 
workers defined their clients' primary problems more frequently as social (social problem 
cases) and CPNs' as mental health (mental health cases). Social workers worked more in a 
wider community context, particulariy in relation to resource mobilising or advocate activities 
and working with outside agencies and professionals (excluding health). They tackled practical 
and emotional and relationship problems far more than CPNs, whose approach was far more 
individualistic. Social workers appeared to have a more definable 'philosophy of practice'. They 
undertook more long term work, this work was of greater intensity and there was a strong 
emphasis on psychodynamic and emotional support work. This evidence showed practice 
differences to a considerable degree consistent with theory. It also indicated greater boundaries 
between occupations than suggested by brief work. 
(J J J) Skills. 
The examination of theory on interpersonal/relationship skills also yielded notable differences 
(Sheppard, 1991, Ch. 6). In social work relationship skills, providing the 'glue' binding together 
disparate areas of practice, are considered fundamental. However, an ambivalence exists in 
nursing between interpersonal and patient (ie medical) orientations. Compared with social 
work, nursing examines skills in a fragmentary way, sometimes relatively simplistically. There 
is an expectation of a greater degree of mastery of these skills in social work and their being 
learned rather than simply innate. There is also a more consistent attempt to operationalise 
them in a detailed way. 
An empirical examination of skills was undertaken and also divided up into brief and extended 
intervention (Sheppard, 1991, chs 7-9). A number of observations were made about the use of 
these data. It was recognised that issues such as, for example, cultural background and 
experiences and a lack of knowledge of alternatives with which to compare their experience of 
intervention, may affect client responses (Sheppard, 1991, Sheppard, 1992). With both brief 
and extended intervention, social work clients identified more skills, made fewer criticisms 
about misused or unused skills and less frequently suggested that intervention made no 
difference than CPN clients (or joint clients with brief intervention). Skills were loosely 
divided into two groups. These were relationship skills, focusing on the human qualities of the 
practitioners and expert skills, broadly more 'technical'. The examination of brief intervention 
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revealed an emphasis on relationship skills. Expert skills were more frequently identified with 
extended work. With brief intervention, social work clients more frequently identified 
listening, empathic, acceptance and advice skills. With extended work, they identified, in 
addition to these skills, analytic processes, releasing feelings and increasing self-understanding. 
The results of quantitative analysis were complex, and did not point in one direction only. 
However, broadly, social work clients more frequently agreed with practitioners in their 
definition of problems. Clients of social workers were more frequently aware of activities 
undertaken, more actively involved in defining, planning and carrying out work and less 
frequently criticised practitioners for deficiencies in psychodynamic work. 
More broadly, a number of observations about skills were made. First, unsurprisingly, clients 
made comments in the light of experiences outside the practitioner's intervention. Their 
responses should be considered in this light: a positive view may reflect the awfulness of 
clients' experiences elsewhere. Second, the key skills with brief intervention were listening, 
empathy and advice. This suggested even with brief contact, clients wished for an active 
helpful response based on a 'real' understanding of them. With extended intervention, expert 
skills of information/advice, analytic processes, releasing feelings and increasing self 
understanding were more irriportant. 
The Reproduction of Knowledge. 
Cleariy, there were notable differences between the practice of social workers and CPNs 
which, to a remarkable degree, reflect differences in their 'knowledge base'. The issue, 
then was, how could we make sense of this. Conceptually, this was analysed in terms of 
work drawn from the literature on the reproduction of knowledge (Sheppard, 1995, ch 
14). This has three elements: sources of unity, sources of diversity and the orientation 
towards practical or life experience rather than formal knowledge. 
A key element was the importance of meaning in linking of formal knowledge to the 
conduct of practice. Following Weber36 a crucial aspect of making sense of social action 
is meaning: the way subjects understand situations is a central component of their actions, 
in occupations, shared meaning, often reflecting the assumptive rather than explicit 
world, are manifested in occupational culture. In occupations with significant education 
and training components, the possession and transmission of knowledge is a key 
component of shared meaning. These shared meanings may be presented in terms of 
common ways a group possesses of categorising and interpreting the world, through 
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common schemas-^^. However, as Atkinson observes^S accepted knowledge is not 
simple, objeclivc and unconlroversial, bul is classified and combined in certain ways. It is 
a cultural imposition. The work drew further on Becher and Bernstein-^^, who used the 
concepts of classification and boundary maintenance to examine the separation o f areas 
of knowledge. It is in this respect, that the curriculum can influence the extent to which 
members of a profession can have a common way of understanding situations confronted 
in their professional l i fe . The curriculum represents the means by which we can define, 
classify and structure the reality confronted in professional l i fe . In Bemstein's'^0 terms 
Classification refers to the organisation o f knowledge into curricula, or the various 
domains of educational activity. Becher^' identifies the saturation 'of epistemological 
discussions wi th spatial metaphors: fields and frontiers...charts and landmarks* in the 
discussion o f educational domains. Boundary, fo r Bernstein, refers to the external limits 
to one discipline, which differentiates it f rom others. Strong boundary maintenance can 
lead to completely different perspectives according to different occupational knowledge 
orientations. Boundary may not, Becher thinks, relate simply (o the 'edges' of subject 
matter, but also to distinctive approaches to the same subject matter. These are of three 
types: a distinction of style or emphasis, a division of labour, or difference in conceptual 
framework. 
A conceptual analysis o f sources o f diversity as wel l as homogeneity was also 
undertaken. This is of significance when attempting the empirical analysis o f the 
reproduction of knowledge through particular case examples. Bucher and Strauss^^ drew 
attention to the possibility o f 'segmentation' within occupational groups on the basis of 
specific and divergent interests. Gouldner^^ distinguished between 'locals', whose group 
loyalty is focused on the organisation and 'cosmopolitans' whose wider reference is the 
professional group. R u s c i o ^ suggests that 'either-or' formulations (heterogeneous-
diverse versus homogeneous-unified) are not he lpfu l . He writes o f un i fy ing and 
segmenting tendencies. Drawing on a biological analogy, he distinguishes the 'genotype' 
f rom the 'phenotype'. The former represents the fundamental instruction to the organism 
while the latter represents the actual manifestation in a particular physical setting. Hence 
there may be both unity and diversity within a particular occupation. Becher^^ similarly 
distinguishes convergent f rom divergent disciplines. The former are tightly knit with 
strong common values and perspectives while the latter are loosely knit disciplines 
without a clear sense of cohesion or identity. 
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The applied nature of social work raises further issues around the importance of applied 
knowledge relative to l i fe or practice experience. There may be a d i f f i c u l t y of Tit ' 
between theory and practice and formal knowledge in some areas may be absent. 
Practitioners may be reliant on their 'lay' formulations, while their 'virtualities* - the f la i r 
they show in the use of their knowledge - may be s igni f icant^ . Attitudes, as Friedson has 
observed, may also be significant: the extent to which experience rather than formal 
knowledge is valued. In medicine this has been called the 'clinical gaze' or training for 
dogmatism 47 
The analysis of practice indicated that, perhaps surprisingly, the 'knowledge boundaries' 
were relatively strong between social workers and CPNs. This, furthermore, suggested 
that 'knowledge seepage' between CPNs and social workers was relatively l imited. 
Prolonged and close contact had not led to two occupations characterised more by their 
similarities than their differences, rather the reverse. Hence, it would appear that unifying 
rather than segmenting aspects are most apparent in this comparative analysis. Indeed, i f 
experience were more significant than formal knowledge, we might have expected that 
the common experience o f working together would have rendered more similar the 
approaches of the social workers and CPNs. Yet social workers retained a distinctive 
practice reflecting the distinctiveness of their formal knowledge. 
Focus. 
While concepts such as classification and boundary maintenance provide conceptual links 
between formal knowledge and distinctive characteristics of social work practice, our 
understanding is incomplete until we relate this to the kind of activity social work is. 
Applied knowledge does not exist in some kind of 'intellectual limbo', but has a focus. 
This involved two interrelated areas o f significance. First, what is it that this knowledge 
is being applied to? what is the knowledge for? Second, how is the defini t ion of the 
phenomena with which social workers deal related to the forms of knowledge used? This 
was presented earlier in terms of roles, but this was more formal ly or conceptually 
considered in terms of social work as a socially constructed activity (Sheppard, 1995, Ch 
3). 
These issues helped contextualise the use of knowledge. Social work as an activity may 
be understood in two key ways. Social workers qua social workers deal wi th people who 
have been socially defined in some sense as socially problematic - hence their concern. 
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for example, with child abuse and mental i l lness^ . These definitions may be contested, 
but their institutional acceptance implies, within the 'assumptive world ' of social work, a 
high degree of consensus. Social work's concern w i th socially defined individuals is 
carried oi i l under the aegis of state delegated aiithorit^'^^. This is manifested largely 
through agency function, but may be more directly delegated to social workers, as with 
compulsory admission assessments (Sheppard, 1990, part I ; Sheppard, 1995, ch 3). 
Hence, i f knowledge is to be applied to practice, its focus is on people who have been 
socially defined in particular kinds of ways. Social work was further formulated in terms 
of an orientation towards the socially defined individuals as subjects and an interactional 
focus for practice. (Sheppard, 1995 ch 3) These formulations of concern, orientation and 
focus make meaningful an emphasis on interpersonal skills and a psychosocial approach 
to intervention. 
DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL WORK K N O W L E D G E 
The 'Practice Paradigm' of Social Work. 
These observations provide clues to the forms further development of formal knowledge 
for social work might take, which were explored in the work which is the subject of this 
thesis. I f knowledge is to develop in a way relevant for social work, it was argued, it must 
take account both o f the nature of social science knowledge and the focus for this 
knowledge (social work) . This work sought, furthermore, to build on the observations 
about knowledge and practice domains by examining two further issues: how can social 
workers utilise a process of reasoning which minimises the likelihood of error? and how 
can we develop a framework which w i l l allow for the incorporation of both formal and 
experiential knowledge? This, then, focused on the principles and methods by which 
formal knowledge may be related more overtly, consciously and consistently to practice, 
while recognising its l imits. A key to this was the 'excavation' o f the 'assumptive world ' 
of social work, one which provided the basis for 'practice consistent' knowledge forms. In 
this a realist approach was taken, one which characterises the assumptive wor ld of social 
work. Knowledge for social work was considerably aided by the systemisation of this 
assumptive wor ld , which was formulated in terms o f 'practice led theory'. This was 
contrasted wi th 'theory driven' practice, characterised by a conception o f social work 
unrestrained by practical constraints, as, fo r example with Marxist approaches 
'Practice led theory' had three elements: the practice paradigm of social work; the 
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principle of convergence; and the principle of adequacy of f i t . This was developed in 
Sheppard (1995) chapter 10 (see also chapters 6 and 7). 
The 'practice paradigm' of social work is assumed in practice, rather than generally 
overtly stated (Sheppard, 1995, ch 10,). Drawing on earlier chapters extensively 
analysing the senses in which need, empowerment and self determination are used in 
social work (Sheppard, 1995, chapters 6 and 7) three key dimensions were identified: an 
objectivist core to the definition of phenomena with which social workers deal (eg that 
child abuse or mental illness really and objectively exist); an approach to explanation of 
these phenomena in terms of a 'limited voluntarism'; and an appropriate focus for practice 
governed by structural constraints and which is consistent with what is described in 
academic terms by Burrell and Morgan^* as the 'sociology of regulation'. Useful 
knowledge for social work, therefore, w i l l be that which is most consistent wi th the 
'practice paradigm' of social work. A second element was the principle of convergence, 
which involved distinctions between between (a) foreground and background knowledge 
and the concepts o f (b) theoretical specificity and (c) research validity. These were 
explored in some detail in Sheppard (1995, ch 10). The final concept developed was that 
of 'adequacy of fit', to characterise in specific practice situations, the criterion fo r 
choosing between relevant forms of knowledge. 
The notions of practice led theory provided the context for the further development of 
relevant forms of knowledge. The first involved the notion of the social worker as 
'practical qualitative researcher' and the second involved the development o f social 
science based assessment schedules. Both, and particularly the first, involved the concept 
of reflexive eclecticism which characterises the Theory of Emergent Understanding. 
These original concepts were developed through extensive theoretical analysis which w i l l 
now be summarised. 
Social Workers as 'Practical Qualitative Researchers': Towards the Theory of Emergent 
Understanding. 
The theory o f emergent understanding is designed to reflect the nature and limits to 
human understanding. This was developed in Sheppard (1995, ch 9; Sheppard, 1995a). It 
characterises practice understanding and intervention as a continually emergent and 
dynamic matter. It is case based and seeks to bring together formal and experiential 
knowledge in a way which allows for the most adequate fit between the situation and the 
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social worker's understanding of it. It draws, first on the centrality of the concepts of 
meaning, social action and social interaction (Sheppard, 1995, ch 9) . Versrehen is 
interpretive understanding^^ was considered to contain three key elements: 
intuition^^^ capacity to impute m o t i v e s ^ and the capacity to understand and fol low 
rules^^. Together these constitute the internal 'psychological' and external socially 
contextualised elements o f meaning. Social action, after Weber^^^ was considered to 
occur when a social actor ascribes certain meaning to their conduct and by this meaning 
is related to the conduct of others. Social interaction occurs where actions are 
reciprocally oriented towards the actions of others. Reflexivity is a concept of further 
significance because actions are not unproblematic and may be ambiguous. Reflexivity 
describes the process by which we ascribe meaning in social interaction^^, including 
reflection on ourselves and others, monitoring acts of ourselves and others and creating 
ways of explaining situations. 
This process was formalised by drawing on concepts of categories and schemas - the 
concepts and 'naive theories' which we use to make sense in everyday life. Categories and 
schemas (from everyday l i fe) and concepts and theories (from formal knowledge) provide 
the means by which we can 'make sense' in practice situations. They may be applied in a 
search for the 'most adequate f i t ' with the situation confronted. This is achieved using a 
further process characteristic o f methods of human understanding: the creation and 
testing of hypotheses 5^. The hypothesis testing process is one which seeks to disconfirm 
our understanding o f particular situations. This is critical because of evidence that 
humans possess a 'confirmation bias' through which they seek to conf i rm existing 
hypotheses and which may lead to mistakes in practice. This is arguably highlighted by 
some child deaths when the children were under the supervision of social workers^^. 
Reflexive eclecticism, therefore, entails: 
1. The generation and incorporation o f a wide range of schemas of potential relevance to 
practice situations. 
2. The use of a retroductive approach to the process of analysis, involving high levels of 
sensitivity to disconfirming evidence. 
3. A case based focus for knowledge for practice in which the 'adequacy of fit' of schema 
or theory is the test of appropriateness. 
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It combines, therefore, the processes of making sense and reasoning. This argument was 
taken further in relation specifically to the qualitative nature of social work practice 
(Sheppard 1995a). This article argued that both interpretivist and positivisi approaches to 
social science tended, for different reasons to give the social scientist a privileged 
position, creating an unwarranted gap between social science and everyday l i f e 
understanding. Indeed the method of experimentation is not simply a matter for the lab 
scientist, but is part of the methodology of everyday l i f e ^ . Hence everyday l i fe even has 
the appropriate language. Good experimental methodology is called, in evcr>'day l i fe , 
'trial and error' - a process of hypothesis testing until the right conclusion is reached. 
Poor methodology is termed ' jumping to conclusions', where an individual derives an 
incorrect meaning f rom a situation by iiiadequately considering alternative positions. I f 
we look at the process of making sense, rather than the product of social science, there is 
rather less o f a gap between social work practice and social science than many have 
argued. 
What distinguishes social science is its greater rigour^K Practice may learn then from this 
rigour, and Analyt ic Induction, a qualitative research methodology, was used as an 
heuristic device to explore the potential for greater practice rigour. From this, two 
concepts of hypothesis testing were developed: 
• Progressive hypothesis deveiopmenn a step by step approach o f examining hypotheses 
one by one, abandoning those which confront disconfirming evidence until the one most 
adequately fitting the data is developed. 
• Comparative hypothesis assessment, where a number of competing hypotheses may be 
used to identify their ' f i t ' with the data. 
Hypothesis generation and use is efficacious because it involves a commitment to 
precision and explicitness and because it provides the focus for both social science 
knowledge and experiential knowledge. Furthermore, hypotheses contribute to the 
development of practice wisdom in two ways: where they have been found relevant fo r 
similar problems (problem relevant hypotheses) and where they are generic or 
transferable (eg loss as relevant to unemployment and bereavement). The practice 
community possessing a rigorous concern for evidence and a routine scepticism was 
characterised as possessing critical awareness, a concept based on the general application 
of refiexive eclecticism. 
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The syslemisation of our understanding of practice is therefore characterised as a rigorous 
and ref lexive exercise, which reflects the l imits to human understanding, the 
characteristic ways in which humans 'make sense' and draws upon formal and 
experiential knowledge in a case based fashion. Its Realist orientation, refiecled in the 
concept of limited understanding and 'adequacy of fit' differentiates it f rom both Applied 
Social Science and Interpretivist formulations. Its emphasis on emergence distinguishes it 
f rom the Applied Social Science model, and its systemisation of hypothesis testing, the 
search for disconfirming evidence and emphasis on 'adequacy of f i t ' distinguishes it f rom 
interpretivist models of the relationship between knowledge and practice. 
Developing Social Science based Assessment schedules. 
Social Science based assessment schedules are instruments which may be used directly in 
practice by social workers and which are based on social research. Their development 
incorporates the principles of 'practice led' theory, outlined earlier. The method for their 
development was conducted through an exemplar: research on Approved Social Work 
(ASW) practice, which led to the development of the compulsory admissions assessment 
schedule (CASH) . This reflected clearly the key elements o f 'practice led theory' 
identified eariier. This was manifested, not simply in terms o f the practice paradigm of 
social work, the principle o f convergence and that of adequacy of fit. It also involved (a) 
that the assessment schedule was structured in a way that reflected the key domains and 
categories of knowledge identified in the research and (b) that its conceptual schema 
reflected the theoretical understanding developed in the original conceptualisation and 
analysis of practice. It also involved an approach which allowed for the evaluation of the 
assessment schedule, to discover whether or not it was usable and made any difference in 
practice. These factors exemplified, in the context of a semi structured schedule for 
practice, all the key elements of practice led theory. 
The focus for this study was a particularly significant area of practice, assessment for 
compulsory admissions (sections) by approved social workers (ASWs) under the Mental 
Health Act , 1983 (the Act) . Under the Act an individual may be sectioned i f , in brief, in 
the belief o f the assessing individuals, he or she is suffering f rom a mental disorder and 
admission is in the interests o f his/her own health or safety or the protection o f other 
persons (the 'health or safety' criteria). This is a little researched area, and only Barnes et 
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have made a significant contribution. Their work focused on quantitative social and 
demographic correlates of compulsory admission. 
The central focus of this study was the interpretation, in practice of the 'health or safety 
criteria'. This involved a theoretical analysis of the role of the ASW, and an examination, 
in the light of this theory, of the interpretation by ASWs of the 'health or safety criteria' 
when undertaking section assessments. In the light of limitations identified in this area by 
the research, a new knowledge base was developed, the Compulsory Admissions 
Assessment Schedule (CASH). It was intended that the health or safety criteria would be 
more systematically and consistently applied by social workers using C A S H . This hope 
was borne out by the subsequent analysis of its use by ASWs. In broader terms, this 
involved developing an approach where social science might be more directly related to 
practice through social science based assessment schedules. 
Theoretical Approach. 
While the central place of knowledge as an (occupational) cultural imposition was 
retained, ASWs* actions were further examined wi th in their state defined role. This 
definition, consistent with the notion of social work as a socially constructed activity (see 
Sheppard, 1995, ch 3) has implications for the meanings attached by ASWs to their acts 
(Sheppard, 1990, Part 1). ASWs were presented as concerned with mental health as a 
social problem rather than a health problem per se, wi th an understanding of social 
problems drawing on Merlon and Nisbelt^^. ASWs' particular interest is wi th deviancy 
rather than disorganisation. This deviancy is identified against ( impl ic i t or explicit) 
norms, established either (through statute) by the state or (in practice) by ASWs (amongst 
others). Second, their authority is delegated by the state. This process, according to 
W i l d i n g ^ , implicit ly involves defining the problem as personal, susceptible to individual 
solutions by experts. Third, ASWs act in two ways as *rule enforcers'. This drew on 
Hart's^^ concept of the 'open texture of law*. ASWs were considered to operate within 
this 'open texture*. This 'open texture' involves circumstances where legal rules operate at 
a level of generality preventing their precise application to individual situations. They 
therefore require interpretation (the function of precedent in courts) in this case made by 
assessing professionals. This open texture in principle gives ASWs a wide degree of 
discretion. ASWs are nile enforcers in another way: with residual rule breaking. S c h e f f ^ 
consider these are rules of behaviour demarking the normal f rom the odd or strange, and 
psychiatric symptoms may be presented (sociologically) as residual rule breaking. 
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Finally, ASWs have a 'right to define' what an individual needs rather than what that 
individual wanls^^ . This reflects what Parsons has called the 'primacy of cognitive 
rationality'^^ and gives ASWs their capacity to ascribe (with others) an of f ic ia l identity 
as well as provide access to resources. 
Further factors emphasising the normative aspect and assumptions were o f theoretical 
significance f o r ASWs exercise o f discretion. These were occupational culture, 
particularly knowledge orientation^^; illness as a social state involving expectations 
about help seeking behaviour and behaviour when actually i l l ^ * ^ ; and the commitment to 
legalism, involv ing the accurate use of the law and its processes in the conduct of 
practice. 
Methodology. 
The study adopted an action research approach. This is distinguished by its concern both 
with practical concerns o f people in problematic situations (ASWs in relation to section 
assessments) and the goals of social science (understanding practice and developing the 
knowledge base)^^ A second characteristic is its developmental nature. Research is used 
to make observations about practice f rom which improvements may be identified, put 
into practice and evaluated by comparison with the original position. Zuber-Sheritt^2 
identifies four phases: planning, action, observation, reflection. These four phases were 
evident in this study. They were the problem specification and development of theoretical 
framework; the analysis through this framework, of practice; the development of CASH 
through reflection on practice; the examination and evaluation of its use; and reflections 
on the process o f knowledge development and implications of its use. Act ion research 
then (a) provides a means for bridging the theory-practice 'gap' identified by Sheldon^3 
and (b) emphasises subjects' understanding o f their actions through a stress on 
collaboration between researcher and practitioner. 
Stage One. 
(J) Methods: 
Stage one o f research was concerned wi th the interpretation by ASWs of the 'health or 
safety criteria' in practice situations. It adopted a qualitative methodology and focused on 
two central issues: the process by which ASWs carried out assessments, and more 
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specifically, their assessment of risk in relation to the 'health or safety criteria' (Sheppard, 
1990, Part 1). These methods are particularly useful where we cannot know in advance 
the main ways of classifying and making sense of information^'^. They also allow 
subjects to describe their actions in their own terms, a l lowing the researcher to 
incorporate meaning into the analysis of responses^^. The semi structured, rather then 
conversational technique o f unstructured interviews, was consistent w i th the 
conceptualisation of ASWs as state functionaries. Since the concern was the way they 
carried out their duties prescribed by the Act, it was possible to identify in advance the 
main issues. A S W responses were examined within the conceptual framework of Risk 
Analysis, which, drawing on Breariey^^, is divided into hazards, dangers and risks. 
(U) Results: 
120 referrals to ASWs at a C M H C were examined in this way. These constituted neariy 
all daytime referrals in a city of 250,000 over a one year period. The qualitative analysis 
of risk assessment indicated that, in a significant minority o f cases, a lack of clarity 
clouded ASW assessments o f their cases, making it d i f f i cu l t to jus t i fy adequately their 
actions (Sheppard, 1990, Part 2). This was associated wi th what 1 called a 'presumption 
of risk': a view of situations involving mental illness as inherently risky. Second, the 
classification of the application of the 'health or safety criteria' revealed a wide range of 
factors used in interpretation of these criteria. These ranged f rom death on one hand, to 
f a m i l y integri ty or reputation of a public f igure on the other. Evidence was 
overwhelmingly based on information and observation, although knowledge based on 
psychiatric condition and previous acquaintance with the patient were also used. Fourth, 
on some occasions mental health was used as the health or safety criteria, consistent with 
o f f ic ia l advice^^. Hence some individuals (but not others) were sectioned on mental 
health grounds alone. Finally the development o f the classification revealed some 
inconsistency between ASWs in their application of the 'health or safety criteria'. This 
indicated a wide 'threshold of risk' distinguishing those sectioned f r o m those not 
sectioned. 
Many of these factors were identified with what I called a 'Mental Health Orientation' - a 
tendency to give priority to mental health state over health or safety criteria in making 
decisions. This orientation is consistent with GP and wider medical referrals^^. This 
originated, I suggested in (a) the lack of formal knowledge base to assess risk (b) the 
extensive psychiatric knowledge base and (c) the wide discretion given ASWs, A n 
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alternative 'Social Risk' orientation was developed, giving equal status to the 'health or 
safety criteria', which, I argued, was a natural 'home' for ASWs. Given the imbalance of 
knowledge wi th the powerful psychiatry knowledge base, and the complexity of 
assessments, the need for an ASW knowledge base, within this Social Risk orientation 
was apparent. 
Stage Two. 
(J) Development of the Compulsory Admission Assessment Schedule. 
This knowledge base was encapsulated within CASH. This was an assessment schedule 
developed for the direct application of theory to practice (Sheppard, 1990, Part 3). It is a 
semi structured instrument designed for use in practice, and was developed wi th 
extensive instructions (and definitions) in relation to three key areas: the main dimensions 
of the relevant sections of the Act , the conceptual framework of Risk Analysis, and the 
range of factors considered to be significant in research. These latter factors were further 
developed with ASWs in the light of their practice and its use. 
Hence CASH was developed along the fol lowing dimensions. 
• Hazards: classified in the light of research and subsequent discussions with ASWs. 
• Dangers: were divided, as with the Act into health threat (mental and physical), safety 
threat and threat to others. This was further conceptualised in terms of (a) the nature and 
severity of the danger and (b) the significance of vulnerabilities (related to the danger). 
A n overall rating o f seriousness of danger was made by the A S W in the light of this 
assessment. 
• Risk was assessed by reference to two sets of factors. Factors relating to the behaviour 
of the person comprised the first set and these may reduce or increase the risk o f the 
danger occurring. Social support comprised the second. This focused on whether it (social 
support) existed and its capacity to reduce the likelihood of the danger occurring. 
• Evidence was examined in terms of comprehensiveness and reliability. 
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A rating of level of risk was then made on the basis of the analysis of risk and evidence 
provided. Together wi th seriousness of danger this gave a rating of Overall Risk. It 
should be noted that while CASH sought to develop formal knowledge for practice and 
encourage systematic and conceptually clear assessments, the judgement o f Overall Risk 
was left to the ASWs themselves. 
Alongside the development of CASH were a series of meetings with ASWs in the study, 
serving two purposes: to acquaint ASWs with , and gain their help in refining, CASH; and 
to train them for its use in preparation for its evaluation. This involved extensive 
discussions at group or individual level as well as a 'pilot' period of three months when 
C A S H was used in actual section assessments. During this time C A S H was under 
constant review, and the ASWs became proficient in its use. 
(J J) Evaluation of the Compulsory Admissions Assessment Schedule. 
CASH was evaluated on the basis of expectations about the impact of its use noted in its 
development (Sheppard, 1993). The first of three methods used was a quantitative 
approach, based on data derived f r o m the use of C A S H in practice. The second, 
qualitative approach involved the use of methods similar to stage one. Silverman^^ 
advocates a simple numerical approach to qualitative research. This provided an 
indication o f the relative significance of different responses and allowed the frequency 
with which clarity was displayed in stage one assessments to be compared with stage 2. 
Qualitative methods also contributed to the analysis of consistency between ASWs in 
their assessments. This was undertaken, first, by comparing the Overall Risk ratings with 
which different ASWs distinguished those who could be sectioned f rom those who could 
not. However, the apparent consistency of quantitative data might reflect suppression of 
real differences of criteria used to rate cases. This was examined through classifying and 
relating qualitative reports o f patients' circumstances to ASWs ratings o f cases. Thi rd , 
ASWs were asked to assess the usefulness of C A S H in terms of the extent to which it 
helped (or not) their assessment and the time it took to complete. This reflected the need 
to identify whether CASH was considered to benefit those for whom it was intended. 
CASH was evaluated through its use by five ASWs, in relation to a further 71 referrals 
over one year. In view of training requirements and rate of referral this represents a 
substantial sample. I t was shown to be highly sensitive to differences between those who 
could and those who could not be sectioned and ratings of severity were consistent wi th 
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the nature of danger identified. The use of CASH was associated with a narrower rather 
than wider interpretation o f the law, emphasising particular dangers of death, injury and 
serious illness. The qualitative analysis of ASW accounts showed the use of CASH was 
associated with a higher degree of conceptual clarity than was evident in the stage one 
research. It was practical to use, generally seen positively by ASWs and considered 
particularly helpful in cases where decisions were d i f f icu l t to make. The success wi th 
which it could be used suggested it could provide the basis for wider accountability for 
actions that are otherwise carried out away f rom public gaze, yet nonetheless are 
significant for personal liberty. Analysis of qualitative data showed a higher degree of 
consistency than evident in stage one research. An additional benefit, not anticipated, was 
the development of a classification of case characteristics associated with different ratings 
of seriousness o f danger and which may potentially be used on a wide basis to encourage 
consistency in the conduct of assessments. 
T H E CONTRIBUTION T O K N O W L E D G E OF THESE STUDIES. 
This corpus of work focused on the the theory-practice problematic of social work and 
sought to understand and develop the relationship between social work practice and its 
formal knowledge base. The work was, overall, characterised by an emphasis on the 
importance of meaning, both in understanding and developing the relationship between 
theory and practice. This was undertaken first by an examination of the different 
traditions which undeHie perceptions of the theory-practice relationship. It then sought to 
examine the distinctive ways in which knowledge was reflected in practice through a 
comparative analysis of the work of social workers and CPNs in the light o f their formal 
knowledge base. This was understood in terms o f occupational meaning expressed 
through the reproduction of knowledge in practice, emphasising in particular the concepts 
of classification and boundary maintenance. The further understanding and development 
of knowledge for social work was based on the two key elements of the nature of social 
work itself and its social science knowledge base. Within this broad framework, the key 
elements of social work's practice paradigm, and the principles o f convergence and 
adequacy of fit were constructed as a basis for further developments in knowledge fo r 
practice. Two themes were developed from this: the Theory of Emergent Understanding 
and the use of Social Science based Assessments Schedules. The work leading to the 
construction and use of the compulsory admissions assessment schedule represents an 
exemplar o f the way in which social science based assessment schedules may be 
developed. A t the heart of the problem of understanding and developing the relationship 
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between social work and its formal knowledge base lies the issue o f meaning, and 
although there are a number of complex conceptual and empirical issues which relate to 
this, meaning must remain a central feature of our concern with 'theory and practice'. 
Overall, the work was carried out within a framework which sought to understand the 
nature and development of social work knowledge in terms o f two key elements: the 
nature and status of social science knowledge and the nature of social work itself. Hence 
the intellectual framework from which the work developed started, on the one hand, with 
an examination of the intellectual traditions of social science and a critical analysis of the 
notion of applied knowledge in the light of these traditions (Sheppard, 1995, Part 3). On 
the other hand the framework was developed through a critical analysis o f views about 
the nature and purpose o f social work itself, involving both normative and positive 
theorising, and including concepts such as social funct ioning, self realisation and 
empowerment as well as that o f stale functionary (Sheppard, 1995, chs 2 and 3). This 
clearly indicates that we cannot consider the nature and use of social work knowledge 
without considering what it is being applied to. Knowledge for what? is a key factor here. 
This dual approach of detailed theoretical analysis to contextualise the examination of 
social work knowledge is novel. Most authors^O ^ have tended to consider the issue of 
knowledge without this extensive analysis of the nature and purpose o f social work, 
which has tended to remain implic i t or insufficiently examined. This dual approach, 
furthermore, created the framework through which we could use further concepts to make 
sense of knowledge for practice. This was the case, for example, wi th concepts of 
classification and boundary maintenance for the analysis of existing practice, and quite 
crucial to the development of further concepts such as the elements of practice led theory, 
including the practice paradigm of social work and the principle of convergence. These 
latter concepts could not have been developed without this dual approach. 
The examination o f mental health social work in the light o f community psychiatric 
nursing was the first attempt to bring together theory and practice in a coherent analytic 
framework which sought to examine practice in the light of , and only after, a 
comprehensive analysis and classification o f the realm of theory discourse conducted in 
social work (and community psychiatric nursing). In so doing it was the first study to 
draw upon an analytic framework emphasising accepted professional knowledge as a 
cultural imposition, creating a 'knowledge space' associated wi th the occupation which 
may then be reproduced in practice. 
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Its comparative approach was (in this context) also novel. A central problem of previous 
research, particulariy that of Hardiker, was the lack of a comparison group facilitating the 
identification of theory and practice which is distinctive to social work. While Hardiker 
teased out the ' implicit theory' used by social work practitioners, without a comparison 
group, we cannot know whether this was no more than the representation, in social work, 
of the process of making sense in everyday life. The empirical result, then, was that the 
work identified that which is distinctive to social work. 
The work was novel, in further, theoretical, respects. The key concept of Reflexive 
Eclecticism in the Theory of Emergent Understanding was systematically developed and 
novel. The concept of reflexivity has rarely been mentioned^' and never systematically 
developed in relation to social work practice. By identifying the characteristic ways in 
which humans 'make sense' of their social worid, a framework was created which allowed 
both formal and experiential knowledge to be incorporated. Previous writers, using an 
interpretivist approach had emphasised the development of 'frameworks of meaning' 
which social workers could use to understand practice situations. Other writers in the 
applied social science tradition (notably Sheldon) have emphasised an hypothesis testing 
falsification approach. In creating a framework for combining the two, and l inking this to 
the human capacity for reflexivity, the concept of reflexive eclecticism was able to create 
depth as well as breadth of understanding in relation to any particular practice situation. 
However, it emphasised not simply frameworks fo r meaning, but also the process of 
reasoning. Using a Realist (epistemological) approach and a retroductive metholdology, 
these approaches allow for the practitioner to identify and develop the category, schema, 
theory or concept, least l ikely to be wrong in any practice situation. This is the 
probabilistic equivalent o f falsificationism. I t also provides for the process o f reasoning 
and the case focused use of formal and experiential knowledge in practice. These were 
developed in terms of hypothesis testing, in particular the different processes involved: 
involv ing the concepts of progressive hypothesis development and comparative 
hypothesis assessment 
The constituent conceptual elements o f practice led theory were also novel. These were 
identified deductively f rom the dual theoretical analysis (of applied knowledge and social 
work). Hence the development of the practice paradigm of social work, involving a core 
of objectivism (in the definition of phenomena), limited voluntarism (in the perception of 
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human nature and the explanation of behaviour) and an approach reminiscent of the 
sociology of regulation (as the appropriate focus of practice), was derived deductively 
f rom the analysis of the social worker as state functionary and the examination of practice 
assumptions through the concepts o f need and self determination. The principle of 
convergence, distinguishing between foreground and background knowledge and 
involving the principles of congruence and research validity is also novel and is intended 
to 'focus' formal knowledge as precisely as possible on practice. The concept of 'adequacy 
of fit' is one that arises in the context of a realist analysis and a case centred and case 
focused use of formal knowledge. 
The development of the Compulsory Admissions Assessment Schedule was the first 
attempt to apply the principles of 'practice led theory' to the development of knowledge. 
As an exemplar of social science based assessment schedules, therefore, it was novel. Its 
methodology, using action research, was parliculariy useful for emphasising convergence, 
since the action researcher's problem orientation is a practical problem wi th theoretical 
relevance and the audience is both social scientists and practitioners. Its practice led 
approach was indicated in the book itself. The approach involved in the first instance 
theorising about the nature o f the A S W role. This theory generated a set of questions 
which were used in the empirical analysis. This in turn generated CASH which was used 
in practice and subject to evaluation in the process of which further insights relevant for 
consistency in practice were obtained. This approach was explicitly 'practice led' in the 
sense indicated earlier; knowledge was developed within a f ramework of meaning 
consistent with practice; it involved focusing on problems confronted by social workers; 
it involved the principle of convergence. 
This exemplar also showed how concept generation could be incorporated within this 
practice led approach. This is evident in the development of the 'mental health' and 'social 
risk' orientations and the 'presumption of risk'. It also showed how it could facilitate the 
(appropriate) standardisation o f practice. Hence, the research on the use of C A S H 
generated a classification of the main characteristics of different levels o f severity of 
overall risk. This is of potentially major importance in developing criteria f o r 
distinguishing those for whom a section is expected form those for whom it is not. The 
practice led approach, as shown in this exemplar, is consistent with the development of 
theoretically informed practice, and practice relevant theory. 
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CLIENT SATISFACTION. 
BRIEF INTERVENTION AND 
INTERPERSONAL SKILLS 
MICHAEL SHEPPARD 
SUMMARY. There have been reservations expressed about the use of the 
concept of satisfaction in relation to clients views of services received. 
There is, additionally, little research on client perspectives of mental health 
tvork. This article explores client satisfaction with brief intervention from 
workers based at a community mental health centre. A number of differ-
ences in the services received, and client's perceptions of these, are identified 
which relate clearly to the level of client satisfaction. Tliese differences can 
be related clearly to interpersonal skills such as communication skills, 
empathy, listening and genuineness. It appears, then, tftat satisfaction does 
meaningfully represent client's experience, and this has implications for 
skills acquisition and use, an issue of fundamental importance for practice. 
Introduction 
Taking the views of consumers seriously is nov^ something of an article of 
faith in social work. As 'consumers of services', their judgements about the 
quality of help received are of great importance. Indeed, these judgements 
provide a significant means by which these services may be evaluated. Of 
course, this issue is complex. Some clients may be unwilling consumers, such 
as some child abusing parents or some young offenders, and as 'captive 
clients' their views of the service may have little to do with its quality. Who 
precisely is the consumer, furthermore, may be debated generaUy and in 
specific instances. When monitoring a child at risk, is it the child or the parents 
or perhaf>s the society (or more accurately the state) that empowers social 
workers to protect the child? Nonetheless the burgeoning client perspectives 
literature, involving those directly in receipt of services, bears testimony to 
the significance with which their views are regarded. 
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One area, however, where consumers' views have been rarely solidted 
in Britain, is that of mental health. Brandon (1981) has related this to the 
subject area : some actively resist the notion of accepting the views of those 
labelled mad or disturbed except for confirming diagnosis. Their problem 
(mental health), for some, appears to undermine the validity of their obser-
vations on their situation. There is, therefore, v^th a few notable exceptions, 
such as Fisher et al.'s (1984) study of area sodal work clients, a small 
qualitative study of crisis intervention (Davis et al, 1985), and a more detailed 
comparison of the views of sodal work and community psychiatric nursing 
(CPN) clients (Sheppard, 1991), very little known about client experiences of 
intervention with mental health problems. This study seeks to extend our 
understanding of clients' perspectives by examining the views of 39 consum-
ers of brief intervention at a Community Mental Health Centre. This appears 
useful for tlvee main reasons : the paudty of research in the area of mental 
health, the focus it places on spedalist workers in a mental health rather than 
area team setting, and the growing importance of commuiuty mental health 
centres as settings for the provision of community focused mental health 
services. In a more general sense it possesses one further advantage. The 
clients studied were individuals who had sought help voluntarily. It is likely, 
therefore, that responses would be less influenced by factors relating to the 
'sodal policing' role involved with involuntary dients (although while being 
voluntary thennselves, they may be aware of this 'sodal policing' role). 
This study examines factors related to client satisfaction. Some reserva^ 
tions have recently been expressed about the use of client satisfaction as a 
means for evaluating intervention. These may broadly be divided into six. 
The concept of client satisfaction, some think, is too general to provide a 
meaningful guide to the way clients think. More detailed information is 
required on spedfic aspects of the clients' experiences (Locker and Dunt, 
1978). Second, satisfaction may be related to the uwy a service is given rather 
than the outcome (positive or negative) of intervention (Rees and Wallace, 
1982). Third, some dients may pronounce themselves satisfied knowing little 
of the alternatives available (Fisher, 1983). Fourth, in some cases merely asking 
people to rate something can produce favourable evaluations (Fisher, 1983). 
Fifth, individuals' comments are the prisoner of the moment: what they say 
on one occasion may be different from another occasion, possibly at a 
differentstageof intervention (Sainsburye/a/.,1982).Finally,satisfactionmay 
be related more to the clients' cultural background and expectations than 
their actual experience of intervention (Robinson, 1983). Fisher (1983, p.41) 
suggests that 'ultimately, then, the emphasis on the concept of satisfaction 
gives us only a very crude understanding of the reaction of dients'. 
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These reservations are permeated by at least three themes. First, although 
they are reservations they are made within a value commitment that it is 
important to take into account consumers' views. To make this commitment, 
as Shaw points out (Shaw, 1976, p23) is to suggest at least an implicit conflict 
of interest between the consumer and producer (professional), v^th an 
associated assumption that worker and client are liable to see things differ-
ently. This, of course, may well be the case (Rees, 1978) but the tendency to 
emphasise difference rather than similarity may produce a 'mental sef where 
we assume a distance between the client and worker (or researcher) which 
does not reflect the degree, and areas, of shared meanings. There may, 
therefore, at times be a tendency to exaggerate the problems involved. 
This 'conflict' assumption is closely related to a view that worker and 
client (and researcher) inhabit very different social worlds. Satisfaction may 
mean one thing to the researcher but quite another to the client. The 
background assumptions which influence the way clients would view or 
even understand the concept of satisfaction would thus considerably influ-
ence individual responses. Abran\s (1976) and Shaw (1976) suggest that 
objective conditions and personal history are mediated through perceived 
conditions, expectations and aspirations to produce satisfaction levels. On 
this basis, user studies should take serious account of the social context of 
meaning and mutually shared meaning should not be taken for granted 
(Robinson, 1983). Indeed Douglas (1971) suggests that some assumptions 
held by social groups may frequently only be sensed by members of those 
groups rather than known explicitly and thus at times difficult to formulate 
explicitly. 
A further theme relates to scepticism over the use of the term 'satisfaction' 
itself. Shaw (1976; 1984) suggests that different assumptions may lead 
researchers to ask questions which are of marginal importance to the client 
themselves. The client may, for example, regard social work as a bartering 
relationship entered into for the purpose of gaining specific material ends. 
The 'personal' relationship with the social worker seen as a means to these 
ends, n\ay simply be viewed as an interference to be tolerated in order to 
receive the service. Focusing on the relationship may, at best, give only a 
partial picture. Rees and Wallace (1982, p.Sl) likev^se point to differences 
between the quality of the relationship and (perceived) nature of outcome, 
and that statements of satisfaction may relate to either or both (or perhaps 
something else). Fisher (1983; Fisher et al, 1986) commenting on research 
undertaken on children in care, goes so far as to suggest that the very concept 
of satisfaction itself may not properly represent clients' construction of 
intervention. Instead ofsatisfaction,whichappearedinappropriatetodescribe 
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parents' views of their children receiving control they could not exercise 
themselves, they used the notion of 'moral sanction'. This referred to the 
appropriateness or acceptability (to the parents) of a range of ways of dealing 
with the problem he or she was experiencing. 
It would be foolish to dismiss the themes which underlie reservations 
about 'satisfaction', which emphasise both social context and background 
assumptions. However, by focusing on these we may give insufficient weight 
to other factors of significance. First, while recognising sodal context, it is 
important to recognise that what goes on in the interview/intervention itself 
is significant: factors 'internal' as well as 'external' to the intervention have 
importance. There is, second, an issue of who has what kind of interest in 
which kind of issue or question. Much of the client perspective research has 
attempted to create a picture of the client's construction of their experience. 
In the process, the aim is somehow to get inside the 'world(s)' of clients, and, 
by writing about it, represent this world to those who are providers of 
services. This, it would be generally accepted, is of interest to the service 
providers. We may, however, also be concerned with issues of direct interest 
to the service providers themselves, particularly in terms of the tasks they set 
themselves. Such an approach would be evident in seeking clients' views of 
task centred work. The starting pouU is the issue of the efficacy of task centred 
work, generated from within the social work profession, and clients views 
represent one aspect of the examination of this approach. Some studies have 
been criticised for asking clients questions which are of interest to the 
profession, but which my be of peripheral interest to the clients. The problem 
here, perhaps,isnotthatsuchquestionsareasked, but that theyarepresented 
as //thisrepresented clients' viewsof intervention unmediated by the particular 
interests of the profession or researcher. We should instead recognise that 
when asking questions the terms of which are set by the researcher or 
profession, that clients are responding within these terms. We would not 
thereby pretend that we have the 'clients' view*, but that we have clients' 
views of a particular realm of issues of concern to the profession or researcher. 
A third point is that by emphasising differences between clients and 
workers (and researchers) we may thereby underestimate the possibility of 
common ground - the extent to which meanings may be shared. England 
(1986) points to the significance of shared meanings to social life as a whole 
and social work in particular. Good social work practice, he thinks, is to a 
considerable degree, about achieving, as accurately as possible, shared 
meanings between client and worker. It is important to balance a recognition 
of difference with the possibility of shared meanings. 
Rnally, it may be that the concept of satisfaction itself has been aggran-
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dised, and it is this which, to a considerable degree, is responsible for 
reservations about its usefulness. If, for example, we attempt to view it, as 
Rees and Wallace (1982) indicate, as a measure of both the quality of the 
professiorml relationship and the outcome of intervention, it may be that we 
are asking too much. We may instead accord it a more humble, yet perhaps 
a correspondingly more powerful role. The concept of satisfaction would be 
used to indicate a general sense in which the clients, overall, felt positive or 
negative about intervention. If we start at this point, then it may be possible 
to identify which elements, if any, of worker-client interaction are related to 
satisfaction. This study uses satisfaction in this way: to indicate a general 
sense in which clients felt positive or negative about intervention. 
Given the reservatior\s expressed it is most important to discover whether 
the concept of satisfaction has any use as a measure of the extent to which 
clients feel positive or negative about intervention. This article approaches 
this problem by relating levels of satisfaction to the nature of intervention and 
quality of (some) skills used by the workers. It focuses specifically on brief 
intervention which, I have observed elsewhere (Sheppard, 1991), may for 
both theoretical and practical reasons be differentiated ft-om more extended 
intervention. 
Method 
The study was carried out with clients of the Psychiatric Advisory Service 
(PAS) at the Nuffield Mental Health Centre, Plymouth. The methods used are 
discussed in great detail elsewhere (Sheppard, 1991). The clients were made 
up of three groups of 13 receiving intervention, respectively, from CPNs, 
social workers and jointly from CPNs and social workers. Each group was 
broadly representative of clients seen at the centre, based on an earlier survey 
(Sheppard, 1991). Intheprevioussurvey workers were asked to identify which 
problems from a range of mental health and social problems, they considered 
primary in each case.* These were divided into those with mental health 
primary problems (mental health cases) and those with social problenns 
primary (sodalproblemcases).Theclientsinterviewed reflected theproportion 
of clients in each group who were mental health cases and those who were 
social problem cases. Excluded from consideration were clients who were 
assessed for compulsory admission under the Mental Health Act and those 
who, following assessment by PAS workers, were hospitalised. When these 
clients were excluded from the survey results, 12 (39%) social work clients 
were mental health cases and 19 (61%) were social problem cases; 24 (57%) 
CPN clients were mental health and 18 (43%) were social problem cases; and 
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34 (39%) of joint clients were mental health cases, while 54 (61 %) were sodal 
problem cases. The clients in this study were divided up as follov^: 
Social work and joint work: 5 (38%) mental health cases, 
8 (62%) social problem cases. 
CPNs: 7 (54%) mental health cases, 
6 (46%) social problem cases. 
This stratification wasbroad. However, given thenumberof clients who, 
in previous studies refused an interview or for other reasons were unavail-
able, it was considered unwise to stratify in too great detail. The first client 
seeneachdaywhowasnotassessedforcompulsoryadnussionorhospitalised 
informally and who received brief intervention (as defined by the agency, 
which in all these cases lasted under two weeks) was chosen. A letter was sent 
jointly signed by the senior CPN and social worker requesting a research 
interviewandarranginga time. Astamped addressed envelope was included 
if they v^hed to refuse the interview. The refusal rate was high: 15 CPN, 13 
social work and 17 joint clients refused, and this should be borne in mind 
when exanuning the results. Al l clients were interviewed within a month of 
intervention; all but three between two or three weeks of seeing the worker. 
The results reported were based on fully structured instruments, which are 
reproduced elsewhere (Sheppard, 1991) a method which has been used in 
other studies (Paykel and Griffiths, 1983; Comey, 1981; Sainsbuiy et al, 1982). 
Additionally, the workers completed a fully structured questionnaire, v^th 
classification of problems and activities identical to those of the client, to 
facilitate comparison. This also has been reproduced elsewhere (Sheppard, 
1991). Client satisfaction was measured by a five fold classification: very 
satisfied, quite satisfied, neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (neutral), quite 
dissatisfied and very dissatisfied. The data are analysed in two ways: first 
using a satisfied - not satisfied dichotomy. Satisfied here refers toquite or very 
satisfied, and not satisfied to the rest. The second involves the ful l range of 
measures, which is used where such information provides something ad-
ditional to thesatisfied-notsatisfieddichotomy. The clients were askedabout 
their degree of satisfaction at the beginning of the interview in order that their 
assessment was not influenced by their more detailed consideration of 
intervention, which occurred vAih subsequent questions. The subjects of this 
study were those who receivedagencydefinedbriefintervention.Theagency 
divided clients into those who received brief help and those who received 
short or long term caseload intervention. The former group overwhelmingly 
involved people who received intervention lasting under a week and where 
there were one or two face to face interviews with the client. On the rare 
occasions these interventions lasted beyond a week this was invariably only 
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to complete processes (such as contacting outside agencies) which had been 
initiated within that week. 
Results 
Clients were almost evenly divided by sex: 20 male and 19 female. Twenty six 
(68 %) were aged 20 to 44, three were aged over 65 and the rest were aged 
between 45 and 64. Twenty one (54%) clients were married or cohabiting. 
Eleven clients (28%) were owner occupiers, 14 (36%) lived in council ac-
commodation and the rest were lodgers or lived in hostel or privately rented 
accommodation. Four clients had retired and 16 (45% of those of working age) 
were unemployed. This group of clients, in a number of respects, therefore, 
was socially disadvantaged. 
CASE CHARACTERISTICS 
Satisfaction may first be related to clients' problems. Slightly more of the 17 
mental health cases (59%) than the 22 social problem cases (50%) were 
satisfied, a far from significant difference^. Detailed analysis, using the ful l 
range of measures from very satisfied to very dissatisfied likewise shows no 
significant differences in level of satisfaction according to the type of case. Not 
all cases where a mental disorder was considered by the worker to be present 
were defined as 'mental health cases' since a sodal problem might be 
regarded as primary. It is useful, therefore, to relate satisfaction to mental 
health status. Mental i l l health was considered present in 21 cases and absent 
in 18 cases. Clients with a mental disorder were slightly more frequently 
satisfied than when it was absent, 12 (57%) of the former group compared 
with nine (50%) of the latter pronouncing themselves satisfied. This was not 
significant . Workers were also asked to divide those with mental health 
problems into definite and borderline cases.^  Results are shown in Table 1. 
Althoughactualnumbersarequitesmalldifferencesarejustbelowsignificance 
(using Fisher's exact test). This is emphasised still more with the fu l l range of 
measures (very satisfied to very dissatisfied). Five of those with a borderline 
disorder were quite or very dissatisfied compared with only one with a 
definite disorder. The reason for this configuration is not clear, but may be 
investigated further. 
This can be undertaken in relation to the concept of case complexity, 
involving three measures: the number of problems per case, the number of 
severe problems find the number of cases with multiple problems. Only one 
(not satisfied) client had no sodal problems. However, 12 (60%) of the 20 
clients with one or two problems were not satisfied with intervention. 
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compared with only five (28%) of the 18 clients with more than two problems 
(p= 0.07 when those with two or less problems are compared with those v^th 
more than two). Furthermore, examination of problems which workers 
considered to be severe shows that 10 (59 %) of the 17 with no severe problems 
were not satisfied compared with only eight (36%) of the 22 with one or more 
severe problems. Although not reaching significance, these data indicate that 
those with the most severe problems - measured by the number and severity 
of sodal problems and 'caseness' of mental illness - were more likely to be 
satisfied than those with less severe problems. It is the 'in-between' clients -
those with borderline mental illness, less than two sodal problems (though 
not without any sodal problems), and without severe sodal problems who 
were least likely to feel satisfied with intervention. It may be that their problems 
weresevereenoughtocausegreatdistress,whilenonethelessleavingthemstrong 
enough to withhold more positive comments on the worker. 
Further evidence supporting this view is provided by clients with 
multiple problems. Individual problems were divided up into three broad 
areas: practical, emotional and relationship and physical i l l health. * Those with 
problems in more than one broad area were defined as clients with rhultiple 
problems. Rathermoreclientswithmultipleproblems,lloutof 18(61%) than 
those without multiple problems -10 out of 21 (48%) - were satisfied vynth 
intervention . Although not significant these differences suggest the less 
severe group were less positive about intervention. 
However, the picture is more complex when the full range of satisfaction 
measures is used. Six of the seven clients with multiple problems who were 
not satisfied were quite or very dissatisfied, compared with only 2 of the 11 
clients without multiple problems (the rest were neutral). TTiere was a 
tendency to extremes of satisfaction and dissatisfaction amongst clients with 
multiple problems with greater 'centring' around neutrality in other clients. 
Furthermore, 10 of the 13 clients with 2 or fewer problems were neutral while 
all 5 of those clients classified 'not satisfied' with more than two problems 
(28% of total) were quite or very dissatisfied. Likewise, in relation to severe 
problems, 6 of the clients with no severe problems (35%) compared with four 
clients with one or more severe problems (18%) were neutral. The difference 
between these two groups in unsafisfied dients, therefore, is almost entirely 
the result of those who were neutral. It is difficult, therefore, to maintain that 
case characteristics were related directly to satisfaction. 
There were no significant differences in relation to the presence of 
problems from particular broad areas. Eight out of 14 clients with practical 
problems (57%) were satisfied compared with 13 out of 25 (52%) without 
them.Likewise, 19ofthe35 clients withemotionalandrelationshipproblems 
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(54%) were satisfied compared with 2 of the 4 without these problems. 
Finally, slightly more of those with physical health problems - seven out of ten 
- were satisfied than those without these problems (14 out of 25,48 %). This 
was not, however, significant. 
WORK UNDERTAKEN 
Satisfaction may also be related to the kind of work undertaken. This may be 
examined in terms of workers' activities. There were no sigruficant differences 
in level of satisfaction according to whether or not particular activities were 
undertaken. Indeed across all activity areas the data are remarkable for the 
similarities in level of satisfaction whether or not particular activities were 
performed. Both clients subject to one activity only were not satisfied, 
compared withfouroutof6receiving twoactivities,9ofthe22receivingthree 
activities, and 3 of the 5 receiving four activities (not significant). 
These activities may be divided into broader roles (assessor, drug ad-
ministrator, psychosocial treatment agent, teacher-counsellor and broker) 
(Whittaker, 1974).^  Undertaking particular roles was not significantly related 
to client satisfaction. However, did particular roles make a difference in 
relation to particular problem areas? The broker role, with its elements of 
advocacy and resource mobilising, appears particularly relevant to practical 
problems. Likewise, the psychosocial treatment agent role, involving 
psychodynamic work, ventilation and emotional support and morutoring 
appears relevant to emotional and relationship problems. Table 2 shows the 
results using the full range of measures from very satisfied to very dissatis-
fied. The psychosocial treatment agent role made no difference to satisfacHon 
amongst clients with emotional and relatior\ship problems. It may be that this 
role was orUy required on some occasions and on those occasions when 
clients considered it necessary it was undertaken. The broker role with 
practical problems presents a different picture, with significant differences 
according to whether or not it was taken. However, the picture is not simple. 
Clients were more likely to be dissatisfied when the role was absent, but 
equally were more likely to be very satisfied. Hence comparing quite satisfied 
and neutral with extremes of very satisfied, quite dissatisfied and very 
dissatisfied the differences are significant (Fisher exact probability test two 
tail=0.003) These extremes may indicate that on some occasions clients 
considered this role unnecessary, but when not performed and considered 
necessary they were dissatisfied. 
This argument has some substance. Clients were asked if they would 
have liked the worker to have undertaken activities other than those they 
performed. The results are shown in Table 3. Those clients who did not wish 
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for an alternative activity were significantly more satisfied than those who 
did. Indeed the la tter group was the only one where active dissatisfaction was 
expressed. Differences are likewise significant when simply divided up 
between satisfied and not satisfied clients (p=0.001). Indeed, there was a 
greater dissatisfaction displayed by clients when workers failed to undertake 
desired activities in a number of areas: discussing future options, monitoring, 
education in sodal skills, psychodynanuc work and advocacy. 
Thisisreflected in commentsmadebyclients.One woman, whohad been 
given information about local supports, commented that: 
...she offered a few suggestions about voluntary work, but its not 
what I needed -1 knew that. I needed moral support - to work on 
my emotional problems. I didn't specifically ask her for this -1 
expected she would identify it - for her to offer it to me. 
Another woman wanted to move from her flat and had had her expec-
tations raised by her (referring) GP who had said that workers would support 
her applicarion. They, however, did not, and failed to give a reason for this: 
A l l they said about it was that I'd done the house up and that I 
should go out and see people more - otherwise I'd have the same 
problem of doing the place up as 1 had when I moved in. They 
didn't contact housing though - not as far as I know anyway. 
Contrast the critical tone of these comments with the more positive 
responses of those who did not feel they would have benefited from alterna-
tive activities. One client, for example, was surprised by the skills displayed: 
She was better than I expected. She knew more than I thought. Its 
difficult to say exactly what. They seemed to know about handling 
emotions and things.... She was very perceptive. She seemed able 
to draw things out of me. I became aware of things I had not really 
thought of before. 
The work undertaken may also relate to the approach taken to intervention. 
Clients were asked whether or not they considered workers had been open 
in theirdealings with theclientparticularly in relation toprovidingthem with 
appropriate and relevant information about their situation, and in telling 
them how they (the worker) viewed their situation. This was done in relation 
to five problem areas: practical and finandal, child careand familial, personal 
functioning, sodal relations and network and ill health. Workers were 
considered not be open in one or more of these areas in only three cases. 
However, using the fuU range of satisfaction measures, these clients were 
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markedly less satisfied: one was quite dissatisfied, and two very dissatisfied. 
In cases where workers were open 10 (28%) were very satisfied, 11 (31 %) quite 
satisfied, 10 (28%) neutral, 3 (8 %) quite dissatisfied and 2 (5%) very dissatis-
fied (Mann Whitney U test, p=0.07). Lack of openness was identified in both 
practical/financial and personal functioning problems in two cases and in 
child and family care and social relations or network problems in one case. 
Although lack of openness, therefore, was rare, it was clearly associated vAth 
dissatisfaction. 
The perception of worker openness derived, from the comments of 
clients, largely from a sense of the kind of person they (the worker) was: 
Theblokelsaw-hewasjustsogoodatwhathedid...from the start 
he was such a friendly person, he was someone you could trust -
he was someone who didn't impose himself on you. 
Another commented that 
She strikes me as sincere.... I feel I can trust what she's saying - she's 
pretty honest with you. 
Compare this with a woman who had a poor relationship with her 
husband and financial problems and found it difficult to cope, who con-
densed 
...their whole attitude. They seemed rather self centred - they 
weren't really interested though they wouldn't admit it... Al l she 
said was if you get any more problems we'll give you this card and 
you ring us. 
Clients were also asked, over the same five areas, about their involvement 
in planmng, and carrying out a response to their problems. There were three 
divisions for each area : nuinly or entirely the worker, equal responsibility, 
and mainly or entirely the client. Table 4 shows the number of cases where, 
in at least one area of either planning or action responsibility was taken 
maiiUy or entirely by the worker. Although differences were not significant, 
clients were more frequently satisfied where this was the case than where it 
was not. This was consistent for both planning and action: identical data 
emerged in relation to planning, and in both cases when action was under-
taken in at least one area by the worker the clients were satisfied, compared 
vAth 19 of the 37 occasions when this was not the case. This, it should be 
emphasised, did not mean all the planning and action in these cases was 
primarily undertaken by workers. In all these cases, there were areas of 
planrung and action carried out equally or primarily by the client. These data 
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indicate, however, that when a nwi of responsibility occurred clients were 
more likely to be satisfied. 
A G R E E M E N T B E T W E E N C U E N T A N D WORKER 
The degree of agreement between client and worker was measured in 
relation to two elements of intervention: problenns defined and work 
undertaken. Problems were examined in terms first of the extent to which 
clients identified problems identified also by the worker, and second in terms 
of concordance and discordance between client and worker. While the 
former identifies the frequency with which clients agreed with workers' 
definitions of problems, in the latter case discordance occurred where the 
worker identified a problem the client did not or vice versa. The scope for 
discordance (thelattercase) was greater, therefore, than that for disagreement 
(the former case). 
There were no significant differences in the level of concordance and 
discordance in any individual problem area according to the level of client 
satisfaction. This was the case also in relation to the extent clients identified 
problen^s also identified by the workers. Table 5, however, provides a much 
clearer picture. This presents an aggregation of all instances of concordance 
and discordance, and agreement or disagreement in relation to specific 
problem categories which lay within each broad problem area. Clients agreed 
with workers in the majority of problems identified by the latter, although 
clientsdidnotdefineasproblemsasignificantminorityofproblemsidentified 
by workers. However, although there was slightly greater agreement when 
cUents were satisfied, the difference between satisfied and dissatisfied clients 
was small. The full range of measures of satisfaction shows that while there 
wasnoticeablygreateragreementwhenclientswereverysatisfied,differences 
between other levels of satisfaction, apart from very dissatisfied, were minor. 
However, workers showed far more concordance with satisfied than v^th 
dissatisfied clients. This result is primarily because of differences between 
satisfied and not satisfied client groups with emotional and relationship 
problems, which anyway represented the bulk of the problems identified by 
clients and workers. However, there is no simple linear relationship between 
level of satisfaction and degree of concordance. Hence concordance was 
greater amongst quite satisfied than very satisfied clients, and amongst quite 
dissatisfied compared with 'neutral' clients. The configuration of the data, 
where not satisfied clients did not differ greatly from satisfied clients in their 
level of agreement on problems identified by workers, but these not satisfied 
clients displayed far greater discordance than satisfied clients, shows that 
lack of satisfaction was related to a considerable degree to problems identi-
Social Work & Social Sciences Revieiv 3(2) 
136 MICHAEL SHEPPARD 
fied by clients but not by workers. This lack of recognition' may be doubly 
frustrating for the client: workers' perspective of clients' drcumstances would 
exclude problems clients genuinely felt they had and, if problems were not 
recognised, they could not actually be tackled. 
The effect this could have is evident in some clients' comments. One 
woman said: 
They didn't seem to realize my difficulties - like with my financial 
problems. All they said was that we all have financial problems -
like with mortgages or whatever - but its not the same when you 
don't get much money. How are you going to save when you're on 
social security? 
Another said: 
They just seemed to go through the motions. I think they classified 
me as 'she's not really got problen^' ....they should be trying to 
imderstand how you feel. I've had the opposite reaction of 'Oh well 
dear*, pat you on the head kind of thing. 11 makes you mad, you feel 
like hitting out at them. 
Client-worker agreement about problems on the other hand, could 
enable the development of meaningful work: 
She seemed to understand what I was telling her. She did give me 
advice - saying it was early days in the relationship (with her 
partner) but she was able to listen while I was able to talk to her and 
I could work out what was happening. 
Clients were asked to indicate which problen^ they thought the worker 
considered them to have and also which activities the worker had carried out. 
The purpose of this was not, as with the previous data, to compare clients' and 
workers' definition of the situation, but to obtain some indication of the 
effectiveness with which workers communicated their definition of the clients' 
problems, and work undertaken, to the client. Effective communication 
would beshownbythe accuracy with which clients identified workers'views 
and activities undertaken. Clients were asked not to guess when they were 
uncertain. Of course, cases where clients did not know the worker's definition 
did not mean that they had not attempted to communicate this, just that the 
client had not 'taken it on board'. These data are quite unambiguous. (Table 
6). Satisfied clients were far more aware of workers' definitions of their 
problems and roles adopted than dissatisfied clients. Indeed the full range of 
measures of satisfaction (from very satisfied to very dissatisfied) shows a 
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fairly close relationship between level of satisfaction and degree of aware-
ness. In relation to problem areas the gap between satisfied and not satisfied 
clients was roughly equal between practical and emotional-relationship 
problems, but slightly greater with iU health. Greater differences are evident 
between different roles: apart from the broker role the gap varied between 13 
and 22%/ although far more clients were aware of the psychosocial treatment 
agent role than that of teacher counsellor. 
O U T C O M E 
The final area related to satisfaction was the clients' view of the outcome of 
intervention. This was based on two measures, psychiatric outcome and 
social problem outcome. Outcome with brief intervention emphasised the 
notion of the worker's helpfulness with social problems and improvement 
with mental health problems. Numerical values were attached to the degree 
of help or improvement as follows. 
Mental health problems Social problems 
No improvement 0 No help 0 
Improved 1 Helped 1 
Resolved 2 Solved 2 
The measures only examined positive change. In relation to mental 
health the notion of 'improvement' was used to indicate where help was 
given (as was'helped'forsocial problems),but given the brevity of intervention 
it wasmoreameasureof initial reductioninintensityornumberofsymptonr^s. 
Both 'resolved' for mental illness and 'solved' for social problems were used 
to indicate where the problem had been reduced to a point where it was no 
longer considered a problem. The index of change was as follows:. 
Sum of score of all The number of cases Index 
cases where the - 5 - where the problem = of 
problem was identified was identified change 
These methods are discussed in greater detail elsewhere (Sheppard, 
1991). Table 7 shows satisfaction related to psychiatric and social outcome. 
There is little ambiguity, either with the satisfied-not satisfied dichotomy, or 
with wider measures of satisfaction. On every measure of psychiatric and 
social problem outcome (except ill health) the outcome for satisfied clients 
was considerably more positive than for dissatisfied clients, with the gap 
widest in relation to emotional and relationship problems. Tl^ere was, 
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furthermore, a clear relationship between level of satisfaction and overall 
measures of both psychiatric and social problem outcome. Outcome was 
most positive for very satisfied clients and least positive for very dissatisfied 
clients. Where clients were satisfied the most positive outcomes were asso-
ciated with emotional and relationship problenis. The complete lack of any 
positive outcome is noticeable in relation to very dissatisfied clients. Clients' 
level of satisfaction, therefore, makes a great deal of sense in relation to their 
evaluation of outcome. 
This is reflected in comments by clients when asked what difference 
intervention made to them. 
One man suffering severe aiwiety said 
It made a lot of difference - things would have got out of all 
proportion I was on tranquillisers and I could have ended up 
in Moorhaven (psychiatric hospital) if I hadn't seen them. 
A woman spoke similarly: 
If I hadn't gone I would have just sat and stewed and it would have 
taken a lot longer to get over. I mean you've got your parents to talk 
to, but they're very subjective. 
Compare this with comments of those who felt there had been no 
improvement: 
...there was nothing really that they did that helped me. In fact I felt 
worse after they had been. 
Another commented, similarly, that intervention made: 
...no difference at all. Except it cost me money. I can't afford ten or 
11 quid for taxi fares. 
Another woman living in fear in a poor vandalised flat said of the 
difference intervention made: 
None really. They didn't actually do anything... I swear if I have to 
stay here much longer I'll slit my wrists. I can't stand it. 
Discussion 
This study, as stated at the outset, is not presented as a refutation of studies 
which emphasise the social context or personal construction by clients of their 
experience of intervention. Rather it sought, by exan^ning factors relating to 
the nature and outcome of intervention, to understand the relationship, if 
any, between satisfaction and those factors analysed. It possesses, therefore. 
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more an 'internal' (to the intervention process) rather than 'external' (relafing 
views to sodal context) focus. While recognising this, however, it remains the 
case that some relationships were identified between factors examined and 
degree of satisfaction. These in turn may be related to interpersonal skills. 
A clear message is given by these results: statements by clients about their 
degree of satisfaction should be taken seriously as an indication of their 
experience of intervention. When the research was devised global statements 
of satisfaction were intended to be used as general indications of the extent to 
which clients felt positive or negative about intervention. This view has been 
vindicated, although results are not simple. Case characteristics had little 
bearing on the degree of satisfaction: hence the nature of the clients problems 
did not affect satisfaction, although clients with problems of middling 
severity may be less inclined to be positive. There were also no overall 
noticeable differences related to the nature or amount of work undertaken. 
However, there is limited evidence from brokering activities with practical 
problems that undertaking roles appropriate to problems confronted is 
important. More significant, however, is the performance of tasks which 
clients considered necessary. Where these activities were not undertaken 
clients were far more likely to be dissatisfied. The definition of the client's 
situation was also important: safisfied clients displayed a greater degree of 
concordance with workers in their definition of their problems than dissat-
isfied clients. Satisfied clients also displayed greater awareness of workers' 
definitions of their problems and of the work undertaken on their behalf by 
workers. A perceived lack of openness by workers wassignificantly associated 
with dissatisfaction. Finally, the clients' perception of outcome was closely 
related tosatisfaction.Statementsofsatisfactionand dissatisfaction, therefore, 
provide a meaningful shorthand for their experience of intervention. How-
ever, simple dichotomies of satisfaction - dissatisfaction are perhaps less 
adequate than a wider range of measures indicating the degree of satisfaction. 
In particular they should include a 'neutral' or 'non committal' category 
which gives expression to the views of clients who were neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied. Common sense suggests that a purely dichotomous approach is 
artificial and this is confirmed by the number of clients who chose to be 
neutral. 
What, however, are we to make of these results in terms of practice? 
Before examining some of their implications we should note Shaw's (1976; 
1984) warnings about basing policy recommendations on clients' views. In 
particular he is concerned about other groups expressing views diverging 
from those of one study. It is worth noting in this context that a study of more 
extended intervention, while varying from this study in some factors, also 
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identifies significant relationships between satisfaction and the nature of 
intervention, and hence is broadly consistent (Sheppard, 1991a). Second, 
viewsshould be relatively stable over time. T\\is was, of course, a retrospective 
study. However, this study was less concerned with using satisfaction as an 
absolute statement of clients' views of intervention. It is possible that at 
different stages of intervention clients express different levels of satiisfaction 
(although this study of brief work precludes this kind of examination). 
However, this study was concerned to investigate, when the client expressed 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction, the relationship between different levels of 
satisfaction and the nature of intervention. 
Although two occupations were involved there is no reason to believe 
that, as guides to practice, the results are not relevant generally to interper-
sonal work. It should be remembered at the outset that this study represents 
the views of clients who had received brief intervention, usually less than a 
week, and hence contact with the worker was limited. Nonetheless, it 
provides empirical evidence about the need for certain skills if workers are to 
maxinriise client satisfaction. It was clearly not the kind of case, but the 
workers'approach and outcome which was significant. This is best understood 
in termsof factors associated toagreaterextentv/ith the absence of satisfaction 
rather than satisfaction. At the core of many factors appears to be problems 
of communication. Clients who were not satisfied showed less awareness of 
the worker's view of their problenns and of the actual work undertaken on 
their behalf. In the lattercasethisappears to havegonebeyond communication 
problems; dissatisfied clients were more frequently unaware of activities 
which were undertaken actually with them, and which to be performed at all 
necessarily required theirparticipation.Thisismostobviouswith the teacher-
counsellor role. This raises the question of how effectively this work was 
performed, when the participating client appeared unaware it had taken 
place! Nonetheless, the worker had clearly not effectively conununicated with 
the client about this work. The higher level of discordance between client and 
worker associated with dissatisfaction,emphasised a conflict in their definition 
of the client's problems. The client, however, may not agree v^th the worker's 
view of their problems, but this was only slightly more evident v^ dth dissat-
isfaction. It is when, taking the group as a whole, workers fail to recognise as 
problems those problems which clients considered themselves to have that 
they were more likely to be dissatisfied. In these circumstances clients would 
be likely to feel workers were not properly 'in touch' with their real situation. 
A perceived lack of openness by the worker - clearly an aspect of communi-
cation - was also associated with dissatisfaction. 
Communication skills are widely recognised as core to interpersonal 
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relations, the foundation upon which intervention is based (Haines, 1981, 
p.l70; Speight, 1986, p.86). This itself has a number of dimensions relating to 
giving and taking messages, checking out meanings, awareness of non-
verbal as well as verbal commixnication and so on (Compton and Galloway, 
1978; Brown, 1973; Smith and Bass, 1982). However, even this fails to give 
credit to the full range of potentially relevant skills. Listening, empathic 
understanding and individualising, for example, have dear relevance. The 
problem of discordance may arise because worker and client genuinely 
disagree over the client's problems. Does this mean that the worker is the 
prisoner of the client's defimtion of their problems if the client is to be 
satisfied? Not necessarily. Before unnecessarily finding lhen\selves discord-
ant with the client, it is possible to negotiate meanings with them in order to 
gain some kind of shared definition of problems. This may involve the age old 
social work principle of 'starting where the client is'. The ability to listen-to 
listen and know what 1 mean' (England, 1986, p.23) - is a clear element of 
starting where the client is. Empathic understanding "the power to feel 
imaginatively the experience of the other person to 'get on the same 
wavelength' as them " (Haines, 1981, p.l52) is closely associated, and required 
if the worker is to be aware not only of the client's problems but also the way 
they experience these problems, and the meaning these problems have for 
them. Problems do not occur in some objective abstract realm, but are placed 
within a client's personal biography and are subjectively experienced and 
imderstood. These brief examples of potentially relevant skills serve to 
emphasise the enormous complexity of the interpersonal situations in which 
two (or more) people come together to work on particular problems. These 
are not, of course, the only potentially relevant skills. Therapeutic skills such 
as clarification, a process enabling clients to re-order their thinking about 
themselves and their situations (Middlemanand Goldberg, 1974,p.l22)orthe 
promotion of self-understanding (Haines, 1981, p.91) may on occasions help 
clients reinterpret problems in ways which bring their definitions closer to 
those of the worker. 
A lack of openness was also significantly associated with dissatisfaction. 
Openness, genuinenessand authenticity have also been extensively discussed 
in the literature (Perlman, 1979, p.60; Barry, 1984, p.l41). They are closely 
related: the worker openly providing information requested, and when 
appropriate initiating information sharing (Kadushin, 1983). Of course, the 
research identified client perception of openness: it's lack indicating a felt lack 
of trust,ofsecretivenesson thepartof the worker.Itmaybethattheseworkers 
were not, in fact, entirely open: but this serves again to emphasise the 
importance of effectively communicating openness. Finally, the data gener-
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ally indicate the importance of approaches associated with task centred and 
contract work (Reid, 1978; Corden and Preston-Shoot, 1987). Key elements of 
this are client participation in defining and carrying out intervention, clarity 
in identification of problems and tasks, and explicit consensual agreements. 
Intervention with psychosocial problems is a complex process. The 
brevity of intervention may suggest a greater opportimity for commuruca-
tion difficulties than more extended intervention, v^th its greater, opportu-
nity for mutual definition sharing (although this issue requires investigation). 
However, this article has both shown that client statements of satisfaction 
represent a mearungful assessment of their experience, and that, if satisfac-
tion is used as a means for evaluating intervention, it provides strong support 
for the need for the development and use of a variety of skills and practice 
competencies. 
Notes 
1. These were specialist menial health workers, who were used to identifying 
mental health problems in their clients. There were, therefore, two classifica-
tions. The first, of mental ill health, included problems such as schizophrenia, 
depression, mania and so on. The second, of social problems included, for 
example, financial, housing, marital, social relations and so on. It was possible, 
therefore, for a woman considered to have marital problems to be classified as 
depressed. The worker may consider the marital problems to be primary, 
perhaps because the n^rital problems are responsible for their depression. 
Alternatively ihey may consider the depression primary, where for example, 
marital problen\s arose largely Ijecause of the depression. 
2. Except where otherwise staled, the chi squared lest was used to test for 
sigruficance. 
3. If a case was defined as 'definite', the person would have to be sufficiently 
disturbed thai a psychiatrist would not besurprised to see Ihem in out-patients 
(or hospitalised) and likely to benefit from psychiatric treatment. Borderline 
cases had symptoms of a disorder, and their symptoms were not sufficient in 
number or severity to be rated as cases. The distinction, then, was one of 
severity. 
4. Practical problems were: housing, financial, employment and home nwnage-
ment. 
Emotional and relationship problems were : marital, child abuse or neglect, 
other child care problems, loss/separation, other social relations or isolation 
problems, emotional and delinquency or crimiiial behaviour. 
Ill health problems were : major physical ill health or disability and minor 
physical ill health or disability. 
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5. Whittaker's divisions were psychosocial treatment and support agent, teacher-
counsellor, broker and advocate. To these were added assessor, because of the 
importance of this function and drug administrator, significant in the CPN 
role. 
Activities were defined as follows: 
Assessor: section assessment, other assessment and information gathering 
Dnag administrator: one activity 
Psychosocial treatment and support agent: psychodynamic work, ventilation 
and monitoring. 
Teacher<ounsellor: education in social skills, providing information and 
advice, discussing future options. 
Broker-advocate: mobilising resources, advocacy on behalf of the client. 
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Table 1: Mentally il l clients; satisfaction related to definite and 
borderline status. 
Satisfied Not satisfied 
Definite 7(88%) 1(12%) 
Borderline 5 (38%) 8 (62%) 
Two tailed p = 0.07 (Fisher's exact test) 
Table 2: Impact of broker role on satisfaction for clients with practical 
problems and impact of psychosocial treatment agent role on clients 
with emotional problems. 
Very 
satisfied 
Quite 
satisfied 
Neutral Quite dis- Very dis-
satisfied satisfied 
Broker role 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 
No broker role 4 (45%) 1 (11%) - 3 (33%) 1 (11%) 
Treatment agent 5(25%) 6 (30%) 5 (25%) 2 (10%) 2 (10%) 
Not treatment 
agent 3 (20%) 5 (33%) 4 (27%) 2 (13%) 1(7%) 
N / S 
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Table 3: Clients' desire for alternative actively related to satisfaction. 
Very Quite Neutral Quite dis- Very dis-
satisfied satisfied satisfied satisfied 
Alternative 
activity 1 (6%) 2 (13%) 5 (31%) 4 (25%) 4 (25%) 
wanted 
Alternative 
activity 9 (39%) 9 (39%) 5 (22%) 
not wanted 
2 tailed p=0.033 Mann WlxitneyU test. 
Table 4: Division of responsibility for planning and action related to 
satisfaction. 
Satisfied Not satisfied 
Mainly/entirely worker 
in at least one area. 8 (73%) 3 (27%) 
No cirea where mainly/ 
entirely worker. 13 (46%) 15 (54%) 
N / S 
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Table 5: Concordance/discordance and agreement/disagreement 
between client and worker. 
SatisHed 
Concord Discord 
Not satisfied 
Concord Discord 
Practical 7 (30%) 
Emotional 36(63%) 
m health 5(38%) 
16 (70%) 
21 (37%) 
8 (62%) 
7(32%) 
19 (38%) 
15(68%) 
31 (62%) 
5 (100%) 
Total 48 (52%) 45 (48%) 26 (34%) 51 (66%) 
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
Practical 7 (70%) 
emotional/ 
Relationship36 (78%) 
m health 5(71%) 
3 (30%) 
10 (22%) 
2 (29%) 
7(64%) 
19 (76% 
4 (36%) 
6 (24%) 
3 (100%) 
Total 48 (76%) 15 (24%) 26 (67%) 13 (33%) 
Very Quite Neither Quite dis- Very dis-
satisfied satisfied satisfied satisfied 
% % 
Concordance- 49 47 44 57 38 34 19 47 20 20 
discordance 
Agreement- 28 82 35 71 17 76 14 64 8 50 
disagreement 
T is total number of instances of (a) concordance and discordance; and (b) total number of 
instances of agreement and disagreement. 
% is (a) Proportion of instances of concordance and discordance which were concordant; 
and (b) proportion of instances agreement and disagreement where agreement oc-
curred. 
Social Work & Social Sciences Review 3(2) 
148 MICHAEL SHEPPARD 
Table 6: Client awareness of workers definition of their problems 
and of activities undertaken by the worker. 
Satisfied 
Aware Not aware 
Not satisfied 
Aware Not aware 
Practical 6 (60%) 4 (40%) 
Emotional/ 29(63%) 17(37%) 
relationship 
5 (50%) 
13 (50%) 
5 (50%) 
13 (50%) 
m health 5 (71%) 2 (29%) 0 (0%) 3 (100%) 
Total 40 (63%) 23 (37%) 18 (46%) 21 (54%) 
Assessor 12 (80%) 3 (20%) 8 (67%) 4 (33%) 
Psychosocial 
treatment 
Agent 12(100%) 0 (0%) 7 (78%) 2 (22%) 
Teacher-
counsellor 15 (56%) 12 (44%) 10 (42%) 14 (58%) 
Broker 3 (75%) 1 (25%) 0 (0%) 3(100%) 
Total 42 (71%) 16 (29%) 25 (52%) 23 (48%) 
Very Quite Neither Quite dis- Very dis-
satisfied satisfied satisfied satisfied 
T % T % T % T % T % 
Problems 28 71 35 57 17 59 14 43 8 25 
Role 28 86 30 60 25 56 11 45 12 50 
T is total number of problems identified by xvorkers. 
% is proportion of problems identified by ivorkers of which clients were aware. 
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Table 7: Satisfaction related to outcome: indexes of change 
Satisfied Not satisfied 
Psychiatric outconne 0.50 0.07 
Sodal problem 
outcome 0.48 0.09 
Practical 0.31 0.04 
Emotional 
relationship 0.53 0.09 
ni health 0.09 0.00 
Veiy 
satisfied 
Quite 
satisfied 
Neither Quite dis-Very dis-
satisfied satisfied 
Psychiatric 
outcome 0.56 0.43 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Sodal problem 
outcome 0.68 0.28 0.14 0.10 0.00 
Practical 0.33 0.30 0.00 0.25 0.00 
Emotional 
relationship 0.71 0.36 0.14 0.08 0.00 
m health 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Theory for Approved Social Work 
the Use of the Compulsory 
Admissions Assessment Schedule 
M I C H A E L S H E P P A R D 
Michael Sheppard is a principal lecturer in social work at the Department of Applied 
Social Science. University of Plymouth. 
S U M M A R Y 
In his work on compulsoo' admissions under the Mental Health Act, 1983, Sheppard 
(1990) developed the Compulsory- Admissions Assessment Schedule ( C A S H ) in response 
to identified knowledge deficiencies and as a means for operationalizing a knowledge 
base distinctive to social work. While subject to detailed theoretical development it was 
not tested in practice. This article examines the use of C A S H in practice, and the results 
have implications for compulsory admission assessments. This paper indicates that C A S H 
is practical to use, that, although there are some grey areas, C A S H on the whole distingu-
ishes clearly between possible sections and those not possible to section, that dangers, 
hazards and risks are clearly identified, that rating is consistent with the seriousness of 
dangers identified, that cumulative use of C A S H may help develop accountability, and 
that social work evaluation of C A S H is positive. This article concludes that there are 
considerable benefits from the use of C A S H , that ASWs should be trained properly in 
its use, and, more widely, that these results, together with Sheppard's (1990) original 
research and theoretical development, indicates that, when conducted appropriately, 
social science can directly, and beneficially, be applied to practice. 
Social work has major responsibilities under the Mental Health Ac t , 
1983 (the A c t ) . Under this approved social workers (ASWs) may act 
as applicants for admission to hospital alongside doctors who provide 
medical recommendations. A person (defined by the Ac t as a patient) 
may be compulsorily admitted i f they are suffering a mental disorder 
and admission is in the interests of their own health or safety or for the 
protection of others (assuming they wi l l not enter hospital voluntarily). 
Admission may be for as long as six months (section 3) and section 3 
is renewable. This is an area both of major importance, and complexity 
Correspondence to Michael Sheppard, Department of Applied Social Science, University 
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of judgement, for social work , involving, as i t does, issues of civil rights, 
and the balance of the treatment needs of the patient against issues of 
personal liberty. 
Recent research has demonstrated the critical role to be taken by 
approved social workers (ASWs) independent of medicine, in section 
assessments (Sheppard, 1990, 1991Z?, c, d\ Barnes etal., 1990; Fisher et 
aL, 1987). A consistent theme is the importance of social factors, both 
in the form of social disadvantage such as race and gender and the 
social process of assessment in understanding sections. However, there 
is evidence that ASWs have been disadvantaged by the lack of a formal 
knowledge base which can provide a balance to medicine in the tension 
between medically based and social assessment (Sheppard, 1990). Its 
consequence is presented in two alternative orientations reflecting.the 
'assumptive world ' of participating professionals. The first, a 'mental 
health orientation' is characterized by greater emphasis on mental 
health status than the health or safety of the patient or protection of 
others. This has a number of associated tendencies: towards a presump-
tion of risk, where the presence of mental illness was regarded as inher-
ently risky, a lack, on some occasions, of clarity in assessment and a 
wide 'threshold of risk* with inconsistencies in some cases between 
ASWs assessing patients. The 'social risk' orientation, by contrast, is 
characterized by equal status given to mental disorder and the health 
or safety of the patient and protection of others, a lack of preconcep-
tions of risk, and a requirement of clarity in assessment of risk. Shep-
pard (1990) speculated that this approach, appropriate to social work, 
would reduce the 'threshold of risk*. I t was also evident f r o m the 
research that development of a formal knowledge base was of great 
importance in this critical area of social work. 
The compulsory admissions assessment schedule ( C A S H ) was 
developed in response to deficiencies in the knowledge base available 
in this critical area of social work. Through the development of the 
concept of social risk and other concepts, its aim was to provide a 
knowledge base distinctive to social work. I t is intended to be used by 
ASWs when carrying out their assessments as a critical part of the 
assessment process. However, although subject to detailed theoretical 
development, C A S H was not actually tested in practice. This is of con-
siderable importance because of its relevance to the adequacy of prac-
tice in the critical area o f compulsory admission assessment. This article 
reports on the use of C A S H by ASWs in assessments for compulsory 
admission over a one year period. 
The assessment of C A S H was based on a number of questions 
informed by expectations noted by Sheppard (1990) in its theoretical 
development. 
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1. Is C A S H an instrument which is practical to use in practice 
situations? 
2. Does C A S H discriminate clearly between circumstances considered 
to require sections f rom those which do not? 
3. Is there internal validity in the use of C A S H (Oppenheim, 1986); 
that is, does the outcome make sense in relation to factors identified 
in each case? 
4. Is the use of CASH associated with clarity in the assessment of risk? 
5. To what extent does C A S H induce consistency between ASWs in 
their assessment? 
6. Does C A S H provide the opportunity for wider accountability by 
ASWs? 
7. D o ASWs consider C A S H makes a positive contribution to their 
assessments? 
M E T H O D 
Sheppard argued that the criteria relating to the health or safety of 
the patient and protection of others were those most significant for 
understanding the distinctiveness of the role of the A S W , and C A S H 
concentrated on this as the focus for ASWs' knowledge base. Extensive 
discussion of the construction, definitions and use of C A S H are given 
elsewhere (Sheppard, 1990) and summarized in the Appendix. The ana-
lysis took the form of action research (Clark, 1972), since methods 
allowed comparison with Sheppard's (1990) previous research. Three 
other elements were also involved. First, assessment was made against 
goals identified by Sheppard, such as consistency in rating. Second, 
'internal validity' was assessed by, for example, examining rating against 
the type of dangers identified. Thi rd , the ASWs' views were sought. 
C A S H is a complex instrument the use of which is designed to be 
learned primarily as part of ASW training. The ASWs involved in this 
research however, were specifically trained for the study, rather than as 
part of a 'normal' ASW training programme. Training for this research 
occurred in five stages, using a combination of individual and group 
training. First, the results of the initial research survey identifying key 
issues and problems confronting ASWs were presented to the group 
and discussed in detail. This provided a forum for considering the relev-
ance of C A S H . Second, arising out of this, group training took place 
in the use of C A S H over two sessions whereby the ASWs became 
acquainted in detail both with the main dimensions and detailed cat-
egories of C A S H , and together with this, the process of assessment 
which accompanies its use. Third , individual instruction was given on 
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its use, drawing upon assessments previously undertaken by the ASW, 
and filling in a schedule in relation to each of these previously under-
taken assessments. This served the purpose both of further acquainting 
them with the schedule and demonstrating its applicability to practice. 
The fourth stage was a 'pi lot ' period, lasting three months, when the 
ASWs used C A S H in actual section assessments. This sensed two pur-
poses. I t demonstrated to the ASWs that it could be used in practice 
situations (there had previously been some reservations in this respect, 
particularly in relation to possible crises), and it helped them to become 
proficient in its use. Accompanying CASH was a brief version of the 
instructions provided by Sheppard (1990), to which reference could be 
made i f necessary when carrying out the assessment. Advice was avail-
able on occasions where ASWs were uncertain about its appropriate 
use. I t was only fol lowing this training that the actual research was 
carried out, over the period of a year, f rom 1 December 1989 to 30 
November 1990., 
Five ASWs, based at a community mental health centre ( C M H C ) , 
agreed to involvement in the project. These were experienced ASWs 
with at least five years post qualifying experience. This has both advant-
ages and disadvantages. I t was advantageous because, as experienced 
ASWs, they were used to making section assessments, and therefore 
likely more easily to concentrate additionally on developing their use 
of C A S H . However, they were also used to their own personal ways of 
undertaking assessments, and C A S H required they develop further 
their ways of making these assessments. However, this process is encap-
sulated in C A S H itself, so the use of it meant they were able to under-
take assessments consistent with C A S H . The C M H C was at the centre 
of a medium sized city of 240,000, with an overwhelmingly white popu-
lation, and received the overhwieming majority of referrals received by 
ASWs in the area. The availability of psychiatrists at the centre meant 
that, in the overwhelming majority of cases ASWs were accompanied 
by psychiatrists. I t was open only during working hours, Monday to 
Friday, so data presented here do not include other times, covered by 
out-of-hours social workers. 
This article is divided by methodology broadly into two. The first 
part involves a primarily quantitative methodology, based on the results 
gained f rom the use of C A S H . Tests of statistical significance made use 
of three non-parametric tests (Siegel. 1956). Where the researcher is 
interested in determining whether the two samples are f rom populations 
which differ in any respect at all that is in location or dispersion or 
skewness, etc, the chi squared test is approporiate. The chi squared test 
has limitations. Most notably, where n<20 or the expected frequency 
in 20 per cent or more of cells is less than five, the Fisher exact test 
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should be used. I t is used when the scores f rom two independent 
random samples fal l into one or other of two mutually exclusive classes 
(a 2x2 contingency table). The test determines whether the two groups 
differ in the proportion wi th which they fall into the two classifications. 
The third test used was the Mann Whitney U test which may be used 
to test whether two independent groups have been drawn f rom the 
same population. I f we have samples f rom two populations A and B , 
the null hypothesis is that A and B have the same distribution. We may 
have an alternative (to the null hypothesis) directional hypothesis that 
A is stochastically larger than B or a further alternative hypothesis that 
B is stochastically larger than A . A two tailed test involves a prediction 
of differences which does not state direction. I t is appropriate for use 
where the intention is to test whether two samples represent populations 
which di f fer in location (central tendency). In relation to these tests the 
probability values should always be interpreted in the context of the 
actual differences between the groups. 
The second involves a qualitative methodology, based on interviews 
with ASWs which fol lowed that reported in detail by Sheppard else-
where (Sheppard, 1990). A l l interviews were conducted during the 
week following the compulsory admission assessment. This meant, as 
the earliest day for the section assessment was Monday and the latest 
day for the interview was Friday of the following week, the longest gap 
between section assessment and interview was 11 days. There was, as 
a result, no problem of recall. The ASWs were always interviewed at 
their place of work. The degree of training involved was extensive, and 
there was no problem motivating the ASWs for involvement in the 
inter\'iews. 
The ASWs were asked a number of questions directly related to their 
conduct, and perceptions, of the section assessment. Those relevant to 
this study were: 
• What were the social circumstances which led to referral? 
• What were the problems of health or safety to the patient? or (for 
the protection of others) who needed protecting and f rom what did 
they need protecting? 
• D id the schedule help in any respect your understanding and assess-
ment of the situation? i f so, how? and 
• How long did it take to fill in? 
These questions were designed to provide further information relevant 
to our assessment of C A S H . One central issue was the degree of clarity 
displayed by the ASWs in relation to their assessments, and in particular 
their reasons for admission. By asking them these questions it was pos-
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sible subsequently to analyse their answers for the degree of precision 
with which they identified the dangers and consequences of failing to 
admit. This is of some importance, since it was evident in Sheppard's 
(1990) research that a lack of clarity was, at times, associated with 
admission without clear reasons of why it was taking place and inconsist-
ent decision making. Given the implications of compulsory admission 
for personal liberty, lack of clarity was of considerable concern. I t was 
important not to 'lead' the ASW in this respect, since this might result 
in more precise answers, suggesting a spurious clarity where it did not, 
in fact, exist. Thus, following the initial question (what in detail were 
the problems of health or safety to the patient? or who needed pro-
tecting and f rom what did they need protecting) the A S W was simply 
asked i f they would amplify the statement. This would allow them to 
elucidate in more detail the way they saw themselves to be acting. These 
questions also allowed us to examine further the consistency of decision 
making by the ASWs. It became possible to examine ASWs' descrip-
tions in relation to the rating they gave of seriousness of danger. This 
allowed us to examine whether ASWs were rating similar situations in 
similar ways and different situations in different ways. 
R E S U L T S 
Altogether 71 section assessments were undertaken by these ASWs 
during the study year, of which 66 were considered to suffer mental 
disorder. The data derived f rom ASWs use of C A S H , except where 
otherwise stated, focus on those cases with identified mental disorder. 
This is because, i f we hold mental disorder constant we can concentrate 
on the process of assessment of the health or safety of the patient and 
protection of others which is the focus for C A S H . T w o difficulties—of 
adequately training ASWs in the use of C A S H and the rate of referral 
to ASWs—inevitably limits the number of cases which may be consid-
ered in this type of study. In view of this, the number o f cases analysed 
here represent a sizeable sample. 
H A Z A R D S 
Hazards are factors which introduce the possiblity o f an undesired out-
come, and dangers are the feared outcome. Dangers arise, or become 
more likely in the face of particular hazards. The difference may be 
illustrated by the following example: 
Watch out for the banana skin on the pavement, for you may slip and hurt 
yourself. 
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Here the danger is that you may 'slip and hurt yourself and the hazard 
is the banana skin. The third significant concept, risk, is the likelihood 
that you wi l l slip and hurt yourself taking into account the presence of 
the banana skin. 
Table 1 shows the six broad classifications covering twenty-seven haz-
ardous situations identified in C A S H . This shows clear distinctions 
between sectionable and non-sectionable patients. Health hazards 
(focusing on the patient) and threatening violence (focusing on others) 
were significantly associated with being sectionable.^ Indeed, these were 
the key factors in deciding whether or not a patient was sectionable: 
they were absent in only four of 70 instances where other broad hazards 
were identified in sectionable patients compared with 18 (53 per cent)of 
34 instances for non-sectionable patients. Contravening social regula-
tions was significantly associated with not being sectionable: individuals 
were, therefore, often referred where their behaviour challenged social 
rules ( for example withdrawing, shouting, creating a disturbance) but 
this was often considered insufficient to merit sectioning. Analysis of 
detailed classification reveals a greater range of hazards in sectionable 
patients, averaging 5.1 compared with 2.95 for non-sectionable patients. 
T A B L E 1. Hazards related to outcome: broad areas 
Sectionable Non -sectionable 
Health 34 (74) 8 (40 ) p = 0-018 
Failure lo provide basic needs 19 (41) 6 (30 ) N/S 
Threatening violence 35 (76) 5 (25) p = 0.0003 
Actual violence 10 (22) 1 (5) N/S* 
Out of control of self and 
actions 33 (72) 10 (50) N/S 
Contravening social regulations 
or expectations 23 (50) 16 (80) /7 = 0.044 
Other 5 ( 1 1 ) 2 (10 ) N/S* 
Figures in brackets are the percentage of each group for which hazards in the relevant broad 
area were identified. The chi squared test with Yates correction has been used to test for 
significance except for *actual violence* and *oiher\ neither of which is significant, and where 
Fisher's exact test* was used. 
' *Seciionable* refers to individuals who were cither sectioned (under sections 2, 3 or 4) 
or who would have been sectioned had they not agreed to informal admission. Not 
sectionable refers to individuals who were not admitted or who were admitted informally, 
but would not have been sectioned had they refused admission. 
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D A N G E R S 
Mental Health Danger, (Table 2) Danger is the feared outcome in the 
face of a particular hazard. C A S H divides these into four: health 
(mental or physical) or safety of the patient, and protection of others, 
consistent wi th the A c t . Mental health was an important aspect of 
'health or safety', identified in 63 per cent of sectionable and 30 per 
cent o f non-sectionable patients, although in sectionable patients mental 
health threat had to be quite or very severe. I n 32 of these 35 cases, 
whether sectionable or not, the mental health threat was psychotic. 
However, mental health threat was rarely considered significant enough 
on its own to just i fy compulsory admission: on only two occasions were 
individuals sectioned on mental health grounds alone.- This provides 
evidence of a balance of consideration of mental disorder with health 
or safety of the patient or protection of others criteria characteristic of 
the Social Risk orientation which C A S H was intended to encourage. 
T A B L E 2. Dangers—Severity related to outcome 
Mental Physical Safety Protection 
health health of others 
Sect. Not Sect. Not Sect. Not Sect. Not 
Sect. Sect. Sect. Sect. 
Mild — — 2 3 1 5 1 3 
Mild to moderate - 2 3 - 1 5 4 3 
Moderate - 4 5 - 2 5 8 2 
Quite severe 23 - 7 - 12 - 11 1 
Very severe 6 - 4 - 16 - 7 -
Total 29 6 21 3 32 15 31 9 
Significant, or just below significant results were obtained using the Mann Whitney U Test 
for 
Mental health: corrected for lies, 2 tailed test - p < 0.001 
Physical health: corrected for ties. 2 tailed test - p = 0.01 
Safety: corrected for ties, 2 tailed test - p < O.OOl 
Protection of others: corrected for ties, 2 tailed lest - p = 0.002 
- On all other occasions it was associated with one or more other danger. Dangers were 
divided by type, based on distinction in the Act. Thus there were health dangers (mental 
or physical), safety dangers, and dangers involving protection of others. Multiple dangers 
were considered to occur where more than one of these danger areas were identified in 
a single case, at moderate or above severity. Table 5 shows a *cut off point of moderate 
danger distinguishing the overwhelming majority of seciionable from non-sectionable 
patients. 
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Physical III Health Danger. CASH distinguishes between both sec-
lionable and non-sectionable patients (Table 2) and between different 
levels of severity associated with particular dangers. A l l five cases where 
the physical health threat was less than moderate were multiple danger 
cases. The type of physical health threat was classified by Sheppard 
(1990) as a means, broadly, for informing ASWs, as laypersons in rela-
tion to physical illness, in the assessment of severity of danger. Thus, 
life threatening illness was considered generally more severe than that 
requiring specialist hospital treatment, in turn more severe than that 
requiring GP treatment or which was transient (see Sheppard (1990) 
for an extended discussion). Although intended as a rough rather than 
precise guide, since there could clearly be overlaps, there was a clear 
relationship between type and rating of severity of physical health 
threat. This can be expressed by attaching a score, ranging f rom one to 
five, to rating of severity.^ Life threatening illness averaged 4.75, spe-
cialist hospital treatment averaged 3.15, requiring GP treatment and 
transient illness averaged 1.66. This broadly consistent relationship 
between nature and rating of danger is consistent with the original aims 
of C A S H . 
Safety of the Patient. A threat to the safety of the patient was identified 
in the majori ty of both groups, with ratings (apart f rom minor overlaps) 
of greater severity associated with sectionable patients (Table 2).* The 
sensitivity o f rating to the t}'pe of danger is again indicated i f we give 
a numerical rating to the severity of danger and relate it to type of 
danger. The critical safety threats were death, injur>' and rape, and 
other threats were of marginal importance.' There was a greater range 
of safety dangers amongst sectionable than non-sectionable patients, 
averaging 2.38 for the former and 1.6 for the latter. 
Protection of Others. Despite some overlap, explained in the same way 
as overlaps in safety of the patient dangers, sectionable patients were 
rated as more dangerous than non-sectionable patients. This contrast is 
most evident in relation to the more dangerous extreme, where in 21 
' Very severe, 5; qufte severe, 4; moderate, 3; mild to moderate, 2; mild, 1. 
• Both cases rated less than moderate were multiple danger cases. Where non-sectionable 
cases were rated as moderate they were not multiple danger cases and ratings of overall 
risk (see below) placed them below moderate seriousness. This indicates that a rating of 
moderate severity in one area was possible without, overall, the seriousness of danger 
and level of risk being sufficiently great for individuals to be sectionable. 
* Average ratings were; death, 4.87; rape. 4,5; injury. 4.33. Where death, injury or rape 
are excluded, the ratings of severity in other areas drop to practically the minimum 
possible: loss of family, spouse, child and material goods were rated as one, loss of social 
relations as 1.67 and prosecution as 1.2. 
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cases of threats of physical harm or injury to others and six of death, 
only one was evident in non-sectionable patients. The sensitivity of 
rating to type of danger is again gauged by attaching a numerical value 
to severity, as previously shown, with death, physical harm and injury 
rated as far more severe than all other types of danger.* Together, these 
data confirm the significance of more serious dangers to others in ASWs' 
assessments. 
Wide versus narrow interpretations of (he law. Sheppard (1990) distingu-
ishes between wide and narrow interpretations of the law. This is most 
obvious in relation to protection of others, where a narrow interpreta-
tion involves only acts of violence (Anderson-Ford and Halsey, 1984), 
a wide interpretation goes as far as to include irritation and nuisance 
suffered by neighbours (Hoggett, 1984) and a third position lies between 
the two, protection involving emotional strain as well as physical harm 
(Jones, 1988). Sheppard (1990) expressed the hope that the range of 
interpretations (narrow to wide) would become narrower with the use 
of C A S H . These results suggest a narrow rather than wide interpreta-
tion of the law by ASWs, with a concentration on more serious circum-
stances rather than those which cause social irritation. Hazards contra-
vening social regulations, such as disturbance, lawbreaking or failure 
adquately to carry out a significant role area (for example child care) 
were significantly associated wi th individuals not being sectionable 
(although such hazares did not preclude sectioning). Amongst dangers 
the critical threats to safety of the patient were death, injury and rape, 
and for the protection of others, death, physical harm or injury. 
R I S K 
Risk refers to the increased likelihood of a loss outcome (in our terms 
danger) in the face of particular hazards. CASH identifies two areas 
which may contribute to or reduce risk levels: the behaviour of the 
patient—involving five alternatives (Sheppard, 1990) and availability 
and adequacy of support. In 44 of the 46 sectionable cases patients' 
behaviour contributed to the increased probability o f danger compared 
with 7 of the 20 non-sectionable patients. Patients' behaviour broadly 
contributed in three ways; by commission (that is by doing something, 
increasing the danger, 19 cases), by omission (by not doing something, 
increasing the danger, 13 cases) and by presenting a barrier preventing 
* Average scores: death, 5.0; physical harm/injury, 4.72; physical illness and mental ill-
ness, 4.0. If we exclude cases where death, injury and physical/menta! health are involved, 
ratings drop dramatically, averaging 2.0 for all other dangers. 
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Others f rom helping (12 cases).' C A S H , therefore, enabled ASWs to 
indicate clearly the contribution of the patient to risk. 
A second element of risk relates to available supports. We may be 
seriously concerned for an elderly demented man living on his own (he 
may wander off into the traffic, he may leave fires or chip pans on), we 
may be less concerned—the risk may be less—where adequate supervi-
sion is available. C A S H divides support in eighteen categories within 
two domains, instrumental and emotional support. Table 3 shows the 
total number of support areas identified in relation to sectionable and 
non-sectionable patients. These are divided into three: supports 
required, available and adequate,^ which are together defined as sup-
port needs. On average, more support needs were identified for sec-
T A B L ^ 3. Support related to outcome: total number of support areas identified 
Required Available Adequate Total Support per 
person 
Sectionable 
Instrumental 75 (54) 55 (40) 8 (6) 138 3 0 
Emotional 17 (52) 12 (36) 4 ( 1 2 ) 33 0-7 
Non-Sectionable 
Instrumental 15 (32) 9 (19) 23 (49) 47 2-35 
Emotional 4 ( 3 6 ) 1 (9) 6 (55 ) 11 0-55 
Total 
Sectionable 92 (54) 67 (39) 12 (7) 171 3-7 
Non-Sectionable 19 (33) 10(17) 29 (50) 58 2 9 
Figures in brackets represent the percentage of total in each row. The number of support areas 
identified may at limes exceed the number of patients assessed. This is because an individual 
may have more than one support need identified. 
' Examples of these types are; 
Commission—"bolting across the road' without any care for traffic, deliberately hoard-
ing tablets, intent on suicide, trying to make (highly explosive) rocket fuel. 
0/nt55ton—entirely involved individuals who had not taken necessary medication or 
failed to eat. 
Those presenting barriers—on^ person's offensive behaviour had alienated others who 
would no longer help, another locked her home help in the cupboard, who now refused 
necessary support. 
• Supports are defined as ^required' where such support was required but support was 
neither available (from anyone else) nor adequate. Supports are defined as 'available* 
where support was required and was available, but the support was not considered 
adequate. Support was considered ^adequate' where it was required, available and 
adequate. 
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tionable than non-sectionable patients,' and, for sectionable patients, 
far more support needs identified were required, or required and avail-
able (but not adequate) than support needs that were adequate. Fur-
thermore, the most prominent support needs identified in sectionable 
patients—supervision of taking medication, monitoring behaviour and 
nursing/health support were also overwhelmingly not adequately pro-
vided. These particular support needs are entirely consistent with hos-
pitalization: behaviour may be monitored, nursing provided and med-
ication given most effectively in the closed medical environment of the 
hospital. 
Table 4 shows the average risk score for each broad area by type of 
support. Each broad area contained a number of individual categories. 
The data presented here are based.on a number of cases where, in each 
broad support area, one or more category (of required, available and 
adequate support) was identified by the ASW. '° The score for each 
support area was based on the rating of level of risk where each of the 
above supports figured." Table 4 is quite striking. Interestingly, risk 
scores indicate that availability of support had little impact: it was when 
T A B L E 4. Broad areas of support: average risk score related to support need 
Required Available Adequate Total 
Instrumental 
Health 3-79 3-92 2-50 3-71 
Personal-instrumental 4-17 3-81 2-22 3-70 
Task suppon 3-83 4 00 2-85 3-36 
Emotional 
Personal-emotional 3-92 3-62 2-67 3-55 
Emotional suppon to others 3-50 4-00 2-75 3-43 
' The difference between instrumental and emotional suppon in number of suppon areas 
identified should be understood in relation to a smaller number of categories classifying 
emotional support. 
'° Health support included: nursing/health supervision, supervising taking medication, 
persona] hygiene supervision; 
Task suppon included: cooking, home management/cleaninc/shopping, physical super-
vision of children, physcial supervision of other dependents, supervision of finances: 
Personal instrumental suppon included: personal physical aid, supervision of eating, 
accommodation, monitoring behaviour; 
Personal emotional support included: emotional support/ventilation, psychodynamic 
support. 
Emotional support to others included: emotional support for the patient*s distressed 
relatives, providing children's emotional/developmental needs. 
" The scores were as follows: low risk, one; fairly low, two; moderate, three; fairly high, 
four; high, five. The score in each support area represents the average for all the cases 
where that support was identified. 
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it was considered adequate that risk levels reduced (cf Henderson, 1984; 
Henderson et al., 1981). I t was not sufficient for someone to offer help: 
only adequacy reduced risk. This has major implications for social work: 
if in potential crisis situations, support has been developed, this may 
reduce the likelihood of compulsory admission. This provides further 
support for Sheppard's (1990) emphasis on the relevance of preventive 
work for section assessment. 
E V I D E N C E 
The accumulation and evaluation of evidence is of obvious importance 
when conducting assessments. Sheppard (1990) identified two key 
dimensions, comprehensiveness and reliability, in the accumulation of 
evidence. Comprehensiveness involves obtaining information, as far as 
possible f rom all relevant individuals, making the assessment as thor-
ough as possible. Reliability involves the critical analysis of evidence 
and the collection of sufficient information, and to be as confident as 
practicable that the information gleaned is clear and accurate. CASH 
tackles this by asking the A S W to idenlif}' whether the main relevant 
individuals were interviewed as part of the assessment process, and 
where some were not interviewed, why they were not. 
These data are analysed in terms of the whole group, rather than 
only those with a mental illness. In 64 cases some relevant others (apan 
f r o m the patient and participating professionals) were interviewed. 
Wi th the exception of two of the other cases lack of contact was under-
standable, and, importantly in the assessment of C A S H itself, in all but 
one case, the A S W provided some justification for limited contact with 
others, the question having forced them to consider this issue. The most 
frequent contacts were made with spouses, mothers, daughters and 
neighbours. I n 27 cases, however (38 per cent), the A S W did not inter-
view all relevant individuals. The reason for this may be grouped into 
four f rom ASW accounts: those not available or at work (15 cases), 
those living away (4 cases), relatives not known (2 cases) and six cases 
involving a variety of individual reasons. In only two cases were the 
reasons for failing to interview questionable. 
Case involving lack of contact: in one case the ASW wrote 'mother not interviewed, 
not available', but subsequently commented that, in retrospect, this was possibly wrong 
(the woman had overdosed and the doctor said the mother could not cope). In another 
case the ASW made no comment. The latter case involved no justification for not inter-
viewing. Cases where reasons for not interviewing were questionable: In one case a father 
was not interviewed, although the patient was 'making definite threats against his dad' 
and had been thrown out by his father two weeks previously following a fight. In another 
case the father of a woman expressing ^pathological hate' against him and making threats 
was not contacted. In both cases the relationship between these people and the patient 
were clear aspects of the danger being assessed. 
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C A S H allowed ASWs clearly to indicate those who were interviewed, 
those who were not and reasons why some were not interviewed. In 
this respect it helped highlight the importance of comprehensive assess-
ment, helped ASWs justify their actions and provide reassurance that 
their assessment had been as comprehensive as possible. Inadequate 
explanations of failure to contact by these ASWs, trained in its use, 
were rare. 
O V E R A L L R I S K 
Table 5 shows a combined danger and risk rating (overall risk) related 
to outcome. Three ratings are significant in the final element of assess-
ment: overall danger, assessed after individual danger areas have first 
been assessed, risk, and overall risk, comprising the combination of risk 
and danger. Sheppard (1990) argues, on theoretical grounds, that 
danger has logical priori ty over risk in the assessment of overall risk: 
there may be considerable concern about a moderate risk of a serious 
danger, such as death or serious injur>', but far less concern over a high 
risk of a mild danger (such as a cold). Table 5 shows that this is the case 
in practice. Outcome, as would be expected i f the schedule adequately 
expressed practice situations, was closely related to the seriousness of 
danger and level of risk. 
Sheppard (1990) introduced the concept of the 'threshold of risk' to 
identify the threshold distinguishing between those eligible for section 
and those not eligible. He suggested the threshold would not involve a 
clean distinction between these two groups, since there could never be 
perfect consistency between ASWs in different situations, but there 
would be a 'grey' area, where the decision might go one way or another. 
T A B L £ 5. Overall risk related to outcome 
Sectionable Non-Sectionable 
1. Mild/mild to moderate danger - 12 
2. Moderate danger/low-fairly low risk - 6 
3. Moderate danger/moderate-high risk 3 1 
4. Quite or very serious danger/ 
low-fairly low risk 
5. Quite or very serious danger/moderate 43 I 
to serious risk 
Comparison of categories one and two with categories three, four and five: 
52-48 p < 0 0001. 
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In the interests of justice, however, we should strive to keep inconsist-
ency to a minimum, and this grey area should involve as few cases as 
possible. He presented a diagram with danger on one axis and risk on 
the other, and the threshold was presented similarly to an indifference 
curve, whose width would be as narrow as possible. Figure 1 shows the 
threshold of risk is quite different f rom Sheppard's theoretical formula-
tion. Instead of an indifference curve, the data reveals a 4 5 degree X 
shape. The distinction, in other words, is far clearer than Sheppard 
expected. This appears, in part because those rated as less than moder-
ate danger were also rated moderate or less risk, while those rated 
above moderate danger were rated above moderate risk.*^ 
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FIGURE I. Overall rating of risk 
High 
c = non sectionable patients 
X = sectionable patients 
Number of patients at each rating level is indicated by the number attached to each symbol. 
For non-sectionable patients the number is to the left of the symbol. For sectionable patients it 
is to the right. 
" In two cases those with relatively high ratings of danger and risk individuals were not 
sectioned. In one case the ASW actually wanted to section but the doctor refused. In the 
other the ASW argued that, while he was prepared to concede a mental illness was 
probably present, although ihey were unable to give a precise diagnosis, he did not know 
enough about the patient's mental health, given environmental factors. 
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R A T I N G O V E R A L L D A N G E R 
The following results are based on analysis of all seventy-one cases 
involved in the study. Its major concerns are with some overall issues: 
the extent to which clarity in risk assessment is associated with the use 
of C A S H , the extent to which rating involves real differences in severity 
of danger and induces consistency between ASWs in their assessment 
and the extent to which ASWs felt C A S H made a positive contribution 
to their assessment. The apparent consistency of quantitative data may 
simply reflect suppression of real differences in criteria used to rate 
cases. One A S W may rate a situation moderate which another rated 
quite severe. However, qualitative data, provided by ASWs' descrip-
tions of patients' circumstances, can examine further the consistency 
implied by quantitative rating. 
Sheppard's (1990) research expressed concern over consistency, and 
hence the problem of, as far as possible, treating like as l ike, according 
to the principles of justice (Mil ler , 1976). C A S H , Sheppard (1990) sug-
gested, may encourage greater consistency. 
Mild danger. Ratings of mild danger were consistently associated with 
mild social disturbance and chaotic or disorganized social l ife. One par-
aphrenic woman had discharged herself, others expressing fears that 
she would deteriorate mentally and in social functioning. 
In the event she was lucid, rational, the place was clean, she had food in the 
home, we found she'd made arrangements to turn the electricity. She still had 
to arrange her social security though. 
Another was withdrawn, lived in a 'grotty bedsit' and had *no direction 
in l i fe ' , possibly becoming depressed. 
It was about self care . . . his self care was very limited —he was living out of 
a fish shop for example—you wondered if he was eating properly. The room 
was bare. . . . His personal hygiene was adequate. He was really nothing like 
the level required for a section. 
Mild to moderate danger. M i l d to moderate ratings were marked by a 
greater emphasis on the effect of patients on others outside the family. 
Each of these cases, furthermore, were previously well known to the 
psychiatric services. Finally there was a greater number of identified 
dangers. I t may be that multiple dangers tipped the balance between 
mild and mild to moderate ratings. 
One man, previously sectioned for schizophrenia, was exhibiting, the 
ASW thought, 'extreme religiosity'. He seemed 'very chaotic' and had 
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come to the attention of the police because of a non violent dispute 
outside a neighbour's home: 
He was trying to get into the house to preach to somebody . . . and this led to 
an argument . . . he had a religious bent . . . but I thought those on their own 
did not justify admission . . . he was not totally out of touch with reality. 
Another woman *was becoming more isolated, she was periodically 
shouting at people, there was an element of self neglect'. However, 
although there was some concern *future assessment was needed' as 
things were not too serious yet. 
Moderate danger. The greater severity of problems in the moderate 
group is evident in three respects: first a greater number and variety of 
dangers identified, second in practically all cases the mental disorder 
was a central feature, and third issues relating to self care, disruption 
of social relations and pestering neighbours were both associated with 
mental illness and more serious than with milder dangers. Issues of 
injury, death and serious ill health did not, however, feature. This was 
clearly expressed in one example. Concern was expressed about one 
woman's 'increasingly deluded and hallucinatory state'. The ASW felt 
She wasn*i looking after herself. She hadn't bathed in ten weeks because she 
felt there were people upstairs so she was in a very dirty and dishevelled state. 
She had been arguing with her neighbours and had broken a few windows in 
her house. Her level of hygiene had deteriorated to a great degree and that 
could have led to health problems. She was hearing voices and was insistent 
that I hear voices too—she told me to press my head against her ear so we 
could both listen. 
Quite serious danger was marked, in general, first, by an increased 
number of identified dangers, and second, these dangers tended to 
involve more serious physical health or injury either to the patient or 
others. Together with this, these cases were generally marked by mul-
tiple dangers, many of which were rated as serious. Concerns ranged 
from possible injury, serious physical health danger and possible sexual 
assault. For example, one manic woman said *she wanted to prostitute' 
and was making sexual advances to others: 
It was the sexual bit —the whole way she was presenting . . . she was also 
aggressive—she could have been hurt or have hurt others. She physically hit 
the GP. She was also not in a position to care for her child. 
In another case of a man deteriorating following his mother's death: 
He had been drinking a lot and not eating properly. His personal hygiene was 
appalling. Physically he's going downhill—he's lost a lot of weight—he has 
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abdominal pain. I would query myself a possible ulcer. There was blood on the 
loc. 
Very serious danger. Very serious danger was, with one exception, 
marked by two associated factors: a serious concern over possible death 
of the patient or others, and a serious mental health condition. The 
descriptions by the ASWs show just how fraught these situations were. 
One woman 
had overdosed and had been up at [general hospital). She had made several 
suicide attempts on the ward and at home. She had tried to bum down the 
nursing home (of her father]—she was keen to take ever>'one with her. Her 
brother had recently died and she had broken up with her boyfriend 
recently. . . . In the interview she staled quite categorically that she wanted to 
kill herself. . . . I think she had a pathological hatred towards her father. I 
think others as well—the psychopathic bit . . , the fact that she was attempting 
to bum down a residential home put people*s lives at risk. 
Other cases showed this combination of severe mental disorder, fraught 
circumstances and threat of death. One manic woman, with 'no insight' 
had *a can of petrol in the middle of an unlit fire which was clearly 
ready to light', while a woman, psychotically depressed, had 'actively 
considered throwing herself under a train'. 
Two themes emerge from an examination of the relationship between 
situations confronted and rating of those situations: that different rat-
ings distinguished between different kinds of situations with differing 
levels of seriousness, and there was a high degree of consistency 
between different ASWs. There were only five exceptions: in two cases 
ar. ASW rated the threat of death as quite rather than very serious, 
while another case was rated quite serious when possessing character-
istics more consistent with a 'moderate' rating—involving disruption of 
social relations and self-care problems. Finally, two cases were rated as 
very serious when injury rather than death was the feared outcome. It 
is interesting, however, that none of these variations differed by more 
than one rating level from other cases with similar characteristics. 
D A N G E R S A N D R I S K S : C O N C E P T U A L A C C U R A C Y 
Dangers clearly indicated. The ASWs making the assessments on the 
whole showed a high degree of conceptual clarity. This was important, 
not simply as an indication of intellectual elegance, but because of its 
implications for practice. Dangers, risks and hazards, as we have seen, 
are conceptually separate, and each require consideration. It is, how-
ever, feared outcome (if they are not sectioned) which is most signific-
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ant. It is the danger that provides the primary justification for compuls-
ory admission (rather than remaining in the community). 
The overwhelming majority of cases where individuals were sectioned 
involved clear identification of the danger. One woman was severely 
depressed and suffering delusions, had isolated herself socially, and had 
stopped eating. 
Another bit of the psychosis was that she was responsible for the imminent 
destruction of the world. . . . She was awaiting her punishment and didn't feel 
she could face this. We were concerned that she might choose to self harm. . . . 
She cenainly didn't care if she died through lack of eating. She'd considered 
throwing herself under a train at Totnes. 
The danger—death—was clearly identified in this account. In other 
cases less serious dangers were identified such as injury. One manic 
woman, for example, who was 'inviting problems' in the street 'could 
have possibly got assaulted, and might have got injured if she wasn't 
thinking straight', while another manic man presented both a mental 
and physical health danger. T felt ', said the ASW, 'his sleeplessness 
and restlessness were likely to cause him health problems and he could 
suffer exhaustion'. 
Lack of Clarity, Sheppard (1990) classified accounts other than those 
clearly identifying danger into two: where, without identifying danger 
(a) the hazard was identified and the danger obvious and (b) the hazard 
was indicated, but the danger unclear. In the former case, the accounts, 
although not identifying danger with clarity, did provide some justifica-
tion for admission. The latter, however, was of serious concern, because 
it was unclear that the danger was sufficiently great, or imminent, to 
justify admission. This approach contained clear elements of the 'pre-
sumption of risk', which CASH intended to avoid—a lack of clarity in 
assessment, and pessimism in the face of mental disorder. 
ASWs failed to give a clear account of danger on only nine occasions. 
However, most cases involved multiple dangers, and, given that many 
cases involved multiple dangers, in no cases did ASWs fail to identify 
any danger with clarity. These figures are dramatically below those 
reported by Sheppard (1990) in the research leading to the development 
of CASH, where, of 90 cases, the hazard was indicated and danger 
obvious on 30 occasions and danger was unclear on 20 occasions. In 
three cases, although one of the dangers was not clearly stated, it was 
obvious from the hazard: for example, there was concern over the manic 
woman, who lacked insight and wanted to drive to Oxford: T don't 
think she could have given due care and attention to her driving. 
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Because of her manic state she would have taken undue risks*. Although 
not stated, the danger, of injury or death, was obvious. 
In six cases one of the dangers was unclear. For example, an elderly 
woman, believing that people she saw were imposters, was highly reliant 
on her home help, whom she locked in the scullery. 
The home help felt at risk and therefore wouldn't revisit. Therefore the woman 
had difficulty in her shopping and cashing her giro cheque for instance. 
The precise danger is unclear. What exactly would the consequence 
have been? Lack of food? Or would she have found some way of 
obtaining food? Would this have led to physical illness? Death? How 
imminent would be the danger? 
I M P A C T O F T H E U S E O F C A S H 
The ASWs were asked if the use of CASH helped, in any respect, their 
understanding and assessment of the situation. In most cases —50 out 
of 71—the ASWs felt it was helpful. Where ASWs considered it made 
no difference, it was because the situations made the decision about 
admission clearcut. Even where ASWs felt it made no difference, on a 
few occasions they noted that CASH became more useful where 
decisions were less obvious or there were unclear areas. CASH gener-
ally took ten minutes to complete. There was some variation however, 
reflecting the complexity of the case. In these circumstances ASWs 
displayed active use of CASH as an aspect of assessment, as, for 
example, with the ASW who decided to think further about the case 
overnight after making use of CASH. 
ASWs considered CASH to have been helpful in a wide variety of 
ways, and there is room only to give examples of their comments.'^ One 
of the ASWs indicating that CASH helped them transcend a medical 
to more social understanding said: 
From a purely medical point of view there were grounds for a recommendation 
. . . but we had different standpoints and it helped me think the whole thing 
through. I got more information on his social situation and on that basis the 
Analysis of ASWs' comments allowed the following classifications to emerge of the 
ways they considered CASH to have been helpful: (a) clarifying the whole process of 
assessment, (b) clarifying lack of problems, (c) helping them be more specific in identi-
fication of hazards, dangers and risks, (d) giving them a greater sense of confidence in 
confirming decisions they would have made anyway (e) forcing them to think through the 
relevant issues (Q helping increase the breadth of assessment (g) helping them transcend a 
medical with more social understanding (h) helping them keep the civil rights issues to 
the forefront in assessment (i) the help given by specific aspects of the schedule, such as 
alerting them to the number and range of factors, degree of urgency and the significance 
of elderly frailty. 
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doctor agreed with my assessment. . . . Although there was some risk I thought 
it was worth erring on the side of leaving him. 
Another commented on the issue of civil rights: it 'was a fairly difficult 
decision. She felt her civil rights were being violated . . . trying to 
balance that with the decision of what the dangers were was difficult 
. . . it was useful to have something as clear as the form to help out'. 
Another, commenting on the impact of support on risk said *the bit on 
social support . . . made me consider what resources were needed and 
. . . available', while a further ASW noted it helped identify the number 
of particular factors involved *in that it concentrated largely on areas 
of loss—of family and so on—and the possibihty of violence'. 
D I S C U S S I O N 
CASH manages to achieve a number of goals which have been set for 
it. CASH appears highly sensitive to differences between sectionable 
and not sectionable individuals. This is most obvious in ratings of overall 
risk, where the 45 degree X shape indicated very little overiap in overall 
risk rating between sectionable and non-sectionable patients. This sug-
gests that CASH reduces unclear areas where inconsistencies between 
different ASWs may arise, because of the systematic procedure, clarity 
of assessment and greater precision occurring in rating dangers and 
risks. This is also evident in relation to specific danger areas, defined 
by the Act, such as physical health, safety and protection of others. 
Assessing and rating these dangers was part of the process which led to 
a rating of overall risk. Clear differences existed between ratings of 
those sectionable and not-sectionable in each danger area, with only a 
small amount of (explainable) overlap. 
Sheppard (1990) suggested that CASH would be associated with more 
consistent assessments between different social workers. Qualitative 
data, provided by ASWs' description of patients' circumstances confirm 
the consistency implied by quantitative rating. The possibility of consist-
ency is bound to be complicated by the interpretation of the law, with 
the possibility of narrower or wider interpretations, mentioned earlier. 
In fact the ASWs appeared fairly consistent in their interpretation, 
adopting an intermediate position which included emotional distress to 
others as well as injury or death. 
While consistency was an aim of CASH the clarity of the differences 
in characteristics between different levels of danger was not anticipated. 
In training, the ASWs were not told which factors would be expected 
to characterize different levels of seriousness of danger: this was left to 
their judgement. Yet an exciting outcome of research is the identifica-
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tion of characteristics of different levels of danger which make consider-
able intuitive sense, and which suggests that further work may be under-
taken to extend the description of characteristics appropriate to each 
level of danger, offering a real hope, if incorporated into training, of 
further encouraging consistency between different ASWs. 
There is an internal validity in ratings made by ASWs also. There is 
a clear relationship between the type of danger feared and the rating of 
its severity. This is obvious, in particular in the areas of physical health, 
safety and protection of others. With physical health, the classification 
discriminates between different types of health danger in a way appro-
priate for assessment of risk by non-medical personnel. In other areas 
rating distinguished clearly between more or less severe dangers: death, 
injury and sexual assault, for example, contrasts greatly in rating sever-
ity of danger with other areas. 
Clarity is also evident with Level of Risk. CASH made it possible to 
identify the ways in which the patient contributed themselves to the 
risk, the types of support necessary to reduce the risk, the significance 
of the adequacy of support to risk reduction and to relate these to a 
rating of risk. I t also enabled the ASWs to be clear in relation to evid-
ence: about whom s/he had contacted, whether or not relevant indi-
viduals had been interviewed, and why some had not. This contributed 
both to comprehensiveness and reliability in assessment. 
The qualitative analysis of ASWs' accounts show that clarity was also 
evident in the ways they thought about their assessments and that this 
was considerably greater than evident in previous research where 
CASH was not available (Sheppard, 1990): the majority of cases 
involved multiple dangers, and there was no case where at least one 
danger was not clearly identified. Clear identification of danger is of 
great importance because of the significance of individual civil rights an 
individual's liberty is effectively at stake, and the ASW should be clear 
about exactly what they fear to be the consequence of failing to admit 
the patient. A lack of clarity may mean that an individual is admitted 
where such admission is not justified by their circumstances. A further 
point is that clarity may be expected to improve consistency of assess-
ment between ASW—sevidence of which we have already noted. 
While recognizing that clarity was greater than in previous research, 
some points should be noted. We cannot be sure that this clarity was 
the result solely of the use of CASH—it may be primarily because of 
the training that occurred, with its emphasis on clarity and conceptual 
differentiation of the critical elements of the analysis of risk. If so, it is 
the training in the use of CASH which is significant. However, such 
separation between the impact of training and use may be hard to 
identify and in the last analysis be somewhat academic—the outcome. 
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in terms of greater clarity, is the same. Furthermore, continuous use 
of CASH would itself be expected to reinforce the conceptual ideas 
underlying CASH and hence help retain a more sophisticated and theor-
etically informed compulsory admission assessment. Finally, the ASWs 
themselves were, on the whole, positive about the use of CASH is 
practice situations. 
CASH was clearly practical to use. In most cases where matters were 
fairly clear it took only ten minutes to fill in. These were, of course, 
ASWs who were throughly trained in its use. This is very important, 
since ASWs' reactions to CASH are likely to vary according to their 
degree of familiarity with it . There are two relevant processes. First, 
there is the mental effort required to locate relevant factors and know 
the meaning of different areas of CASH (such as the relationship 
between the nature of the danger and related vulnerability factors). 
Where ASWs are not familiar with CASH they are likely to consider 
that the effort of using it detracts from the important business of the 
actual assessment. This may induce a sense of frustration—that CASH 
gets in the way of assessment. Second, however, adequate training and 
familiarity, which is required in the use of CASH, means that ASWs 
are not distracted by CASH itself from the business of assessment. In 
that case it becomes part of the assessment process, and helps the ASW 
to consider their assessment more carefully and systematically. There 
is a danger, therefore, that inadequate training would lead to frustration 
with it, and for some ASWs unnecessarily to give up on it. However, 
the absolute centrality of risk assessment in compulsory admission 
assessment indicates that adequate training should be provided. The 
existence of ASW training allows sufficient time to be made available 
as part of that training to allow ASWs to become adequately familiar 
with CASH. 
CASH provides a basis for accountability not otherwise available, 
particularly if used in relation to all section assessments. Bean (1980) 
comments on the essentially private nature of section assessments: 
undertaken by professionals, away from public gaze and separate from 
the courts, despite serious implications for personal liberty. CASH can 
serve two purposes in relation to accountability. I t can, cumulatively, 
provide a clear picture of the nature and process of assessments, and 
reasons for outcome in any particular social services authority. This 
would both aid public accountability and allow departments to monitor 
ASW activities with a view to training needs. 
Finally, we may consider ASWs' comments. In most cases ASWs 
found it helpful, and the variety of reasons given, specific to particular 
cases, confirms its flexibility and applicability to the variable circum-
stances confronted in practice. Even ASWs who said it had added noth-
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ing to their assessment of particular cases frequently commented that 
its greatest use was in cases where the outcome was not straightforward. 
A P P E N D I X : T H E C O M P U L S O R Y A D M I S S I O N S A S S E S S M E N T 
S C H E D U L E 
( C A S H ) 
The Compulsory Admissions Assessment Schedule (CASH) was developed by 
a combination of theoretical concepts—derived largely from Risk Analysis, but 
also involving theoretical considerations of social support, threat and loss and 
empirical analysis of practice, guided by issues derived from the theoretical 
analysis of the role of the Approved Social Worker and Risk Analysis. CASH 
is designed to help the ASW think through the issues of assessement precisely 
and with as much clarity as possible, and to force them to justify their decisions, 
both through detailed ratings of the various aspects of assessment of overall 
risk, and by presenting evidence where necessary in support of their decisions. 
It is intended to provide ASWs with a distinctive knowledge base which encap-
sulates what Sheppard (1990) has defined as a *Social Risk' orientation. This 
basically involves giving the assessment of the health or safety of the patient 
and protection of others criteria equal status to mental disorder criteria; 
emphasizing the need for these criteria to be examined individually and in their 
own right; affirming the need for precise identification of dangers hazards and 
risks; and the need to avoid admission unless there is clear evidence that it is 
needed. 
CASH is a semi-structured instrument designed to be used by ASWs in the 
process of assessement for compulsory admission. It is a detailed instrument, 
which requires training in its use, which is more easily achieved through ASW 
training courses. CASH is broadly divided into six areas, designed to examine 
overall risk, defined by the Act, to the health or safety of the patient or the 
protection of others: hazards, four types of danger—mental and physical ill 
health, safety of the patient and protection of others—and level of risk. Each 
contain detailed classficiations, as well as elements assessing factors accentuat-
ing the danger or increasing or reducing the level of risk. Detailed instructions 
on the interpretation and use of CASH are provided elsewhere (Sheppard, 
1990). 
Hazards, which are assessed first on the schedule, gain their significance from 
their association with danger. Danger is the possible loss outcome which occurs 
in the face of a panicular hazard, e.g. someone may slip and break their leg 
(danger) if they step on a banana peel (hazard). Hazards are divided into six 
categories. Health hazards are self-explanatory. Failure to provide basic needs 
refers to those basic biological requirements to sustain adequate life. 
Threatening violence involves hazards whee by action or verbal communication 
possible future violence is indicated. 'Actual violence* involves violence already 
occurring when the ASW makes their assessment. *Oui of control of self or 
actions* refers to a state where, without threatening or being violent, the patient 
is not aware of the possible deleterious consequences of what they are doing. 
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'Contravention of social regulations or expectations' involves, for example, 
breaking the law or inability to carry out a significant role area such as neglect 
of the child rearing role. 
Danger is the possible loss outcome arising in the face of a hazard and is 
conceptualized in terms of threat, a f^orward looking' concept linking hazards 
to dangers (a hazard creates a threat of a danger). Dangers are divided into 
four, reflecting specifically the criteria of the *healih or safety of the patient or 
the protection of other persons': mental health, physical health, safety of the 
patient and protection of others. Each of these dangers are divided into two: 
the danger itself and vulnerability factors which have an impact on the severity 
of the danger. Mental Health Danger is classified according to categories in 
three broad areas, neurotic, psychotic and organic psychotic. A rating of the 
severity of danger and significance of supplementary' factors is made after the 
danger is identified. These are on scales of 0 (not present) to five (very severe 
or very significant). Physical health danger is divided into two: the danger itself 
and vulnerability factors likely to affect the severity of that danger. Physical 
health threats are classified from no physical illness to life threatening, in a form 
appropiate for laypersons (in relation 10 physical ill health). Ratings are made 
of danger and vulnerability in the same way as mental health threat. Safety 
threat is considered in terms of the concept of loss. This is divided broadly into 
three domains: physics (e.g. injur>'), loss of social relations and material loss. 
These are rated in relation to associated vulnerabilities in the same way as 
physical and mental health threat. Protection of other persons involves a wide 
variety of factors from which others might need protecting, varying from death, 
through emotional trauma to intrusive behaviour. Vulnerability is assessed in 
relation to particular threats, and the ASW is required to identify- the focus for 
the danger i.e. who it is that requires protecting (e.g. spouse, children, general-
ized others). Rating are subsequently made in the same way as mental health. 
At this point the ASW is required to make an initial evaluation of the ser-
iousness of the danger. This is an overall rating of danger made in the light of 
the dangers identified, the severity of the dangers and significance of vulnerabil-
ities and the hazards predisposing towards the dangers. Seriousness of danger 
is rated on a scale of six points from not present (0) to very serious (5). 
Risk is next evaluated. Risk is the concept which links hazards to dangers. 
Risk is closely associated with the probability that particular dangers will occur. 
Thus the danger of breaking one's leg is greater if a banana peel (hazard) is on 
the pavement than if it is not there (all other things remaining the same). 
Hence the presence of the banana peel increases the risk of a broken leg. The 
assessment of risk, therefore, should be a rational analysis based on the proper-
lies of interacting elements. Risk is examined in terms of factors which make 
the danger more or less likely to occur in the face of a particular hazard. 
These are divided into two: the extent to which the behaviour of the patient is 
contributing to the likelihood of the danger occurring, invoKHng five alternatives 
(see note 11) and social supports which may reduce the likelihood of the danger 
occurring. These are classified broadly into instrumental and psychological sup-
port. Each support area is examined in terms of whether it is required to keep 
the patient in the community, whether it is available, and if available whether 
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it is adequate. The ASW is required to identify who is available to provide 
support, and if available why they are considered adequate. 
The final area is the evaluation of evidence. In many respects this has already 
been considered, insofar as ASWs are required to identify precisely and rate 
hazards, dangers and risks. Evidence is considered in terms of its comprehens-
iveness and reliability. Comprehensiveness is sought by asking whether the main 
relevant individuals were interviewed as part of the assessment process, and 
where some relevant individuals were not interviewed, why they were not. 
Assessment of reliability is considered through the critical analysis of the evid-
ence presented and the collection of sufficient information to be as confident 
as practicable that the information gleaned is clear and accurate. 
The ASWs are then asked to give an assessment of risk, in the light of all 
factors considered following their assessment of seriousness of danger. This 
varies, in five stages, between low risk and high risk. Overall Risk which is the 
final overall assessment, is a combination of the conceptually distinct areas of 
risk and danger (see Figure 1 for a diagrammatic presentation of the relation 
between risk and danger in relation to the cases researched). 
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S U M M A R Y 
Social work has for some time had an ambiguous and ambivalent relationship with 
its social science knowledge base. However, this has arisen, at least in part, because 
of the emphasis on ihe outcome or product of social science rather than the process 
by which research is conducted. This paper, focusing on assessment, argues that an 
emphasis on process goes some way to closing the gap between social science and 
social work, that the methods used by social researchers are, in many respects, simply 
refinements of the methodology of everyday life, and that social workers, when 
conducting assessments operate rather like practical qualitative researchers. Using 
Analytical Induction as an heuristic device, it proceeds to explore critical characteristics 
of good practice in social work assessments. It concludes that practice should be 
characterized by critical awareness, involving imaginative development of alternative 
hypotheses, a sceptical attitude towards case assessments and a principle of adopting 
hypotheses least likely to be in error. 
Social work practice has, for some considerable lime, shared a some-
what ambivalent relationship with its knowledge foundations. On the 
one hand, practice underpinned by an adequate knowledge base has 
appeared to offer the glittering prize of secure professional status, one 
perceived to characterize traditional and high status disciplines such as 
medicine and law (Goode, 1957; Greenwood, 1957). On the other, the 
prescriptions of theory have, for many practitioners, often appeared 
distant, esoteric and hardly relevant for the complex and pressured 
world of practice. A consequence has been that the confident hopes of 
many social work writers, documented over some considerable period 
of time, that social work possessed, or has the potential to possess, 
coherent knowledge foundations (Greenwood, 1957; Hearn, 1958; 
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Meyer, 1959; Barilett, 1970; Siporin, 1975), has at times been met with 
cynicism by those who found prescriptions derived from practice experi-
ence of considerably greater immediate use. Stevenson and Parsloe 
(1978) , for example, found it rare for practitioners to incorporate theory 
into their description of their work. Carew's (1979, p. 354) study rein-
forces this in relation to practice action: *with this body of practice 
wisdom as a basis for their activities, the need to use abstract theories 
and generalizations from research were minimal*. 
In relation to social science in general, and sociology in particular, 
this apparent distance between the prescriptions of the academic disci-
pline and the imperatives of practice prompted an extensive reappraisal 
of their place in the social work curriculum (Sibeon, 1990). One 
explanation for this theory-practice dissonance, put forward by Sheldon 
(1979) in relation to social work theory, but equally relevant to social 
science, was a 'culture gap' between the academic and practice arms of 
the occupation. According to this view, nothing in principle prevents 
social work developing secure knowledge foundations. The problem 
resides instead in the gap between these subcultures, one concerned 
with questions of evidence and validity and the other on practice 
rescriptions, and a refusal amongst the academic subculture to adopt 
consistent principles—specifically derived from Popper (1963) —for 
choosing and developing appropriate knowledge forms. 
Others, however, have suggested that the problem is far more funda-
mental. Stevenson (1971), sceptical that social science has developed a 
consistent body of knowledge, warned social workers against erecting 
their knowledge foundations on such 'shifting sands'. Howe (1980) drew 
attention to the paradigmatic and theoretical diversity of social science, 
as a result of which agreement on the focus and methods of study as 
well as interpretation of results can be elusive. To a considerable 
degree, what one 'sees' in social life is dependent on particular perspect-
ives. Sociology and psychology, furthermore, have a poor record of 
developing general theories helping us explain and predict social behavi-
our (Phillips, 1973; Hesse, 1978). Indeed, whether this is its proper task 
is a matter of some controversy. The idea that sociology, for example, 
can be based on a cumulative and developing knowledge base is ana-
thema to a considerable proportion of the academic community, many 
of whom suggest that this 'scientific' approach can never adequately 
represent the human condition (Blumer, 1969; Williams, 1976). Where 
such uncertainty prevails about the nature, focus and proper tasks of 
'pure' social science, its application to practice appears beset by diffi-
culties from the start. 
Other concerns have focused on the nature of social work rather than 
social science. England (1986) suggested the foundation for helping in 
S O C I A L S C I E N C E A N D P R A C T I C E W I S D O M 267 
social work is understanding others. The precise recreation of meaning 
and experience of the client is fundamentally an intuitive process; one 
which is spontaneous, and where the worker is necessarily committing 
him/herself in action to decisions derived from immediate con-
sciousness. The result is that social workers have no exclusive talents. 
There will always be people who have an unusually developed, yet 
untrained, ability to understand others. Formal knowledge of any sort, 
therefore, has a merely subordinate status; it helps make social workers 
more sensitive, but is fragmented and should be plundered as appropri-
ate. Howe (1980) likewise considered that the particular human skills 
required for social work are not necessarily appropriately based on social 
science. Just as the ability to ride a bicycle does not require an under-
standing of mechanics, so it is dubious that expertise in social science 
provides much information about how to react to situations. Indeed, 
like England, Howe suggested that social work is not recognizable by 
particular skills in human relationships. Echoing earlier comments by 
Wootton (1959), he suggested social work would more profitably base 
its skills on expertise about the welfare state and its resources, involving 
the ability to know about, handle and impart information. 
Davies (1981, 1986) suggested that even those approaches of appar-
ently greatest relevance to social work—such as attachment, inequality 
and stigma—have been of strictly limited use. Indeed practical con-
straints rather than any formal knowledge, he argues, have exercised 
the greatest influence on practice. In any case, he thinks, sociology has 
provided an unsuitable basis for conducting practice: rightly possessing 
a freedom to pursue ideas which contrasts with the structural constraints 
upon social work, and with a critical edge which can too frequently 
undermine practice rather than enhance its knowledge base. W'hile his 
more recent writings still reveal caution about the sociology-social work 
relationship, he has suggested three directions for a sociology of social 
work: to examine the function of social work in society; to identify what 
constitutes good practice and to discover means by which practitioners 
may be restricted from pursuing their own goals at the expense of the 
agency and client. 
Others have expressed greater confidence in the social work-social 
science relationship. Sibeon (1990) has castigated Davies for his failure 
to recognize the potential contribution of micro sociology and the futi l-
ity of his attempt surgically to remove the social sciences from social 
work. Hardiker has been equally dismissive: she (Curnock and Har-
diker, 1979; Hardiker, 1981) argues that practice theory is implicit in 
their conduct of practice, and she feels the predominant practice ideolo-
gies have been teased out: without this theory, practice is considerably 
poorer. However, it is not clear that these 'theories' are not simply 
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those used by individuals in everyday life to make sense of, and act 
upon, situations, or that they are extensions of these everyday theories 
made in the light of the social work role, task and context. Sheppard's 
(1991) research does, however, suggest that professional training and 
the theory which goes with it, has an impact on practice, and his com-
parison in this respect of social workers with community psychiatric 
nurses renders this claim more plausible. Sheldon (1986, 1987) and 
McDonald et al. (1992) meanwhile have strongly advocated the incorp-
oration of findings from evaluative studies in the curriculum. 
However, attempts to formulate a consistent process for application 
have been less convincing. Sheldon's adoption of the hypothetico-
deductive method has been criticized for its particularism which effec-
tively excludes an array of potentially useful approaches (Jordan, 1979). 
Sheppard's (1984) suggestion that practitioners should make choices 
based on the values, theoretical framework, methods and consistency 
of findings hardly represents a practical approach for busy social 
workers, while clearly demonstrating the complexity of the task of 
application. His later (1990) advocacy of the adoption of theoretical 
approaches consistent with the structural constraints on social work, 
together with principles of congruence and specificity, carries more con-
viction because the task is carried out by researchers rather than practi-
tioners, who are presented with pre-designed instruments. 
Although differences of view, therefore, exist on the contribution 
or potential contribution of social science to social work, one theme 
permeates all approaches: that limits exist to the applicability of social 
science to social work and that this arises because of their different 
characteristics. These points, however, arise in relation to the given 
knowledge of relevant disciplines: the theories, ideas and research find-
ings available in the existing literature. They represent outcomes or 
products of the endeavours of social scientists. Little attention, how-
ever, has been given to the process by which research is conducted, and 
how this might inform practice. This is perhaps surprising, because the 
concern of the researcher, as much as the practitioner, is to understand, 
and at times explain, the social phenomena with which they are con-
cerned. Sheldon (1983) has suggested the use of single case experi-
mental designs in this respect, expressing a concern about 'over reliance* 
on qualitative terms and advocating the use of experimental methods 
in practice. 
However, many would argue that such experimental approaches fit 
poorly with the reality of the social worid (Blumer, 1969; Williams, 
1976; Bulmer, 1979) and this essay draws on a different tradition. It 
is the contention of this essay that social workers, when conducting 
assessments and attempting to make sense of situations, have much 
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in common with qualitative social researchers. Indeed, they may be 
considered in many respects, to be practical qualitative researchers. 
Such a contention has major implications, for it at once closes the 
*lheory-practice gap', while recognizing that it does so in only one area 
of the theory-practice relationship, and in relation to certain aspects 
of practice. These are, however, important aspects. It is presented, 
furthermore, as a contribution to one of Davies' (1991) central con-
cerns: how we recognize what constitutes good practice. 
This essay will argue that the proclaimed gap between social science 
and social work is, in certain key respects, incorrect; that the linking 
factor is the common methodology for understanding and reflecting 
upon situations; that it is this commonality which allows us to accumu-
late practice knowledge (or wisdom). Having established certain key 
commonalities between social science and everyday life the article will 
seek to understand similarities and differences between social research 
and practice wisdom, and to identify what constitutes good and bad 
methods of practice wisdom accumulation. Analytic induction, with its 
case based methodology, is used as an heuristic device for this purpose. 
Within a qualitative approach in which social understanding can, at 
best, be probabilistic social work assessments are presented as (a) a 
retroduclive process of hypothesis generation, testing and reformulation 
(or redefinition of problems), (b) with an underlying principle of minim-
izing the likelihood of error and (c) characterized by an approach invol-
ving routine scepticism and critical awareness. 
S O C I A L R E S E A R C H A N D H U M A N 
U N D E R S T A N D I N G 
N A T U R A L I S M , P O S I T I V I S M A N D T H E P R I V I L E G E D P O S I T I O N 
The notion of applied social science is based on the application of know-
ledge derived from the process of social research. The theory-practice 
separation, where social workers' presence in the *real world' is con-
trasted with social scientists' abstracted, conceptualized version is, 
though less commented upon, neatly reflected amongst many social 
researchers. Despite differences in other respects, many researchers 
of both positivist and naturalist, though not realist (Silverman, 1985; 
Bhaskar, 1975, 1979) persuasion, tend to present the social researcher, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, as occupying a ^privileged position'. 
This privileged position, for different reasons, leaves the social 
researcher as an 'outsider' to the social work s/he is studying. In the 
case of positivism, every attempt is made to eliminate the effects of the 
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obsen'er by developing explicit standards of experimental or interview 
procedures (Toulmin, 1972). This allows replication by others so that 
an assessment of reliability of findings can be made. In survey research, 
for example, the behaviour of the interviewer is specified down to the 
wording of questions and the order in which they are asked. The 
resulting data yield 'facts' about the world. The aim of the interviewer 
is to generate data which hold independently both of research setting 
and researcher (Srellitz et al, 1964). 
There is a related, though less well documented and implicit, tend-
ency among naturalists (a loose group of interactionists, ethnomethodo-
logists and phenomenologists). One of the most significant assumptions 
built into naturalism, according to Hammersley (1992), is thai all per-
spectives and cultures are rational. Understanding a culture becomes 
the first requirement, and any attempt to explain in terms of material 
interest or ideological distortion is regarded as incompatible with such 
understanding. The result is a thoroughgoing relativism, accepting dif-
ferent perspectives as equally valid and 'true'. Anything more would 
require explanation of perspectives and cultures—the product of social 
causation rather than the active construction of reality by members. 
This is a paradoxical conclusion. While culture members freely engage 
in checking claims against the facts, frequently employing causal 
explanations to account for each other's behaviour, the social researcher 
is debarred from this on the grounds that this would 'distort reality'. 
This entails a distinction between 'science and commonsense' which 
also lies at the heart of positivism. As Hammersley and Atkinson com-
ment, both positivists and naturalists are thereby granted a 'privileged 
position': 
the distinction between science and commonsense, whether used by Positivism 
or Naturalism, tends to imply that science is quite separate from society, and 
that scientists, qua scientists, are quite different from other people 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, p. 14). 
This clear tendency among both theorists and practitioners to separate 
social research from the 'real world' undermines attempts at synthesis 
(of theory and practice). However, the social researcher cannot possess 
the privileged position of 'outsider'. It is quite simple: as human beings 
social researchers are necessarily part of the human world they study. 
This is not a matter of methodological commitment, but an existential 
fact (Borhek and Curtis, 1975; Gouldner, 1970). Deprived of their priv-
ilege, the social researcher joins the social worker in the rough and 
tumble of 'insider'. Both are captured by their common human status. 
The role of social researcher, furthermore, is that of active participant 
in the research process (Schuman, 1982). The way people respond to 
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the presence of the researcher is an important aspect requiring consid-
eration when attempting to make sense of the phenomenon studied 
(Keat and Urry, 1975). 
T H E M E T H O D O L O G Y O F E V E R Y D A Y L I F E 
Social researchers are, then, ^captured' by their common human status. 
A further implication follows: that they cannot avoid relying on 
'common sense' knowledge. 'Common sense', in this respect, refers to 
the way in which we, as human beings make sense of the world. How-
ever distinctive the purposes of social research, the methods it uses are 
merely refinements of those used in everyday life. This is perhaps 
obvious with ethnography. Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) again 
relevantly comment: 
As a 'structured conversation' the interview is by no means unique to social 
research. While the journalistic interview, the social work interview, the market 
research interview and the social science interview each carry distinctive fea-
tures, they are clearly features of a single interactional format. 
Clyde-Mitchell (1983) also draws attention to the basic similarity 
between case material collected and analysed by practitioners, including 
social workers, and social scientists. The same applies, if less obviously, 
to the experiment. While lab experiments characterize lab scientists* 
work, the general device of experimentation is widespread. Medawar 
(1979, p. 69) comments that, in the original Baconian sense, experi-
ments are contrived occurrences as opposed to natural experiences or 
happenings. Experiments are questions put to the world 'what would 
happen if?' This kind of testing is common in everyday life —the laborat-
ory experiment was originally simply a refinement—perhaps encapsul-
ated in the term 'trial and error'. If crackling noises replace a clear 
signal on my car radio, I might first wish to adjust the frequency 
(hypothesizing a 'slippage' from the correct frequency). I f this does not 
work I may check connections on the aerial (are they loose?). If this 
does not v/ork. I may conclude either that the radio is broken (if only 
crackling can be heard) or that the station is off the air (if other stations 
may be heard). 
Testing hypotheses, then, is not restricted to science or social 
research, but is an aspect of everyday life. It is also central to 
understanding others' actions: a key element of both social research 
and ever>'day life. Infants may cry because they are, for example, 
hungry, or in pain or have wet themselves (Dunn, 1978). Without 
precise communication, we must work through the ambiguity to 
understand the message. I f it is about feeding time we may attempt 
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to feed the infant. If they are uninterested we may try another 
option: that they are wet. I f this is not the case we may conclude 
they have *wind' and gently tap their back. If they stop crying we 
may conclude that we have understood (and responded to) the correct 
message. 
When we observe others' behaviour we derive hypotheses from our cul-
tural knowledge and we test this against further information. This, in 
effect, means that our understanding of communication is dependent, at 
least in part, upon the situation in which it occurs. The infant's crying may 
be set against the context of infant-caregiver relationship. Behaviour in 
one context does not necessarily mean the same as that in another 
(Silverman, 1985, p. 21). A raised arm in a restaurant may involve 
attracting a waiter's attention; on a football pitch the recognition of a goal 
scored; in a schoolroom it may indicate a student wishes to answer a ques-
tion or go to the toilet, or something else. 
Everyday language has a name for this methodology of hypothesis 
testing—trial and error—so we also have a name for poor methodo-
logy-jumping to conclusions. Here an individual derives an incorrect 
meaning from a situation by inadequately considering alternative pos-
sibilities explaining a particular behaviour. If two people are engaged 
in deep conversation about matters important for one of them, who 
does the most talking, the listener may close their eyes and be quiet. 
After a while the talker may conclude the listener is asleep, indicating 
lack of interest in their concerns. If they berate the listener for their 
disinterest (and somnolence), they may be surprised to find the listener 
was awake all the time, closing their eyes the better to concentrate. 
Such actions indicate the importance attached by the listener to their 
concerns rather than the reverse. The listener may justifiably berate the 
talker for jumping to conclusions. 
The common availability of language distinguishing between 
adequate and inadequate methods of gaining social understanding 
implicitly recognizes the importance of reasoning in everyday life. 
'Jumping to conclusions' refers not only to inadequate hypothesis 
testing, and distinguishes good and bad methodology, but is also a 
term of denigration. The processes employed by social researchers 
are, in certain, if not all, critical respects embedded in the conduct 
of ever)'day life, particularly in non-routine social situations or when 
information imparted is not self-evident. When a statement is am-
biguous we will search for its meaning: is it a sarcastic or straightfor-
ward comment? are they joking? are they lying? and so on (Brown, 
1973). In Payne et a/.'s (1981, p. 126) memorable phrase, 'social 
actors are depicted as rule using analysts rather than rule governed 
dopes'. 
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S O C I A L W O R K A N D S O C I A L R E S E A R C H 
M E T H O D O L O G Y 
A N A L Y T I C I N D U C T I O N 
The similarity, in certain key respects, of social research methodology 
and that of everyday life undermines, in these respects, proposed dicho-
tomous relationships between social work and social science. For social 
workers are as much captured by their common human status as social 
researchers. At the same time, however, it may, in part, explain why 
many practitioners devalue social research and value life (or practice) 
experience rather more. I t is possible to understand situations, and 
learn from accumulated experience, in a way, at least in principle, help-
ful for practice. The limited applicability of social science leaves a space 
filled by knowledge derived from accumulated experience. It is, para-
doxically, the absence of a gap between the methodology of social sci-
ence and understanding everyday life which allows experience a crucial 
role. Yet Sheldon (1987) has warned of the consequences of humans' 
tendency to confirm their preconceptions. He suggests stricter tests of 
social work perceptions, assumptions and decisions, advocating goal 
setting, timetables and in particular hypothesis setting in practice. If , 
then, social research and developing everyday knowledge are, in certain 
methodological respects, similar, can we learn anything from the meth-
odology of social research? In particular, can it tell us anything about 
the nature of practice wisdom, and what constitutes good methodology 
in practice (i.e. distinguishing good from bad practice)? This question 
involves switching our attention from the results of social research to 
its process. 
Social workers, when making assessments, confront the world rather 
like qualitative social researchers. They are concerned with issues of 
description, accuracy, understanding and meaning, and this information 
is gained largely through interviews, direct observation and document-
ary evidence (Burgess,1985). One major approach to qualitative meth-
odology is Analytic Induction ( A I ) , a method by which qualitative 
researchers try to formulate generalizations that hold across all data. 
Originally formulated by Znaniecki (1934), it has been used or exam-
ined, largely favourably, by Robinson (1951), Lindesmith (1952), 
Denzin (1978), Bulmer (1979), Hammersley and Atkinson (1983), 
Silverman (1985) and Burgess (1985). It is relevant in three key 
respects: it is qualitatively focused, like most social work assessments, 
it is case based, and it seeks to generate generalizations from case ana-
lysis, an approach which is similar to developing practice wisdom. It 
should be emphasized, first, that A I is not without its critics, and second 
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that it is being used as an heuristic (and comparative) device. It is not 
suggested that practice wisdom development is Analytic Induction. 
A necessary interplay, between data and (often implicit) theories 
providing explanatory frameworks is generally considered as significant 
for practice understanding as social research (Howe, 1987; Payne, 1991; 
Sheppard, 1984; Curnock and Hardiker, 1979). This interplay involves, 
in social research, according to Bulmer (1979), a process of retroduc-
tion. This process, he thinks, is exemplified by A I . This holds that 
theories are not developed deductively or inductively, but both deduct-
ively and inductively. There is a constant interplay between observation 
of reality and formulation of concepts, research and theorizing, percep-
tion and exploration (Lachenmeyer, 1971, p. 61). According to Hanson 
(1958) this is simply represented as: the observation of some phenom-
enon, P, is explicable if H obtains. So let us suppose that H is true. 
It is at this point a reasonable supposition, nothing more. From this 
we may further examine data on the basis of hypothesis H. Bulmer 
(1979, p. 659) argues that this is consistent with the generation of under-
standing: neither theory nor data can be arbitrarily separated out in the 
process of exploration. To begin to make sense of phenomenon P (a 
child's behavioural problems) some idea of its cause (e.g. anger) is 
required. This may be later amended to some notion of poor attach-
ment. The point is theory is immediately required to make sense of the 
data. Concepts are neither developed out of obser\'ation, nor are they 
imposed a priori. They are interdependent. 
This progressive development of hypothesis construction and data 
analysis has its equivalent in social work: the initial supposition of 
retroduction is paralleled by the use of *hunch' in social work (England, 
1986), and its progressively more accurate formulation would character-
ize practice where the worker subjected the 'hunch* and subsequent 
hypotheses to analysis in terms of the actual situation. Bulmer's (1979, 
p. 662) description of this as exemplifying *the muddling tentative way 
in which the so-called scientific mind gets ahead' is one social workers 
will readily recognize in relation to practice. 
The central purpose of A I is the development of hypotheses which 
hold across all examples of the problem (e.g. drug addiction). The 
process involves a systematic search for a 'decisive negative case' 
(Lindesmith, 1952, p. 195). I f a theory is false or inadequate the 
researcher knows this approach will more quickly expose weaknesses: 
*it forces the sociologist to formulate . . . his (!) theories in such a way 
as to indicate crucial tests of the theory and permit the explicit search 
for negative cases' (Denzin, 1978, p. 197). We will , in other words, 
realize, or more quickly realize, i f we are wrong. More formally, 
Robinson presented the approach as follows: 
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1. A rough definition of the problem to be explained is formulated. 
2. An hypothetical explanation of the phenomenon is formulated. 
3. One case is studied in the light of the hypothesis with the object of 
determining whether the hypothesis fits the facts in the case. 
4. If the hypothesis does not fit the facts, either the hypothesis is 
reformulated or the phenomenon to be explained is redefined so 
that the case is excluded. 
5. Practical certainty may be attained after a small number of cases 
has been examined, but the discovery by the investigator, or any 
other investigator, of a single negative case disproves the explana-
tion and requires reformulation. 
6. This procedure . . . is continued until a universal relationship is 
established, each negative case calling for a redefinition or 
reformulation (Robinson, 1951, p. 812). 
Its logic is clear: it is only by excluding error that we may hope to 
develop generalizations. While generally supporting its relevance and 
usefulness, some theorists have identified limitations to A I , which are 
considered later. This, however, may be set alongside its great theoret-
ical strengths—clear hypotheses, a method of hypothesis development, 
interdependence of theor>' and data and its emphasis on eliminating 
error-and practical relevance—an emphasis on the case and qualitative 
methodology—in considering social work practice. 
C A S E A S S E S S M E N T 
As an heuristic device, A I can help us consider two related elements 
of practice, case assessment and the development of practice wisdom. 
Stages 1 ^ of A I correspond to the specific case, rather than the produc-
tion of generalizations. These relate to the degree of ' f i t ' between hypo-
theses and evidence. How might social work assessments look when 
guided by these principles? Three themes are evident for practice: clear 
hypotheses, the search for disconfirming data and reformulation of 
hypothesis or redefinition of problem in the face of disconfirming evid-
ence. A I concentrates on what we shall call progressive hypothesis devel-
opment. This is characterized, in practice, by a step by step process of 
examining hypotheses one by one, abandoning those which confront 
disconfirming evidence, until one adequately fitting the data is 
developed. An alternative, in practice, may be comparative hypothesis 
assessment. Here, a number of competing hypotheses may be used to 
identify their ' f i t ' with the data. These may be explored through an 
example. 
Progressive hypothesis development: A 14 year-old may be referred 
by his (the use of the male pronoun is arbitrary) parents because he is 
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disobedient and close to being *out of control'. He has been stealing 
money from his mother's purse, truaniing from school and is increas-
ingly aggressive. According to the referral he is also taking less and less 
notice of what his parents are saying, staying out whenever he likes 
and becoming involved with known young offenders. The parents may 
themselves present this as a personality issue: this is an awkward life 
stage and a nasty egocentric boy. As a loose initial hypothesis 
(presenting problem) this can be examined by seeking evidence. Initial 
interviews with him may show him to be more sensitive than presented 
by the parents, displaying a concern for the way he is drifting and 
an awareness that his parents are understandably exasperated by his 
behaviour. Such evidence negates simple explanations of egocentricity. 
We may then search for alternatives, examining family dynamics. We 
may discover that his mother has been increasingly *snappy' over the 
past year, has, unlike in the past, shown no interest in what he is doing 
and communicated this lack of interest dismissively and with verbal 
aggression. Both parents have been arguing. Such a line of investigation 
contains an implicit hypothesis that the parent-child relationship is 
poor, this is affecting the boy and leading to 'difficult behaviour'. Far 
from being egocentric this reflects sensitivity to his familial circum-
stances. Further investigation may reveal the father and mother have 
been arguing frequently, and this relates to poor performance of her 
traditional (maternal) role. Additional investigation may show she is 
alienated from this role, feels trapped within it, that life holds very little 
for her. She alternates between desperation and anger at her situation. 
We may then hypothesize that the woman is depressed because she 
feels trapped within the limits of her traditional role expectations. 
Although the problems of the boy cannot be ignored, the central prob-
lem is in fact the mother's depression, arising from her individual 
experience of oppression. 
This approach—progressive hypothesis development—is evident 
from the move through hypotheses from egocentric personality through 
family disruption to depression and oppression. It illustrates the critical 
nature of disconfirming evidence and why adequate assessment cannot 
be a matter of seeking confirming evidence. The initial definition of 
the problem was of a disruptive, possibly delinquent teenager, and the 
hypothesis was of an egocentric, rule-ignoring personality. Had the 
practitioner sought simply to confirm this hypothesis, they could have 
ignored disconfirming evidence, or 'fitted' it with the initial hypothesis: 
the boy merely presented himself as sensitive in a calculated attempt to 
throw them off the track. However, the practitioner was both aware of 
the contradictory way the boy presented himself, and by examining 
wider (familial) issues implicitly sought disconfirming evidence which 
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at the same time would provide the basis for the generation of new, 
more adequate hypotheses. This connection, between assessment, dis-
confirming evidence and hypothesis (or problem) reformulation, 
broadly provides a practice reflection of A I in social research. 
Comparative hypothesis assessment. In practice the social worker may 
approach matters with various areas which they wish to explore: the 
boy's personality, behaviour of each parent, marital relationships and 
family dynamics. These may contain a number of implicit, but compet-
ing, hypotheses each of which may be examined in relation to the evid-
ence gathered. The process of exploration does not start here from a 
single reference point, and this would reflect the availability to the 
worker of different potential perspectives on the nature of the problem 
and its explanation. The process of assessment would take place in a 
way that allowed the total range of evidence to be used to falsify 
(potentially) any of the hypotheses. Lindesmith (1952, p. 492) argues 
that A I involves 'going out of one's way to look for negating evidence'. 
Competing hypotheses, implicit in assessment, for example of wider 
family dynamics as well as the boy's personality would, by analysing a 
range of evidence, enhance the opportunity for finding disconfirming 
evidence. Evidence of family disharmony both directs us to reformulate 
the problem and contradicts the implicit unidimensional explanation 
inherent in focusing on the boy's personality. 
Each competing hypothesis may be examined in terms of the 
adequacy of 'fit ' with the evidence collected. If , for example, the boy 
really did display great egocentricity with no other apparent affective 
or behavioural problems in the family we might move towards a 'person-
ality disorder' explanation. Here, falsifying evidence would be 
obtained, not in relation to the boy's egocentricity, but to familial issues 
generating alternative hypotheses. Comparative hypothesis assessment, 
then, contains similar principles to progressive hypothesis development: 
emphasizing disconfirming evidence, sceptical attitude and 'adequacy 
of fit'. 
An emphasis on hypotheses contains two clear commitments: to pre-
cision and being explicit about the hypotheses developed. Where hypo-
theses are not precise this may render falsification difficult, if not 
impossible. It would, for example, be perfectly possible for a practi-
tioner to develop a general hypothesis that the adolescent's 'personality' 
was responsible for the behavioural problems identified. However the 
particular aspect, or aspects, of personality involved may be obscured 
by such a general formulation. The behaviour may be the result of a 
depressive dimension, or of an individual dependent on the good opin-
ion of a peer group who encourages his behaviour (or indeed of an 
egocentric personality). Poor practice is marked by a lack of clarity in 
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hypothesis formulation. The search for disconfirming evidence is made 
difficult by the difficulty in identifying what it is that is being discon-
firmed. Furthermore, assessment has implications for intervention: a 
depressive personality may involve quite different approaches from one 
involving overdependence on peer group opinion. 
Hypotheses, secondly, provide a focus for both knowledge based on 
social science research and ideas, and knowledge based on life or prac-
tice experience. It is perfectly possible, for example, for a practitioner 
to draw upon experience they have had as the aunt of an adolescent 
with similar problems, or indeed, as a person who has experienced the 
angst and problems of teenage years. They might also draw upon their 
experience of family life, as a daughter and perhaps as a mother with 
her own family. Areas of social science knowledge have obvious 
relevance: for example that relating to the sociology and psychology 
of adolescence and the complexities of family life (Rutter, 1979). The 
example is interesting for one area—the oppressive-depressive dimen-
sion to the mother's life—where social science knowledge is likely to 
be particularly significant. It is, of course, possible for the worker to 
draw upon her own experiences as a woman, and those of others she 
knows, to develop awareness of this oppression. However, an assump-
tive world, characterized by traditional role stereotypes, because it 
effectively excludes consideration of non-traditional alternatives, 
renders consideration of these alternatives literally unthinkable. The 
feminist literature, and that specifically linking oppression to depression 
(Oakley, 1975; Scanzoni, 1978; Parry, 1987; Corob, 1987), provides the 
opportunity to make wider sense of the situation, allowing a praxis 
between her experiences as a woman, and those of clients and others 
she knows, and feminist ideas. 
Sensitivity to disconfirming evidence has two dimensions. First, it is 
possible for a practitioner to proceed in a manner which seeks to con-
firm initial impressions or preconceived ideas. This 'verificationism' can 
amount to confirmation of prejudices with potentially disastrous con-
sequences, as in the case of some disclosure interviews with young chil-
dren (see Furniss, 1991) where fears that children may be 'led' into 
inaccurate disclosure of non-existent sexual abuse have been voiced. 
The second relates to evidence, although collected during assessment, 
which, because it contradicts explicit or implicit hypotheses, is ignored. 
While potentially as serious as the first dimension, it is potentially more 
rectifiable. Because contradicting evidence is available the potential 
exists, without examining methods, to question the conclusions reached 
on the basis of available evidence. In the first case disconfirming evid-
ence is not available: all the evidence accumulated is for the purpose 
of confirming particular hypotheses. Only by critical examination of 
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methods of assessment and/or identification of possible relevant areas of 
assessment which have been missed can the misleading and inadequate 
nature of assessment be discovered. 
These instances represent the professional equivalent of 'jumping to 
conclusions'. Interestingly, there is some evidence from the supervisory 
role of social work seniors that a significant task is encouragement of 
adequate assessments (Gadsby-Waters, 1992). Systemized in this way, 
their task is about (a) identifying where evidence contradicts hypo-
theses, (b) identifying potentially relevant areas which have been 
ignored, (c) whether methods used simply confirmed inadequate 
formulations. 
ASSESSMENTS A N D P R A C T I C E W I S D O M 
Practice wisdom may be defined, for our purposes, as the accumulated 
knowledge practitioners are able to bring to the consideration of indi-
vidual cases and their practice in general. This would appear to have 
three main and distinct potential sources: knowledge gained from 
'ever>'day life', derived from the process of living in society and interac-
tion with others; knowledge gained from social science, specifically 
research and ideas; and knowledge gained from the conduct of social 
work practice. This latter involves two elements: knowledge gained 
through assessment and working with a number of cases involving the 
same problem and knowledge gained through work with other problems 
which possess dimensions, the knowledge of which is (potentially) trans-
ferable to the particular problem at hand. These, it should be emphas-
ized, are presented as the main sources of practice wisdom: individuals 
may, for example, make use from lime to time of medical knowledge, 
particularly if working in a health setting. Although all stages of A I 
may be used heuristically to consider practice wisdom, stages 5 and 6, 
concerned with the production of generalizations, appear particularly 
relevant. With A I these generalizations would relate to particular 
classes of cases (e.g. drug addiction), and would be applicable to indi-
vidual instances (cases) within that particular class. 
P R O B L E M B A S E D P R A C T I C E W I S D O M 
We may usefully consider Lindesmith's (1947) example of drug addic-
tion, using A I , because of its obvious relevance for practice. His hypo-
theses concerned the specific circumstances for the creation and main-
tenance of drug addiction; his conclusion that addiction occurs only 
when distress is associated with conscious awareness of its relationship 
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with the absence of drug use. Two issues arise: its usefulness and com-
prehensiveness (as opposed to universality). While these hypotheses 
may be universal, they offer little help to practitioners attempting to end 
the addiction. They can hardly, without medical help, allay withdrawal 
distress, and certainly cannot dispense with conscious awareness of it 
once established (through conventional social work methods). Second, 
the limited scope of the hypotheses means they do not cover a range 
of areas which may be significant for 'kicking the habit'. These could 
include triggering factors such as unemployment, feelings of anomie, 
symbolic meaning of drug taking, peer group pressure and so on (Akers, 
1991; Berridge, 1989; Goldberg and Siollerman, 1986; Dorn and South, 
1985,1987). A l l these may be relevant to the commencement and main-
tenance of drug taking. 
Many of these factors may be frequently, but not universally, present. 
This seems to involve a distinction between universally applicable hypo-
theses, as, for example, claimed by Lindesmith, and hypotheses of lim-
ited generality, relevant to some, but not other cases. For example, not 
all drug addicts are unemployed (and vice versa). The use of crack 
and cocaine in city financial circles indicates drug addiction amongst 
relatively wealthy individuals: here the stresses of the job have been 
considered contributory to drug addiction. This has considerable 
implications. Rather than the progressive elimination of error, which 
A I aspires to, factors are included which are present at some but not 
other times. We may find that anomie is universal to unemployed 
addicts, but not city financiers. This appears to involve a further dimen-
sion: classification within particular problem areas. There is, however, 
a danger of infinite regress here. If we find some, but not all, drug 
addicted city financiers suffer anomie, we would seek to distinguish 
the two by some further associated factor. This kind of continuous 
segmentation is difficult enough for researchers (see e.g. the summar}' 
of Brown's work on depression, Brown, 1986); it is practically imposs-
ible for practitioners. In the pressured world of practice we are more 
likely to occupy the realm of the probabilistic. In developing awareness 
of the kind of circumstances in which particular hypotheses are likely 
to be relevant, we will have distinguished between the applicable and 
non-applicable. In practice, generalization to all cases would an>'\vay 
require a degree of precision not available to the practitioner. They are 
more likely to perceive the lessons of experience in more general terms 
of trends, tendencies and likelihoods. 
In fact there may be less difference between social research and prac-
tice than it appears; the certainty claimed for A I through the progressive 
elimination of error may be illusory. Two criticisms have been made by 
those otherwise impressed with A I (see Robinson, 1952; Turner, 1953; 
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Bulmer, 1979; Silverman, 1985). A I tries to create a 'closed system' by 
identifying factors always present with phenomenon P, but never with-
out it. However, multiple factors (e.g. family integration) also associ-
ated, but variantly, with the phenomenon will not be part of the closed 
system. They will neither be assimilated in the system nor have a uni-
form effect, and are, relative to the closed system, intrusive factors. 
Any prediction must, therefore, be probabilistic. Second, A I aims to 
identify, with certainty, conditions universally accompanying some phe-
nomenon. This, however, implies prediction, which has been refuted 
by both Hume (1975) and Popper (1963). Put simply, this means that 
no amount of observations confirming the association between some 
phenomenon and certain conditions can *prove' an association between 
them, because at any time in the future an observation may occur which 
falsifies this association. It may, therefore, be useful to distinguish 
between practical certainty, as espoused by Sutherland (1939), and 
absolute certainty. Knowledge is necessarily provisional: at any point 
in the future an observation may occur which falsifies an association 
between some phenomenon and its associated conditions. 
For social work, if we stick to our general principle of attempting, as 
far as possible, to eliminate error, then its probabilistic equivalent is 
choosing hypotheses which are least likely to be wrong. This would apply 
to individual case assessment as well as the development of practice 
wisdom. This entails, in any particular case, first, identification of fac-
tors least likely to be absent and second, an appropriately sceptical 
attitude to those we use, as described in the previous section. The 
dangers of verificationism in individual cases are writ large with practice 
wisdom. The process of confirming preconceived ideas can be cumulat-
ive and self-reinforcing: practice wisdom is brought to the case; that 
case 'demonstrates' a particular hypothesis; the evidence from the case 
reinforces the already established practice wisdom. A potential example 
of this is the schizophrenegenic mother, generating schizophrenia 
through a 'double bind' (Bateson et al., 1956). This idea gained currency 
in practice circles, yet research has shown no evidence of its aetiological 
significance (Rinquette and Kennedy, 1966; Haley, 1968). 
P R A C T I C E W I S D O M A N D T R A N S F E R A B L E K N O W L E D G E 
We have, therefore, the probabilistic equivalent of universally applic-
able hypotheses, a distinction between general and limited hypotheses 
and a principle of least likelihood of error. A second form of practice 
wisdom is generic/transferable practice wisdom. This occurs when the 
definition of the problem in separate cases is quite different, for 
example unemployment and bereavement, but knowledge may be 
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transferred across them. This combination of (surface) difference with 
(below surface) similarity marks out generic knowledge. The key is the 
'below surface' similarity between cases. For example, a 50 year-old 
man made redundant and an elderly bereaved woman, whose overt 
problems are different (unemployment and bereavement) may both 
have feelings of loss and possibly depression. In this case the rather 
obvious example is loss. I f , indeed, both unemployed man and bereaved 
elderly woman suffer depression at least three 'layers' exist: unemploy-
ment/bereavement; loss; depression. Generic concepts, however, have 
limited universality of a type different from that described earlier. They 
facilitate the transference of knowledge across apparently different situ-
ations, but the knowledge as applied to one situation, is not completely 
transferable to another. The 50 year-old redundant man may feel loss 
and depression (Warr and Jackson, 1985), but this may be lifted if he 
is immediately offered a new job. Having lost her husband, however, 
the elderly woman is unlikely to recover if someone immediately asks 
her to marry him (Argyle and Henderson, 1985). Unless her relation-
ship was badly damaged, a grieving process would normally separate 
actual loss from the capacity to begin a new relationship. Only when 
this has occurred is she likely to feel able genuinely to enter a new 
relationship (Marris, 1974). 
P R A C T I C E F O L K L O R E A N D S O C I A L R E S E A R C H 
P R A C T I C E W I S D O M A N D S O C I A L R E S E A R C H : S O M E D I F F E R E N C E S 
Practice wisdom, therefore, is optimally developed through a retroduc-
tive process of hypothesis testing and reflection, involving an approach 
to evidence which is sceptical, and a principle of adopting hypotheses 
which are least likely to be wrong. The quality of practice wisdom— 
indeed the extent to which practice experience may allow the develop-
ment of practice wisdom —is, it is being suggested, dependent to a con-
siderable degree on the extent to which a practitioner's work is charac-
terized by these particular qualities. It is in how this process is 
accomplished that social work most clearly differs from social research. 
Knowledge based on social research, first, develops through reports and 
publication. Much of the learning which goes on in practice occurs 
without recourse to writing reports. Practitioners may engage in indi-
vidual reflection on particular cases, or engage colleagues in discussions. 
Where they do write, it may simply involve case recording. Where 
social workers do write practice reports, such as social enquiry reports 
(Hardiker, 1975; Curnock and Hardiker, 1979), they are unlikely to 
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write them in a way that makes explicit practice learning by hypotheses 
testing. Reports are not written primarily for the purpose of developing 
knowledge of specific phenomena (say, drug addiction) but to provide 
information of a particular client or case. The writing of the practi-
tioner's report is generally case focused; that of the researcher generally 
phenomena focused. There is a sense in which knowledge accumulation 
is a byproduct of this assessment process. 
Much of the practice wisdom developed by workers is not written down 
or chronicled. The result of this is a tendency towards 'personalized know-
ledge' or 'practice folklore'. This is knowledge which is known to the indi-
vidual alone rather than generally available (through perhaps books) or 
knowledge which is passed round primarily by word of mouth, becoming, 
through this, accepted canons of practice amongst those party to this 
knowledge. This contrasts with report writing, particularly published 
work in social science, whose primary purpose in the presentation and 
development of knowledge of specific phenomena. Popper (1972) dis-
cusses the process through which research and ideas take on a life of their 
own: they exist separate from their author and are available to wider audi-
ences than those with immediate access to the author. Without this wider 
access, therefore, practice wisdom is much more subject to the vagueness 
of memory and recall. Although there may be some separation of ideas 
from practitioners, where for example discussed within teams, this is lim-
ited compared with social research. Knowledge is, furthermore, less 
likely to be developed systematically. The social worker may, without the 
opportunity (perhaps inclination) to write down their learning, be unable 
to identify what makes two apparently similar situations sufficiently dif-
ferent for different hypotheses to apply. This would reflect both the limits 
to classification identified earlier and also, perhaps, a limit to the degree 
of precision which may be achieved when not relying mainly on docu-
mentation whose primar)' purpose is the development of knowledge 
about the phenomena, a major aspect of which is precise, accurate identi-
fication of relevant variables, which may be subsequently built upon. 
T H E ' P R A C T I C E C O M M U N I T Y ' 
A further dimension of practice folklore shows both similarity with and 
difference from development in social research. There is a 'practice 
community' which occupies a roughly equivalent role to that of the 
'academic community'. Both have tasks of exploration and checking 
validity. Exploration may occur where a practitioner, facing the prob-
lem of 'making sense' of a situation, or deciding on appropriate inter-
vention, engages others to consider alternatives. Is this parent really 
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telling the truth about the accidental nature of their child's injuries? 
W^at are the kinds of things we should look for in order to minimize 
the possibility of error in making assessments? Are there any aspects 
of the case allowing us to establish matters beyond reasonable doubt? 
Formally, this is one aspect of supervision, but it may occur informally 
with colleagues. 
Checking validity may occur at the same time as exploration: how 
far are my initial conclusions justifiable in view of the evidence pre-
sented? is there any falsifying evidence? are there alternative explana-
tions? and so on. The process of checking validity may be more or less 
systematic, its quality depending on the critical faculties of those 
engaged in the debate, and their practice wisdom. This process is, very 
broadly, similar to the process of scrutiny in academic research: 
the research community plays (or should play) a crucial role in checking the 
validity of findings of particular studies. This process is at the heart of the 
justification of research as a source of knowledge . . . [which] rests on the claim 
that research based knowledge is less likely to be in error than information 
from other sources because it is subjected to scrutiny in terms of higher levels 
of routine scepticism [my italics] than is common outside the academic commun-
ity . . . it is this rather than any appeal to a concept of brute data . . . that is 
the major rationale for the intellectual authority of research (Hammersley, 
1992, p. 91). 
This emphasis on routine scepticism, evident in our examination of case 
analysis, is also involved in this concept of 'practice community'. To 
develop this however, within a practice community, it is necessary for 
individual practitioners to develop appropriate scepticism in their work. 
If research is superior to other sources of knowledge because this scepti-
cism is allied to peer scrutiny—research is facilitated in this respect by 
explicit reporting of methodology, results, and frequently assumptions 
underlying studies—then the adoption of its basic processes by practi-
tioners may be expected to leave practice and practice wisdom more 
systematic and less likely to be in error. 
The nature of practice is such, however, that there are, perhaps inev-
itably, differences from peer moderation of social research. The 'folk-
lore* nature of practice wisdom means that it is liable to be more idio-
syncratic and team based rather than available to the whole practice 
community (as an equivalent to academic community). Any 'practice 
community' is more parochial and based around teams. Insights gen-
eralizable more widely to practice are rarely written down and almost 
never widely disseminated. It is liable, therefore, to be subject to more 
ad hoc and informal means for evaluation than social research. 
The quality of 'practice community' wisdom is dependent on the qual-
ity of practitioners constituent of the community. This quality might be 
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called critical awareness, entailing the capacity to hypothesize, to be 
imaginative in developing the range of hypotheses and to subject these 
to critical assessment (i.e. reject those most likely to be in error). Such 
critical awareness distinguishes mere experience from its intelligent use. 
It is possible for someone to have five years' experience and learned 
little, and for another to have had one and learned much. This interest-
ingly identifies a problem amongst those whose experience is not 
marked by its intelligent use; that the very lack of critical awareness 
leaves them less able to judge the quality of, and limits to, their practice 
wisdom. J. S. Mi l l comments that it is better to be a Socrates dissatisfied 
than a fool satisfied, precisely, because of the more developed intellec-
tual faculties of the former. Where a dispute exits ' i f the fool . . . [is] 
of a different opinion, it is because they only know their side of the 
question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides' (Mil l , 
1972, p. 9). We may conjecture that these practitioners will be charac-
terized by a greater rigidity in explaining matters, a tendency to transfer 
explanations from different, though apparently similar situations to 
another; a lack of consideration of alternatives in different cases; and 
possibly a downgrading of social science knowledge as a useful source 
for alternative hypotheses. 
This has implications for team processes. It suggests three aspects of 
the 'ideal' team: practitioners who are characterized by their critical 
awareness; clear opportunities for informal discussion of case assess-
ment and management, together with willingness among team members 
to engage in this; clear opportunities for supervision or consultation 
with those who have a greater fund of practice wisdom. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The switch from a relationship between social science and social work 
which emphasizes its product to one which emphasizes processes of 
social research presents a potentially fruitful way to proceed. There is 
a rigidity about this relationship when primarily emphasizing product: 
relevant knowledge is either available or it is not. Indeed such a rela-
tionship understates the developmental and essentially provisional 
nature of our knowledge of the world. Furthermore the degree to which 
it is precisely applicable in any particular instance may be problematic. 
Howe (1980) has commented that social science is i l l suited to a social 
work approach whereby our knowledge base can tell us with some cer-
tainty that if problem A is present, and approach B is applied, C will 
be the outcome. This presents social work with a relationship with its 
knowledge base analogous to that existing (or believed to exist) in 
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medicine, one which is impossible to sustain once we enter the real 
world of social work practice. 
This does not entail entirely discarding the product of social science. 
There may be circumstances in which social research provides reason-
ably solid foundations for practice. Any practitioner wishing to target 
high risk groups for maternal depression for preventive purposes would 
be considerably aided by the research of Brown and his colleagues 
(Brown and Harris, 1978; Sheppard, 1990). Likewise, ideas from social 
science, many have argued (e.g. Howe, 1987; Hardiker, 1981) provide 
ways of thinking about practice which can be helpful to social workers, 
particularly when grappling with complex situations. Indeed, these 
three areas—social ideas, the results of social research and the process 
of social research—appear to represent the different ways in which 
social science may inform practice. 
The emphasis on systemizing practice wisdom, none the less, reflects 
less optimism about the application of research findings than is evident 
in some quarters (MacDonald et aL, 1992), drawing, as it does, on the 
traditions of qualitative sociological methodology rather than the more 
positivist scientific tradition (Smith, 1987). It is important to appreciate 
that we are not confronted with a stark choice of applied research find-
ings, which may appear of limited use, and poorly formulated practice 
prescriptions. Practice wisdom should be just that, not practice 
prejudice. 
The emphasis on choosing the alternative least likely to be wrong 
may be considered by some to represent an overcautious approach. 
However, given the tremendous responsibilities of social workers, and 
the appalling consequences at times of getting things wrong, as is 
evident from child deaths where social workers were involved, such 
apparent caution may not be misplaced. Indeed, where the 'product* 
knowledge foundations are so uncertain, an emphasis on avoiding error 
appears quite appropriate. Furthermore, the dangers of verificationism 
are real enough. Festinger (1957) showed some time ago that if we are 
not disposed to identify with something, we are able, mentally, to dis-
card it without any nagging concern over inconsistency. However, 
avoidance of error represents only one aspect of the approach. In gener-
ating and testing alternative hypotheses in any particular case, it 
emphasizes equally strongly the imaginative qualities of social workers. 
The generation of hypotheses and a sceptical approach also emphasizes 
precision and rigour. Social work characterized by flexibility, imagina-
tion and rigour represents a target to which practitioners may reason-
ably aspire. 
This represents, however, a more deliberate approach to social work 
than that identified by England (1986). England emphasizes the ordin-
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ariness of social work practice, that is that social workers are largely 
using their common sense, perhaps refined by training and experience, 
to make sense of situations. With this, in certain respects, though not 
in those identified by England, we may agree. Social workers, it seems, 
are involved in using the methodology of everyday life. However, his 
emphasis on hunch or intuition, on the importance of immediate judge-
ments, considerably underrates the importance of the more cognitive 
and deliberative aspects of practice. Indeed, even in relation to every-
day life, England's approach appears flawed: if we were simply spontan-
eous, acting immediately and intuitively, we would considerably 
increase the likelihood of ^jumping to conclusions'. In practice this may 
increase the likelihood and dangers of verificationism. It is surely not 
enough to say *it felt right' or ' I just knew that was how they felt' 
(England, 1986, p. 32). In fact, if a hunch is presented as an hypothesis, 
this intuitive dimension represents only the first stage of an essentially 
retroductive process characterizing good practice. Whatever the social 
worker *felt' (and this may be a poor use of language as 'thought' may 
frequently be a better verb), to leave matters at that would appear to 
entail adopting a very cavalier attitude to the possibility that their initial 
impressions might just be wrong. 
The approaches advocated by Sheldon and others (e.g. Hoghughi, 
1980) to the accumulation of knowledge appear also to be unrealistic. 
It appears unlikely, even were their approaches to be adopted immedi-
ately, that social workers could dispense with large areas of practice 
wisdom as the primary means for negotiating difficult and complex situ-
ations. However, rather, than simply comparing unfavourably practice 
approaches to evaluating the validity of findings with those of social 
research, we might better spend our lime systemizing and developing 
these practice approaches more rigorously. In this respect we might find 
some common ground with Sheldon. For there is a great emphasis on 
hypothesis development and falsification, although this is undertaken 
within a retroductive rather than hypothelico-deduclive framework. It 
is by informing practice with social research processes that greater sys-
temization may occur. 
In their discussion on professions, Jamous and Peloille (1970) refer 
to the technicality-indetermination ratio. Technicality refers to methods 
which may be transmitted and mastered in terms of rules and indeter-
mination refers to those which cannot and emphasize the individual 
qualities—virtualities—of the practitioners. A profession, like medi-
cine, they think, is able to maintain and extend its control over certain 
crucial areas of life —health and illness—because of its success in main-
taining a particular combination of technicality and indetermination in 
their conduct of practice. Where professional action is entirely governed 
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by rules, it is possible for practitioners to adopt roles which are generally 
routine with little discretion left to the practitioner. Where a profession 
operated in an area characterized predominantly by indeterminacy, 
there would be few rules, indicating minimal guide for practice. Medi-
cine's success lies in the combination of rules, derived from a particular 
knowledge base and which emphasizes the need for professional train-
ing, and indeterminacy, which emphasizes the need for personal and 
good judgement in individual instances. Hence, Friedson (1970) sug-
gests, medicine values the qualities of individuals who practise, 
resulting, he thinks, in a tendency to overemphasize the indeterminacy 
of phenomena with which they deal. *Real medicine' is to be learned 
at the patent's bedside, through actual experience (Atkinson, 1977). 
The trick, for any profession, is to avoid too high a degree of inde-
termination, which suggests little need for a general knowledge base, 
and hence education and training, at the same time avoiding too great 
an emphasis on technicality, which results in programmed responses, 
and the possibility of control by outsiders to the profession, such as 
managers (Weeks, 1980). The bureaucratic nature of the social work 
setting, together with the difficulty social workers experience at times 
in exercising control over the problems with which it is their function 
to deal, generates a constant pressure for their tasks to be routinized, 
through for example departmental procedures, entailing greater mana-
gerial control (Howe, 1986). The developments in care management 
and provision offer just such an opportunity for routinization of work 
and extension of managerial control. They raise questions about the 
unique usefulness of social work skills in relation to some client groups 
or tasks and the possibility that at least some areas formerly the domain 
of social work practice need not be performed by social workers. The 
development of entirely structured assessment forms (for example the 
Core Assessment Schedule of Devon Social Services), derived from an 
obscure, if any, knowledge base, and which require minimal training 
for use, and the employment of unqualified workers to carry out these 
assessment tasks, indicate the extent to which routinization and mana-
gerialism are developing. 
The extent to which individual areas or aspects of practice require 
specific social work knowledge or skills can only be settled by reference 
to those particular aspects of practice. However, this can only be under-
taken in the light of the particular characteristics of social work know-
ledge and practice. The social worker characterized by critical 
awareness is one who requires high levels of training enabling them to 
think clearly in often complex situations. They require imagination and 
rigour enabling them to respond reflexively to frequently uncertain situ-
ations. Being trained in this way for reflexivity, emphasizing process. 
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entails the development of virtualities in practitioners: it is the quality 
of critical awareness which is developed, and the nature of the situations 
which are their concern, which limit the extent to which routinization 
can characterize practice. Social work can only be adequately defended, 
and focus on the areas for which social work is required, if it is clear 
about the particular qualities its practitioners bring to situations. By the 
same token, however, the application of routinized methods to situ-
ations which are non-routine can involve 'fitting' clients into precon-
ceived categories, without the flexibility to explore their particular 
circumstances. Such an approach can hardly be considered to be in the 
client's interests, appearing more service than needs led (however this 
is defined). A clear appreciation of the need amongst social workers 
for critical awareness is more likely to lead to realistic appraisal of 
social work and its contribution, while limiting the extent to which 
inappropriate routinization of tasks takes place. 
There are, furthermore, implications for social work education. The 
emphasis on the need for the development of critical awareness—high 
level cognitive skills—is arguably associated with education rather than 
just training. It is appropriate that the traditional virtues of higher edu-
cation, emphasizing rigour and imagination, which characterize pure as 
well as applied subjects, should be highly prized by social work. The 
tendency towards anti-intellectualism in practice noted by, for example, 
Sheldon (1979) and Carew (1979), is potentially very destructive in this 
respect. The nature of these skills, furthermore, helps explain why they 
are difficult to identify and why social science has often been considered 
relatively marginal to practice. I f constant emphasis is made on a social 
science-social work relationship which concentrates on product, then 
we are looking, at least some of the time, in the wrong place for our 
knowledge base. 
There exists, furthermore, in some quarters (Sibeon, 1990) a suspi-
cion that there is less commitment to these aspects of social work learn-
ing emphasizing rigour, imagination and scepticism in the Dip.S.W. 
curriculum than might be desirable. Despite the advance represented 
by a minimum of two years in higher education to achieve a qualifica-
tion, we may question whether this is sufficient adequately to develop 
critical awareness. Social work, it is arguable, should as a minimum be 
a degree level subject, not only because of the applied ^product' nature 
of its knowledge base, but because also of its 'process' nature. It is, 
paradoxically, because of the limits to the 'product' knowledge avail-
able—the kind of knowledge which justifies long and high level training 
for traditional professions such as medicine—that a long training is 
required for social work. However, a particularly strong focus, in this 
case, would be required on the processes of rigorous knowledge 
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accumulation. It may well be that, in developing the systematic practi-
tioner, we can learn from focusing, in the curriculum, on the processes 
of social research. The quality of imagination, the capacity for rigour 
and the ability to question both your conclusions and the way you go 
about reaching them would appear to be qualities which should be 
required of social workers even at basic qualifying levels. 
Social work has at times appeared less than convincing in identifying 
a clear and distinct knowledge base, and has seemed to many to be an 
activity which any reasonably competent person might carry out. It 
is, perhaps, more than ever important to identify clearly the kinds of 
knowledge and virtualities required for social work. This essay is pre-
sented as a contribution to this process. 
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